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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is a comprehensive guide to the current interpretation of the 
principle of good faith in the lex mercatoria. It sets out the full background to this 
interpretation, exploring the development of good faith in major legal cultures in the 
Western world and in arbitral practice. 
 Modern lex mercatoria is one of the most conspicuous manifestations of 
globalization in the field of law. Previous examples of global law are the Roman ius 
gentium and the medieval law merchant. The principle of good faith has been 
fundamental in all these manifestations. The thrust of this thesis represents an 
investigation of the reasons for the essential role of good faith in universal contexts, 
and in particular, its meaning in the lex mercatoria.  
It is argued here that national laws have been influential on the meaning of 
good faith in the current lex mercatoria. Hence, four major legal systems in the civil 
and the common law areas are studied: German, French, US and English. 
Nonetheless, other national systems are also mentioned throughout the thesis. This 
analysis will reveal the fundamental dynamism of the concept of good faith. 
This thesis challenges the traditional view of good faith as a moral and 
subjective concept, impractical and difficult to assess. It will show that an objective 
notion of good faith is vigorous in international commerce nowadays. 
This thesis explains that good faith in the lex mercatoria is interpreted as 
cooperation of the parties to a commercial contract. This notion fits the experience of 
global trade today. This theory will be verified through an analysis of: comparative 
legal history, sociological, philosophical and political theories, international 
instruments embracing the lex mercatoria and also through cases from national 
courts and international arbitration.  
This comprehensive study will serve as a context for future investigations on 
ancillary duties that emanate from good faith and on the principle of good faith in 
specific stages of the contractual iter, such as re-negotiation of the agreement. It will 
contribute to the harmonization and unification of law in different regions of the world 
and also to global projects containing the language of good faith. Likewise, it will be 
useful for traders and practitioners, especially arbitrators dealing with good faith in 
international disputes between merchants. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
It is said in the current climate of flourishing cross-border trade that 
divergences between national contract laws feature among those barriers 
which prevent the market from delivering its full potential. For this reason, the 
harmonization of contract laws is currently pursued in different regions of the 
world1 and also – with the same aim – it is proposed here that the lex 
mercatoria is being developed through contract practice, through regulations 
of self-governing associations of traders and is applied by arbitral tribunals.2  
This thesis surveys a core principle of the lex mercatoria – good faith – 
which has been called ‘The law of good faith’3 because of its presence in 
many institutions of private law (good faith is also a well-established principle 
of public international law). For example, good faith has been applied to 
contract law, inheritance law, company law, bankruptcy law and property law. 
In some jurisdictions, such as Quebec and Switzerland, the civil codes contain 
a general statement as regards this principle: ‘Each person’s rights shall be 
applied according to good faith’.4 The wide reach of this principle in an 
unwritten system, such as the lex mercatoria, implies the possibility of 
different interpretations by practitioners and arbitral tribunals. This could, 
however, lead to injustice, as the grievances of merchants could be dealt with 
in differing ways. The considerable scope of this principle might also lead 
professionals to dismiss the applicability of the lex mercatoria as an 
alternative to regulate the contract. This study will contribute to the current 
debate by establishing the meaning of good faith within this transnational legal 
system. 
However, the discussions on good faith are not reserved to the lex 
mercatoria. Despite the fact that the principle is generally recognized in 
national laws from the civil law area and also in the commercial law of the US 
                                               
1 For example, OHADA in Africa; OHADAC in the Caribbean; and CIDIP in the American 
region. See the analysis of these attempts of harmonization in Chapter Four, Sections 4.5 and 
4.6. 
2 See Sub-section 1.1.1 of this chapter. 
3 S Jackson, ‘Good Faith in Construction – Will It Make a Difference and Is It Worth the 
Trouble?’ (2007) 23 Const.L.J. 420 
4 Article 6 of the Quebec Civil Code and article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code. 
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and in international instruments,5 there are still suspicions in professional 
circles about the meaning and reach of this general clause. For example, 
there is an ongoing theoretical debate on the acceptance of good faith in a 
number of common law jurisdictions,6 and also on the meaning of good faith 
and on other major issues related to it in the US law.7 Therefore, although the 
national perspective has been tackled by scholarship,8 it is considered in this 
thesis in its relation to the meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria.  
The core of this investigation, i.e., the examination of good faith in the 
lex mercatoria will be pursued through the analysis of international 
instruments representative of the lex mercatoria (Chapter Four) and of arbitral 
awards applying the lex mercatoria (Chapter Five). However, due to the 
arguable nature of the field in which this research is developed, the following 
sub-section undertakes an analysis of the literature on the existence, content 
and applicability of the lex mercatoria.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 In this notion are included non-legislative means of harmonization of law, such as 
UNIDROIT Principles and PECL. 
6 See the opinion of Justice Priestly in a decision by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales 
12 March 1992: <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920312a2.html> accessed 30 April 2011. 
This opinion is mentioned in this thesis in Chapter Four, n 5 and accompanying text. See also 
United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 
(3 July 2009) <www.austlii.edu.au> accessed 30 April 2011. This judgement upholds a 
favourable view about the enforceability of agreements to negotiate in good faith. 
7 There are three major theories about the meaning of good faith in the UCC postulated by: 
Summers, Farnsworth and Burton. See the analysis of these theories in Chapter Two, Section 
2.5.1. The discussion over the replacement of the doctrine of consideration by good faith has 
generated stirring interest. See, inter alia, J Gordley, An American Perspective on the Unidroit 
Principles (Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Roma 1996). 
8 See Section 1.7 of this chapter. 
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1.1.1 LEX MERCATORIA 
 
1.1.1.1 CONTEXT 
 
The great impulse that international commerce has had in the last 
decades is evident. Numerous factors have influenced this dynamism: inter 
alia, the development of quicker and safer transport systems for goods, the 
development of technology that allows producers to offer services far away 
from the final receiver9 and the establishment of economic and political 
systems that welcome international commercial exchange.10 Commerce today 
is international by definition. Besides, informal electronic transactions are 
taking the place of vis-à-vis contracts, requiring responses from the law 
according to the new way of trading internationally.  
The globalization of commerce has determined a process of global law 
creation.11 Further to the international exchange of goods and services as the 
economic foundations of the lex mercatoria, Schmidt-Trenz holds that 
international trade is something similar to the original state described by 
Hobbes, that is, a chaos because of the absence of a centralized state power. 
Such a situation can be overcome by private agreements that allow the 
equilibrium and confidence in the fulfilment of assumed obligations. The 
author calls this ‘co-operation in the absence of government’.12  
                                               
9 A fundamental technology advance is internet. See Gautrais and others in ‘Droit du 
Commerce Électronique et Normes Applicables: La Notion de Lex Mercatoria’ (1997) Revue 
de Droit des Affaires Internationales 547, 568. Gautrais notes that, ‘The experts in the 
business community, on the internet or elsewhere, forget that the convention thus formed is a 
juridical act. The trivial nature of the exchange, the moderateness of the engagement and the 
user-friendliness of the communication, are removing the sacred aura surrounding the 
operation’. 
10 Countries with governments from the entire political spectrum form part of major regional 
economic organizations such as: EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA. See F Di Mauro, S Dees and 
W McKibbin (eds), Globalisation, Regionalism and Economic Interdependence (CUP, 
Cambridge 2008). 
11 P Le Goff in ‘Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the Process of 
Globalization’ (2007) 14 Ind.J.Global Legal Stud. 119, distinguishes lex mercatoria from the 
global law, regarding the former as one of the key elements of the latter. On the need for 
global law, see R Domingo, The New Global Law (CUP, Cambridge 2010) 98. 
12 See Schmidt-Trenz’s ideas in J Basedow, ‘Lex Mercatoria e Diritto Internazionale Privato 
dei Contratti: Una prospettiva Economica’ in G Venturini and S Bariatti (eds), New 
Instruments of Private International Law. Liber Fausto Pocar. Vol. II (Giufffrè, Milano 2009). 
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Hence, the present stage of good faith in international transactions is 
determined by the momentum of the lex mercatoria.13 The purpose of this 
section is to describe this legal phenomenon. Besides the descriptive 
approach, a normative perspective is also assumed, as this study will not 
remain neutral on the existence and advantages of the lex mercatoria.14  
As a matter of fact, many times differences between national legal 
systems – which were made for internal purposes – hinder the negotiation and 
the solution of disputes related to transnational commercial operations. Many 
attempts have been made by states to solve this through conventions that 
seek to harmonise the law in particular areas, e.g. international sales of goods 
or bills of exchange.15 However, these kinds of regulations are always 
insufficient and do not reach the goal of uniform criteria due to the 
unwillingness of states to concede on the many aspects that they consider to 
represent their legal culture or national interests. The commissions usually 
come across with compromising formulae – as the one contained in article 7 
of the Vienna Sales Convention as regards good faith16 – which did not solve 
concrete issues of trade.  
As a result, the ‘practical law’ of economic operators – made by 
practices, usages and standard contracts – has started to regulate trading 
relationships, thus reviving the lex mercatoria. For example, the lex mercatoria 
is enshrined nowadays in international principles, conventions and general 
terms as INCOTERMS.17 However, these manifestations do not exhaust the 
lex mercatoria, whose main sources are the custom and practices of the 
                                               
13 It is worth pointing out that this study is unavoidable for someone wanting to know the 
significance of good faith in international commerce in our day. At the same time, someone 
wanting to study the lex mercatoria cannot avoid referring to good faith, since this is one of 
the inspiring principles of the lex mercatoria: ‘Lex mercatoria requires that contracts are 
performed in good faith’ ICC award n. 5904 (1989) 115 JDI 1107. Original in French.  
14 However, renowned authors do not take sides. See, inter alia, U Draetta, R Lake and V 
Nanda, Breach and Adaptation of International Contracts. An Introduction to Lex Mercatoria 
(Butterworth, Salem 1992) 3: ‘Although we are neutral as to the theoretical existence of the 
lex mercatoria…’ 
15 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods CISG; 
and 1988 United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes.  
16 See Chapter Four, section 4.1. 
17 Certain terms have been in INCOTERMS for a long time (first version 1936) while others 
have to settle down and establish as usages, therefore, in the terms of Goode, they are 
‘evidence of existing usage or a fashioner of new usage’. R Goode, ‘Usage and its Reception 
in Transnational Commercial Law’ (1997) 46 Int’l & Comp.L.Q. 1, 26. 
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mercantile, shipping and insurance enterprises of all countries. Normally, the 
general practices and usages of particular sectors of commerce have been 
acknowledged by professional organizations of traders and included in model 
contract forms and general conditions. For example, in the construction 
industry the Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs Conseils (FIDIC) has 
adopted a number of model contract forms;18 this has also been done in 
Britain with the contract forms of the Grain and Feed Trade Association 
(GAFTA) and those of the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations 
(FOSFA).19 Other professional organizations of commodities traders also 
have adopted standard contracts and other forms of standard law making.20  
These limited examples show that the lex mercatoria tends to evolve and 
adapt according to different contexts of business and regions. As a result, the 
general term lex mercatoria has become lex maritima,21 lex petrolea,22 lex 
electronica23 and lex constructionis,24 according to the particular sector in 
which it is applied.  
 
                                               
18 See R Knutson and W Abraham, FIDIC: An Analysis of International Construction Contracts 
(Kluwer, The Hague 2005). 
The importance of the FIDIC conditions of contracts has been enhanced by the issuance of 
the new World Bank guidelines for procurement, which are incorporated in the Bank’s loan 
agreements with its borrowers, who must use its Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs), based 
upon the FIDIC form of contract conditions (the Red Book). See Guidelines: Procurement 
under International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Loans and International 
Development Agency Credits of May 2004 (revised October 2006) 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMD
K:20060840~pagePK:84269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266,00.html>  
accessed 19 February 2010. 
19 A request was made to FOSFA for an example of these standard form contracts. This was 
refused. Statement by Anna Baran on behalf of FOSFA’s Chief Executive (Personal email 
correspondence 4 March 2011). 
20 See F De Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria (TMC Asser Instituut, North-
Holland 1992) 188.  
21 See W Tetley, ‘The General Maritime Law – The Lex Maritima’ (1994) 20 Syracusa J.Int’l L. 
& Com. 105. 
22 See D Bishop, ‘International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a “Lex 
Petrolea”’ The Centre for Energy, Petroleum, Mineral Law and Policy Volume 2-3 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol2/vol2-3.html> accessed 17 February 2010. 
In this article the author reports several arbitral cases in which principles emanating from the 
world-wide custom and practice in the oil business have been applied.  
23 See F Marella and C S Yoo, ‘Is Open Source Software the New Lex Mercatoria?’ (2007) 
UC Berkeley: Berkeley Center for Law and Technology  
<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0467105j> accessed 17 February 2010. See on the 
importance of the custom in cyberspace and, particularly, on the role of usages in the lex 
electronica: Gautrais and others (n 1). 
24 C Molineaux, ‘Moving Toward a Construction Lex Mercatoria, A Lex Constructionis’ (1997) 
14 J.Int’l Arb. 55. 
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1.1.1.2 THE ADVENT AND THE REVIVAL 
 
During the Middle Ages the lex mercatoria appeared as a body of 
international customary rules governing the cosmopolitan community of 
merchants who travelled all around Europe. This law was produced by an 
autonomous merchant class in order to regulate its own affairs without 
reference to the law of the land and/or to coercion.25  
Röder, who supports the idea of a medieval law merchant, claims, 
however, that ‘theories on the unbroken connection between the old lex 
mercatoria and the new transnational business law of the twentieth century 
must be contested. Perhaps the principal objection lies in the differences 
between the legal sources’.26 Such an objection should be welcomed if the 
limited reach of the old law merchant governing the transactions of solely 
European traders is considered.27 However, it must be remembered that 
European traders exported their ideas to their new empires and beyond as 
they dominated trade until recent times.  
What is important for the purpose of this thesis is to know, firstly, 
whether customs and practices of merchants were, in fact, applied as distinct 
from the law of the town. Secondly, it is also important to establish if there was 
uniformity on underlying principles, especially on good faith. Could good faith 
be considered a principle of the medieval lex mercatoria? 
As regards the first aspect, it is worth recalling the thinking of Mitchell 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, who agreed that the law merchant, 
in fact, was vague and indefinite, but in spite of its vagueness the law 
merchant existed: ‘In every commercial country in Europe there were rules 
and legal doctrines for merchants and mercantile transactions that were 
                                               
25 See H J Berman, Law and Revolution. The Formation of Western Legal Tradition (Harvard 
University Press, London 1983) 339-356. 
26 T Röder, ‘The Roots of the “New Law Merchant”: How the International Standardization of 
Contracts and Clauses Changed Business Law’ 
 <http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/0610roeder.htm> accessed 23 December 2008 
27 O Volckart and A Mangels in ‘Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval? 
(1999) 65 Southern Economic Journal 427 postulate the non-universal feature of the medieval 
lex mercatoria. Furthermore, Sachs, returning to the original sources – especially the court 
rolls of the fair of St. Ives, the most extensive surviving records of the period – demonstrates 
that merchants in medieval England were substantially subject to local control. See S Sachs, 
‘From St Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval “Law Merchant”’ (2006) 
21 Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 685; and A Cordes, ‘The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria’ (2003) 
Oxford U Comparative L Forum <http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml> text after n 
26, accessed 24 May 2011. 
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regarded alike by merchants and by jurists as distinct from the common law of 
the land’.28 
The ‘law merchant’ of medieval times was the system of rules actually 
enforced in the commercial courts and actually observed by merchants in their 
dealings. This lex mercatoria is regarded as having possessed certain 
uniformity in its essential features; first of all, it was mainly based on custom. 
In spite of the luxury of formulae that many agreements had during the Middle 
Ages, both Church and mercantile usage laid stress upon the binding force of 
a verbal promise.29 Only for the sake of evidence and, to prevent 
misunderstandings, contracts were generally committed to writing. Under the 
influence of the notaries a uniform legal phraseology – stylus mercatorum – 
was introduced into the commercial documents of Southern Europe, and this 
uniformity of language did much to fix and generalize mercantile customs.  
In England, particularly, the Bristol Treatise on the lex mercatoria 
shows clearly that the force of custom was recognised. It is possible to read 
therein ‘Set apponitur adhuc le affidavit propter antiquam consuetudinem’.30  
As regards the second aspect, that is, whether there was uniformity on 
underlying principles, good faith and the lex mercatoria were utterly united 
during this period in which Western mercantile law assumed the character of 
an integrated system of principles, concepts, rules and procedures. The 
principle of good faith already present in all legal systems of the time was 
adapted to the special needs of the mercantile community, i.e., to the system 
of commercial credit, which was invented in this period, and to the business 
associations of that time: commenda31, compagnia32 and various other forms 
                                               
28 W Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (CUP, Cambridge 1904) 8-
9. 
29 Mitchell indicates that, ‘The idea of good faith, an idea urged by the Church and supported 
by the merchants, did more than create a rule protecting the honest purcharser in market and 
fair. Slowly it undermined the Roman and Germanic principle that in general formless 
contracts are not binding”. Ibid 102. ‘In the 14th century the validity of nuda pacta in 
commercial transactions was recognised in Italy by mercantile usage, and it seems probable 
that in commercial and local courts they were recognised in England’. Ibid 105. 
30 It is a call to apply the old custom. The Little Red Book of Bristol, vol. I. c. 4, p. 60. 
31 Commenda is a contract whereby one partner of a joint venture travels over sea and trades 
the common goods while the other stays at home and is involved only as an investor. Source: 
A Cordes, ‘The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria’ (2003) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 
<http://ouclf.iuscomp.org> text after n. 41 accessed 28 April 2011. 
32 Medieval compagnie were associations of merchants, ship-owners, owners of productive 
activities and bankers who traded goods. Generally, a wealthy family was in charge. They had 
also a network of agencies and subsidiaries in Europe and in the Middle East. The height of 
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of commercial partnership.33 Good faith was reflected in all these agreements 
of partnership and credit which imply trust in the other party.34  
From medieval times, the lex mercatoria evolved to a second stage that 
occurred with the creation of sovereign states and the nationalization of law in 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. In this period the lex mercatoria lost 
its practical orientation and international character.35 
Two emblematic examples of incorporation of the law merchant into the 
general law of nations are France and England. In the former the 
incorporation was accomplished by legislation; in England, by judicial 
precedent: 
 
In France codification of commercial law on a national scale was first carried out by 
the Ordinance sur le commerce of Louis XIV of 1673 and Colbert’s Ordinance de la 
marine of 1681. A revision of this legislation was commenced in 1787 but was 
interrupted by the French Revolution. Only at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
was work resumed and in 1807 the Code de Commerce, one of the five great codes 
of Napoleon, was enacted … In England the incorporation of the law merchant into 
the common law was largely carried out by two Chief Justices, Sir John Holt, who 
officiated from 1689 to his death in 1710, and Lord Mansfield who was Chief Justice 
from 1756 to 1788.36 
 
The third and contemporary stage of the lex mercatoria begins with the 
boosting of the idea of globalization of commerce.  
Globalization is a phenomenon highlighted as a characteristic of our 
era of information technology and increased international trade and mobility.37 
                                                                                                                                      
this form of association was in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See López, Raymond 
and Constable, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World (Columbia University Press, New 
York 2001). 
33 See The Companion to British History (Routledge, London 2001) 350. 
34 See n 29. 
35 See C Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate (2nd edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1977); and H Berman and C Kaufman, ‘The Law of International 
Commercial Transactions’ (1978) 19 Harv.Int’l L.J. 221, 226. 
36 Schmitthoff (n 35) 5. 
37 For a critical view about the modern process of globalization, see J Harold, ‘Lessons from 
History’ (2003) <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=886> accessed 27 March 2008. 
See also J Kunstler, ‘Globalization is an Anomaly and its Time is Running Out’ (2005) 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6104> Harold and Kunstler have a North 
American view of the phenomenon. They state, basically, that the pillars of globalization – 
world peace and interdependence between countries – make, at the same time, this process 
vulnerable. The peace experienced a great setback with the attacks of 11th September where 
‘every part of the package that had previously produced such an unprecedented economic 
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It is not, however, a recent development; on the contrary, it existed from 
ancient times. 38 
The Roman and Mongol Empires are examples that confirm this view.39 
The Roman Empire had an active trade flow within the regions which formed 
the great Mediterranean world. The expansion of the mercantile economy 
when Rome developed maritime supremacy introduced in the law a 
determining element: good faith, which was a source of new institutes and a 
complex of contractual relations. These appeared as a reflection of the social 
reality existing between Roman citizens and peregrini (those who were not 
Roman citizens). In this context there emerged a new ius in contrast to the 
traditional ius civile and at the same time part of it, called ius gentium, defined 
as ius gentium est quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit (Gaius 
I, 1),40 whose centre was the international trade.41 
In modern times, practitioners have developed their own ‘third legal 
order’ because certain areas during the process of industrialization 
(nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and globalization (second half of the 
twentieth century) were simply not covered by national or international law. 
The expansion of transnational activity put intense pressure on states to 
recognize and adapt to the special needs of long-distance trade. According to 
the experts, the main failing of national laws is that they were incapable of 
regulating the changing events of international trade.42 Under the dynamics of 
rapid and fundamental changes, national law and economic needs drifted 
apart. Thus, the international community started to regulate itself by standard 
contract forms and regulations of self-governing associations of traders.43 The 
first areas of commercial activity to begin systematically developing their own 
                                                                                                                                      
growth in many countries – the increased flow of people, goods, and capital – now seemed to 
contain obvious threats to security’ (Harold). In the same way, the interdependence would be 
seeing its sunset with the oil-short future.    
38 See N Chanda, ‘What is Globalization?’ (2002) <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/essay.jsp> 
accessed 2 April 2008 
39 See J Saunders, The History of the Mongol Conquests (Routledge and Paul, London 
1971); and C Parker, Global Interactions in the Early Modern Age, 1400-1800 (CUP, 
Cambridge 2010). 
40 The law of nations is the law which natural reason has established among all humankind.  
41 See P Cerami and A Petrucci, Lezioni di Diritto Commerciale Romano (Giappichelli, Torino 
2002) passim. 
42 See B Goldman, ‘Introduction’ and F K Juenger, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and the Conflict of 
Laws’ in T Carbonneau (ed), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration. A Discussion of the New Law 
Merchant  (Kluwer Law International, London 1998).  
43 Cf. n 17, 18 and 19 and accompanying text.  
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rules of contract were the insurance and the transport industries. Röder calls 
this phenomenon ‘the “colonization” of contract law by businessmen and 
companies’.44 Following this trend, arbitral awards referred to international 
principles accepted by traders around the world in order to substitute for the 
paucity of regulation. These are manifestations of the renaissance of the lex 
mercatoria.  
Municipal law has shown its weakness in regulating international trade. 
On the one hand, the law of a particular state might be too undeveloped to 
cope with the challenges that a multilateral agreement with numerous 
embedded contracts presents. On the other hand, the private parties to a 
contract are not well-disposed to submit the solution of an eventual dispute to 
the law of the other party and, a fortiori, to the law of the host state in the case 
of a foreign investment agreement.45 These factors have favoured the 
development of business practices and sector regulations. Therefore, the lex 
mercatoria has gained ground in international trade.  
It must be recognized, however, that the choice of the lex mercatoria in 
lieu of national law in the contract is still very rare; as also is the exclusive 
application of the lex by arbitrators.46  
Nonetheless, the reality demonstrates that awards based on the lex 
mercatoria have not been set aside by national courts.47 For example, in 1987 
the English Court of Appeal, on the application of the lex petrolea,48 held that, 
‘By choosing to arbitrate under the rules of the ICC and, in particular, article 
13.3, the parties have left proper law to be decided by the arbitrators and have 
not in terms confined the choice to national systems of law’.49 It must be 
                                               
44  Röder (n 26). 
45 The reasons for this are, among others, lack of knowledge of the other legal system, 
additional costs associated to the application of a foreign system and perceived 
disadvantage. 
46 See the statistical analysis made by F Dasser, ‘Mouse or Monster? Some Facts and 
Figures on the Lex Mercatoria’ in R Zimmermann (ed), Globalisierung und Entstaatlichung 
des Rechts (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2008) 129, 131. 
47 See J Lew, L Mistelis and S Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International, London 2003) 455; and O Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 ICLQ 747, 755. See the reasons why arbitral 
awards are recognized by national courts below in the text after n 158. 
48 The term lex petrolea makes reference to a particular branch of the universal lex mercatoria 
applicable to the oil industry. 
49 Deutsche Schachtbau und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m.b.H. v Ras al Khaimah National Oil Co. 
and Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246, 25; [1987] 3 WLR 1023, 
1035. The House of Lords’s decision: [1990] 1 A.C. 295; [1988] 3 W.L.R. 230.  
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clarified that article 13.3 Rules of Arbitration of the ICC is today’s article 17, 
which refers to the ‘Rules of Law’ applicable to the merits of the dispute. It has 
been widely recognized that these ‘Rules of Law’ include the lex mercatoria, in 
other words, article 17 of the ICC Rules (former article 13.3) allows the 
application of the lex mercatoria.50 Furthermore, there is an old well-known 
decision related to the lex mercatoria and good faith: NORSOLOR v PABALK. 
The case arose out of a dispute between a French Corporation (NORSOLOR) 
and a Turkish Company (PABALK) following the termination by NORSOLOR 
of an agency contract with PABALK. The contract provided for ICC arbitration, 
but it did not specify the applicable law. PABALK instituted arbitral 
proceedings seeking damages for the termination of the contract. An arbitral 
tribunal was constituted in Vienna. The absence of a stipulation of the law to 
be applied caused the arbitrators to consider whether they should apply 
Turkish law (as lex loci executionis), French law (because it was the law of the 
principal’s establishment), or the law with which the contract was substantially 
connected. The arbitrators found that the terms of the contract gave no clue 
as to which law should apply. Taking into account the international character 
of the contract, the arbitrators decided to disregard domestic laws, whether 
Turkish, French or other law, and to apply the ‘international lex mercatoria’. 
They held that one of the principles of the lex mercatoria was the principle of 
good faith and that, by application of the principle, NORSOLOR should be 
held responsible for the termination of the contract, entitling PABALK to 
damages. The decision was annulled by the Court of Appeal of Austria which 
considered lex mercatoria ‘a world law of uncertain validity’. The Supreme 
Court of Austria quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that, if 
the award referred to the lex mercatoria, it was based on the principle of good 
faith, which is an ‘inherent principle of private law’ and that it was not, 
therefore, contradictory to the provisions of either Turkish or French law.51 
The lex mercatoria appears legitimated by the evidence of its 
usefulness and not by the imposition of any national or international authority 
                                               
50 See the analysis of article 17 of the ICC Rules below in this chapter (text after n 158). 
51 ICC award 3131 of 26 October 1979 in (1983) Revue de l’Arbitrage 525. The case is also in 
Y Derains & S Jarvin, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Paris 1990) 122 ff. The résumé is mainly based on Delaume’s report in G 
Delaume, Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts (Oceana, New York 1988) 322.  
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whatsoever.52 Here, a remarkable example of its usefulness is what Dasser 
metaphorically qualified as ‘omnipotence’, because ‘there are few contractual 
cases that cannot be solved solely with the two complementary principles: 
pacta sunt servanda (promises ought to be obeyed) and good faith’ 
(parenthesis added).53 However, the content of this phenomenon is still 
arguable. Accordingly, the different positions on the existence and on the 
concept of the lex mercatoria are explored in the following sub-section.54  
 
1.1.1.3 THE DEBATE ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 
 
The views of academics, arbitrators and of judges fall mainly into two 
groups:  those who uphold the existence of the lex mercatoria and those who 
deny its existence as an autonomous legal order.55 
The first group supports the existence of the lex mercatoria.56 These 
authors, in general, agree that the expansion of business has revealed the 
shortcomings of national and international law and, consequently, that it has 
prompted the development of the lex mercatoria. However, many authors 
within this group recognize that the lex mercatoria could not exist without the 
complement of national and international law. Among them, Maniruzzaman 
considers that the lex mercatoria does not reach those standards of domestic 
                                               
52 Besides, some national statutes have acknowledged the application of the lex mercatoria 
by arbitrators: article 1496 of the Nouvelle Code de Procédure Civile in France; and also 
Dutch law. See the analysis of these norms below in the text that accompanies n 160-1. 
53 Dasser (n 46) 133. See, however, P Mayer, ‘Le Principe de Bonne Foi devant les Arbitres 
du Commerce International’ in C Dominicé, R Patry and C Reymond (eds), Études de Droit 
International en l’ Honneur de Pierre Lalive (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bâle/Francfort-sur-le 
Main 1993) 555, who states: ‘The omnipresence of the good faith principle in the lex 
mercatoria does not appear to constitute an asset’. 
54 See a good record of legal and scholarly positions on the lex mercatoria in De Ly (n 20).  
55 See T Carbonneau (n 42) passim. Among the contributors who are against the Lex 
Mercatoria: F A Mann, G Delaume and K Highet; among the supporters: B Goldman, A 
Lowenfeld and F Juenger. 
56 There are many particular positions within this group of authors, e.g. Highet in ‘The Enigma 
of the Lex Mercatoria’ in Carbonneau (n 42) 134, relies on the existence of the lex mercatoria 
but not as a system of law. For him, ‘The concept of principia mercatoria more correctly 
reflects the nature, application and content of the law merchant than any suggestion that it 
amounts to an inchoate or undiscovered legal system that exists outside national 
jurisdictions’. Furthermore, Schmitthoff in The Unification of Law of International Trade 
(Akademiforlaget-Gumperts, Gothenburg 1964) sees the lex mercatoria as a synthetic 
concept embracing similarities among various national legal systems. He is one of the main 
exponents of the so-called ‘Positivist view’, which considers the lex mercatoria having 
existence only through the state’s acknowledgement, giving effect to conventions and uniform 
laws.   
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legal regimes or public international law in order to regulate integrally a 
contractual relationship.57 Lowenfeld supports also this view: ‘In each of the 
cases I have mentioned, lex mercatoria supplies the solution to a particular 
issue, without necessarily governing all aspects of the transactions’.58 
Lowenfeld considers that the lex mercatoria is an additional option in 
the search for the applicable law.59 The following illustration provided by 
Lando helps to understand such a meaning: 
 
Suppose that a Scandinavian seller has sold goods to a German buyer which are 
supposed to have a long life, and the buyer notices the defect after both the German 
(6 months) and the Scandinavian (1 yr) periods of limitation have run. An arbitrator 
might say, I need not decide between German and the Danish law, because under 
either one the claim is barred. Alternatively, the arbitrator might determine that both 
the German and the Scandinavian statutes were designed for internal transactions 
only, and might look to the Vienna Sales Convention for guidance.60  
 
It is not certain whether this example was taken from reality; 
nonetheless it is possible to assert that the ICC award n. 5713 of 1989 has the 
same factual background and legal rationale.61 Goode, commenting on this 
case, criticizes the use of the Convention to solve the controversy as an 
expression of a general usage of the trade (i.e., as an expression of the lex 
mercatoria) for several reasons, inter alia, the fact that the contract was 
concluded in 1979 when the Convention did not even exist; and also because 
article 39 related to the controversy was highly debated, so it could hardly 
express a usus and opinio iuris – the features of a binding usage in 
international commerce.62 With this case Goode justifies his criticism of the 
willingness of arbitrators to resort to Conventions as manifestations of 
                                               
57 See A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge 
for International Commercial Arbitration?’ (1999) 14 Am.U.Int’l. L.Rev. 657, 703. Cf. also G 
Delaume, Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts (Oceana, New York 1988) 99. 
58 A Lowenfeld, ‘Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator View’ in Carbonneau (n 42) 84-86.    
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 81. 
61 S Jarvin (ed) Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-1990 (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer 1994) 223. 
62 See the analysis of customs and usages as sources of the lex mercatoria below in this 
chapter. 
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consecrated usages.63 It is important to note that Goode is an advocate of the 
lex mercatoria. He points out that, ‘To the extent that the lex mercatoria 
represents general principles of law common to relevant States there seems 
no reason why it cannot be applied as the proper law governing the 
substantive rights of the parties’.64 
Some authors even defend the prominence of the lex mercatoria 
against the chosen law. Carbonneau is a leading voice in this first group: 
 
The application of any law designated by the parties must be tempered by reference 
to commercial usages, which now are being progressively formalized into the basic 
tenets of the lex mercatoria. In any given international arbitration, the arbitrators can 
modify provisions of the governing law and adapt them to the rules and principles of 
the arbitral international law merchant.65 
  
 Tetley, with the excellent example of lex maritima, asserts the 
existence of the lex mercatoria in this area. He justifies his view with the 
history of the lex maritima, e.g. the general average66 is an example of lex 
maritima dating back to the Rhodian Law 800-900 BC. A modern lex maritima 
does exist in international bills of lading, charter party forms, marine insurance 
and in universal terms and practices throughout the shipping world; these 
instruments are applied by arbitrators as part of the lex mercatoria regardless 
of national law or international convention.67  
Tetley’s contribution acts as a good counter-argument to the wide view 
of Carbonneau. It appears that the arbitrators do not set aside the chosen law 
or correct it with the lex mercatoria, but most of the time the matter is 
regulated by national law allowing the application of international contract 
                                               
63 Goode (n 17) 20. 
64 Ibid 29. 
65 T Carbonneau, ‘A Definition of and Perspective upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate’ in 
Carbonneau (n 42) 21. 
66 Average means the apportionment of financial liability resulting from loss of or damage to a 
ship or its cargo. The origin is from late 15th century French avarie 'damage to ship or cargo', 
earlier 'customs duty', from Italian avaria, from Arabic awār  'damage to goods'; the 
suffix age is on the pattern of damage. Originally denoting a duty payable by the owner of 
goods to be shipped, the term later denoted the financial liability from goods lost or damaged 
at sea, and specifically the equitable apportionment of this between the owners of the vessel 
and of the cargo (late sixteenth century); this gave rise to the general sense of calculating the 
mean (mid eighteenth century). 
67 See W Tetley, ‘The Lex Maritima’ in Carbonneau (n 42) 43.  
 29
practice or commercial customs. Municipal systems of law do not regulate the 
subject in another way because to do so could obstruct the normal progress of 
contracting. In other words, a different regulation could mean a forced solution 
to what is normally assumed as binding. This phenomenon is, ultimately, what 
it is called lex mercatoria. Here, Berman and Kaufman note: 
 
International trade terms relating to allocation of risk of loss or damage to goods, 
clauses of bills of lading – in marine insurance policies, certificates and in letters of 
credit –, arbitration clauses and other devices used in export and import are generally 
understood by trading enterprises throughout the world and are governed by similar 
legal rules in virtually all countries.68 
 
The common criticism about the lack of predictability of the lex 
mercatoria can be rejected with Carbonneau’s remark that ‘a perusal of 
published maritime arbitral awards indicates that there is a high degree of 
substantive adjudicatory uniformity on major issues which typically arises in 
maritime litigation’.69 That is to say, there is a substantive predictability.  
 
The second group of authors prefers to exclude the lex mercatoria 
mainly based on its failure to constitute an autonomous legal order, on its lack 
of authority, predictability and consistency. In this group, Flanagan holds that 
the lex mercatoria fails the prerequisites of an autonomous legal system and 
therefore is not a practical choice of law for international contract, but that it 
could survive as a collection of distinct legal principles and rules.70 The 
sceptics consider that, whatever content may be ascribed to the new law 
merchant, it is not the repository of ‘true’ legal rules or procedures that can 
protect parties against the abuse of discretion and unprincipled adjudicatory 
determinations.71 Mann expresses his sceptical view about the existence of 
the lex mercatoria in the following terms: 
 
                                               
68 Berman and Kaufman (n 35) 221. 
69 T Carbonneau, ‘A Definition of and Perspective upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate’ in 
Carbonneau (n 42) 16. 
70 P M Flanagan, ‘Demythologising the Law Merchant: The Impropriety of the Lex Mercatoria 
as a Choice of Law’ (2004) 15 ICCLR 297, 306.  
71 F Mann, ‘Introduction’ in Carbonneau (n 42) xxiii; see also G Delaume, ‘The Myth of the Lex 
Mercatoria and State Contracts’ in Carbonneau (n 42). 
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One of the purposes of that doctrine is to eliminate the search for the proper law of 
the contract or, more generally, the rules of conflict of laws. More than that, the 
purpose is to substitute ill-defined ‘equity’ for rules of law, to rely on what is 
considered fair and conforming to usage. It is difficult to imagine a more dangerous, 
more undesirable and more ill-founded view which denies any measure of 
predictability and certainty and confers upon parties to an international commercial 
contract or their arbitrators, powers that no system of law permits and no court could 
exercise.72 
 
It is difficult to agree with the pessimistic position towards the existence 
of the lex mercatoria, for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, effectively, a large part of the world trade is based on standard 
contract conditions issued by trade associations.73 To illustrate this with an 
actual example, in the award rendered the 13th July 1998 the arbitrators found 
that:  
 
While it was acceptable for the buyer (claimant) to buy higher quality coffee for a 
coverage deal if there was a shortage of suitable coffee on the market, the buyer 
breached its obligations under the Hamburg coffee trade usages by failing to 
mitigate the damages and to inform the seller of its intention to re-sell the coffee to a 
third party, as the seller was unable [to] ‘influenc[e] the sale and the sale’s timing’ 
(bold added).74 
 
 Secondly, international trade contracts usually provide for submission 
of any dispute to arbitration under the rules of a trade association or the ICC. 
As has been seen with the example of article 17 of the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration,75 the rules governing institutional arbitration consider general 
principles and customs of the trade to solve the controversy.76 
                                               
72 F Mann, ‘England Rejects “Delocalised” Contracts and Arbitration’ (1984) 33 Int’l & 
Comp.L.Q. 193, 196-7. 
73 See n 17, 18 and 19 and accompanying text. C Schmitthoff, ‘The Unification or 
Harmonisation of Law by Means of Standard Contracts and General Conditions’ (1968) 17 
Int’l & Comp.L.Q. 551. 
74 (2000) 25 Yb Comm. Arb’n 216. According to the award, the Hamburg coffee trade usages 
were applied in force of article 43 of the European Contract for Coffee (ECC). 
75 See n 50 and accompanying text. 
76 Cf. Berman & Kaufman (n 35) 228. Other norms providing for the application of the lex 
mercatoria are studied below in this sub-section. 
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Thirdly, ‘the adage Lex ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit77 has been 
recognized by the practitioners of law as false and dangerous in its 
generalization, and no interpreter would any longer base any proof 
whatsoever upon it alone’.78 In the case of paucity of regulation, arbitrators 
apply the lex mercatoria. For example, article 42 of the ICSID Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States expressly permits an arbitrator to apply the laws of the host state as 
well as rules of international law to a dispute where the parties have not made 
an express choice of law. Article 42(2) provides that ‘The Tribunal may not 
bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law’. 
With regard to this norm, it has been said that ‘it is reasonable that in the non 
liquet situation the tribunal should look to lex mercatoria to fill gaps or clear up 
obscurity in the applicable law’.79 
Fourthly, it has long been recognized that there is a relationship 
between the legal method of a period and the type of thinking generally 
prevalent at that period. The lex mercatoria conforms to the way of thinking 
globally which prevails nowadays. The lex mercatoria is a consequence of the 
collapse of positivism,80 which insists on the separation of law and morals or, 
in other words, on the separation of law as it is and law as it ought to be. It is 
directly contrary to natural law theories, which tend to have some touchstone 
                                               
77 ‘When the law wanted to regulate the matter, it did regulate the matter; when it did not want 
to regulate the matter, it remained silent’. 
78 G Del Vecchio, General Principles of Law (F Forte tr, Boston University Press, Boston 
1956) 51. 
79 Molineaux (n 24) 63. Here, in 1992 the Resolution on Transnational Rules adopted at the 
65th International Law Association Conference in Cairo stated that: ‘The fact that an 
international arbitrator has based an award on transnational rules rather than the law of a 
particular state should not in itself affect the validity of the award: 1) where the parties have 
agreed that the arbitrator may apply transnational rules; 2) where the parties have remained 
silent concerning the applicable law’. See A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘Conflict of Laws Issues in 
International Arbitration: Practice and Trends’ (1993) 9 Arb.Int’l 371. 
80 Wieacker describes the stages of European legal thinking as follows: ‘The epochs in the 
history of German private law also match the four great shifts in European legal thinking, 
perhaps more marked in Germany where the intellectuals were more impressionable than in 
the old nation states of Europe. After the emergence of European legal science in the twelfth 
to fourteenth centuries they were: its diffusion (“reception”) throughout the whole of Europe 
between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the rise and dominance of the modern law of 
nature in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the historical school and positivism, both 
scientific and textual, in the nineteenth century, and finally the collapse of positivism and the 
legal crisis in our own century’. F Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe. With 
Particular Reference to Germany (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 7. 
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that a man-made law has to meet for its validity.81 The application of the lex 
mercatoria is a natural reaction to the necessity for a freer approach which 
aims to go beyond the positivist structures in the pursuance of justice in 
commerce. Lex mercatoria constitutes the corrective of strict legalism, as it 
has been necessary throughout ancient and European legal history: ‘In Rome 
with the discretionary powers of the praetor, in the Middle Ages the aequitas 
canonica and in modern statutory positivism the general clauses and the 
judicial balancing of interest’.82  
Finally, on the practical side, in the European Court of Justice there is 
an opinion of the Advocate General acknowledging the existence of the lex 
mercatoria as regards a case discussed before the English Court of Appeal. 
The following passage is noteworthy:  
 
The foregoing general outline, which should be supplemented by a description of the 
essential role of the permanent arbitration institutions or the emergence of a new lex 
mercatoria, gives a general picture of international arbitration which, having 
progressively fewer links with national legal systems, is tending, according to some 
commentators, to become ‘denationalised’ or indeed ‘delocalised’.83 
 
In summary, certainty derives from authority and such authority does 
not exist in the context of the lex mercatoria. However, the truth derives from 
reason and this is most important for the quality of justice granted by the 
arbitrator to merchants coming from different cultures. It seems that the lex 
mercatoria is a reasonable system as it represents the shared legal 
understanding of the international merchant community. 
 
1.1.1.4 SOURCES AND CONTENT 
 
Two theories mark the debate in this field: 
- There is a broad theory that considers as components of the lex 
mercatoria all principles and rules governing specifically international 
                                               
81 See H L A Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1958) 71 Harv.L.Rev. 
593. 
82 F Wieacker, ‘Foundations of European Legal Culture’ (1990) 38 Am.J.Comp.L.1, 25. 
83 [1991] I.L.Pr. 524, 532. The case in issue is Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v Società Italiana 
Impianti PA [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 342 
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contracts, be they enacted by interstate treaties or even state legislations or 
spontaneously produced by the societas mercatorum, following usages of 
international trade and general principles. 
- The restrictive theory limits the content of the lex mercatoria to 
usages and general principles spontaneously produced in the ambit of 
international trade. Berthold Goldman is a leading exponent of this theory. The 
following is his definition of lex mercatoria: ‘A set of general principles and 
customary rules spontaneously referred to or elaborated in the framework of 
international trade, without reference to a particular system of law’.84 
Goldman assumes a narrow vision of lex mercatoria by setting the 
features of its sources to be transnational, customary and spontaneous. At the 
same time, he does not believe that the laws of inter-state or state origin 
relating to international trade can immediately form part of the lex mercatoria, 
but that through a process of frequency of practice in international trade they 
become transformed into customary law. His writing on the clause rebus sic 
stantibus85 illustrates his definition of the lex mercatoria: 
 
No doubt international arbitrators stick, in principle, to pacta, and one could contend 
that this has nothing to do with lex mercatoria, since this principle is embodied in 
practically all municipal legislations. It is to be noted, nevertheless, that very 
frequently, when they apply pacta sunt servanda arbitrators do not refer to a 
particular municipal legislation; they see the principle as a general one, which means 
that it is applied as an element of the lex mercatoria, and therefore, that its actual 
consequences are not to be taken from any municipal law whatsoever.86 
                                               
84 B Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - The Lex Mercatoria’ in J D M 
Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 
1987) 113, 116. 
85 During the Middle Ages the notion of clause rebus sic stantibus – or the implied condition 
that circumstances would not change and that the will of the parties was conditioned thereby 
– was developed. In a general way, the clause goes back to the writings of Baldus in the 
fourteenth century (Commentaria ad D.12.4.8).The doctrine remained popular until the 
nineteenth century when the parties’ intent became more sacrosanct. The key point in the 
case of change of circumstances is the allocation of the risk. For example, in Germany due to 
the inflation in the aftermath of the First World War the issue was how could one achieve an 
equitable distribution of the currency risks in a currency market which found itself in great 
turmoil. In practical terms, the change of circumstances implies the modification of the 
framework in which the formation of the contract took place. In international commercial 
contracts force majeure and hardship cover these situations of economic disequilibrium 
during the performance of the contract. See articles 7.1.7 and 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
86 Goldman (n 84) 125. 
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The same is the case of rules aimed to minimise damages. They come 
originally from the common law area, but they are enshrined in the lex 
mercatoria nowadays as rules with independent value.87 
Goldman’s view is accepted here, in light of the positions taken in 
arbitral awards recorded throughout this thesis: arbitrators apply what appears 
as customary rules accepted as binding by international traders. Furthermore, 
the existence of a substantive lex mercatoria – which is not necessary 
enshrined in positive rules – explains that sets of principles, such as PICC, 
are continually revised and updated. Here, consider the United Nations 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.88 This 
Convention regulates instruments which have long been used in international 
trade and finance for securing payment and performance in international 
commercial contracts.89 The international practice generated concepts and 
principles in this area which have been widely used and commonly accepted; 
therefore, they can be characterized as elements of the lex mercatoria.90 The 
Convention barely changes the existing self-regulation and it is hardly 
innovative.91 For that reason, the proper Convention has been characterized 
                                               
87 Cf. the following ICC awards: n. 4761 (1987) 114 JDI 1012; n. 2103 (1974) 101 JDI 902; n. 
2142 (1974) 101 JDI 892; n. 2478 (1975) 102 JDI 925; n. 2291 (1976) 103 JDI 989; n. 2520 
(1976) 103 JDI 992; and n.3344 (1982) 109 JDI 978.  
88 The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 11 
December 1995 and entered into force on 1 January 2000. 
89 The UNCITRAL’s website states that, ‘The Convention also solidifies recognition of 
common basic principles and characteristics shared by the independent guarantee and the 
stand-by letter of credit: 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees_cre
dit.html> accessed 26 April 2011 
90 The following are the attempts of self-regulation by the international trading community in 
this area: 1) in 1978 the ICC published Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (UCG); 2) as a 
result of the revision of in 1983 of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
(UCP), it was decided to include stand-by letters of credit under the scope of UCP; 3) in 1992 
the ICC published the Uniform Rules on Demand Guarantees (URDG); 4) in 1998 the US 
Council of International Banking (USCIB, now the International Services Association) 
embarked in a project to formulate self regulatory rules for the US stand-by letter of credit 
market. These International Stand-by Practices (ISP Project) led to International Stand-by 
Practices (ISP98) which were adopted by USCIB. See F De Ly, ‘The UN Convention on 
Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 831. See also N 
Horn (ed), Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises (Kluwer, 
Antwerp & Boston 1980); N Horn, ‘Normative Problems of a New International Economic 
Problem’ (1982) JWTL 338; R Horn and C Schmitthoff (eds), The Transnational Law of 
International Commercial Transactions (Kluwer-Devanter, Antwerp & Boston 1982). 
91 De Ly (n 90) 844 states that, ‘The Convention complements the existing self-regulation 
provided for in URDG, UCG, UCP, and ISP98’.   
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as an expression of the lex mercatoria.92 In this case the arbitrator who 
applies the Convention applies elements of the lex mercatoria, which had 
existed as such before the Convention was enacted.93 
On the other hand, Schmitthoff has a positivist view of the lex 
mercatoria. He states that the lex mercatoria is developed in national 
contexts: ‘Transnational law is the uniform law developed by parallelism of 
action in the various national systems in an area of optional law in which the 
state in principle is disinterested’.94 The same author asserts: ‘The modern lex 
mercatoria is the deliberate creation of formulating agencies and is expressed 
in international conventions or model laws or in documents published by such 
bodies as the International Chamber of Commerce’.95 Consequently, 
commercial custom is not part of the ‘new’ law merchant, as he calls it. It is 
only the raw material which has to be distilled into formally enacted or 
declared rules in order to become binding.  
The understanding of the lex mercatoria as ‘spontaneous law’ (i.e., 
Goldman’s narrow view) means that the lex mercatoria is generated outside 
governmental intervention by practitioners, due to the necessity to regulate 
areas uncovered or insufficiently governed by national laws. However, the 
insufficiency or non absolute autonomy of the lex mercatoria is also 
acknowledged. National and international law have an essential role in 
aspects uncovered by the lex, for example, the capacity of the parties.96 
In essence the lex mercatoria is made by contract practices and the 
common understanding on which they are based. Contract practices and 
usages of trade are truly spontaneous and subjected to modification or 
adaptation according to the necessities of traffic. The lex mercatoria may act 
                                               
92 R Horn, The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and the Lex 
Mercatoria (Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero. Saggi, Conferenze e 
Seminari N. 30, Roma 1997). 
93 There are also a number of authors, who agree with Goldman’s narrow view, inter alia, Roy 
Goode. See Goode (n 17) 2-3; and R Goode ‘The adaptation of English Law to International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (1992) 8 Arb.Int’l 1, 12-13. Similarly, Audit considers lex mercatoria 
as a body of ‘spontaneous’ law, i.e. law created by standard commercial practices and arbitral 
decisions. See B Audit ‘The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria’ in Carbonneau 
(n 42). 
94 C Schmitthoff, ‘Nature and Evolution on the Transnational Law of Commercial 
Transactions’ in N Horn and C Schmitthoff (eds) The Transnational Law of International 
Commercial Transactions. Studies in Transnational Economic Law Vol. 2 (Kluwer-Devanter, 
Boston 1982) 22. 
95 Schmitthoff (n 35) 21. 
96 See Maniruzzaman (n 57). See also Lowenfeld (n 58) 84-5. 
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as a source for international conventions, for the international private law and 
even for the contract law of each country, but it exists as such before it is 
embraced by these regulations. This does not mean that the principles of the 
lex mercatoria are always incorporated into conventions. In fact, several 
conventions do not reflect the lex mercatoria.  
It is considered here that the work of formulating agencies is the formal 
face of the lex mercatoria.97 However, this formalization is not a sine qua non 
for its binding force. The lex mercatoria is a spontaneous force.  
Formulating agencies and intergovernmental organizations – such as 
UNIDROIT – have made excellent compilations of important segments of the 
lex mercatoria. Besides, the process of harmonization of commercial laws in 
different regions of the world (Africa and America, for instance)98 is 
incorporating the lex mercatoria. Furthermore, at a global level, in 2000 
UNCITRAL Secretary Gerold Herrmann proposed the preparation of a Global 
Commercial Code in the form of a compilation of special rules relating to the 
most important types of commercial transactions.99 
This reality prompts a new question: will the new lex mercatoria 
disappear, absorbed by the work of formulating agencies or by a universal 
code as it happened once with the old lex mercatoria? 
A more or less universal consensus upon the general rules in 
commerce can be forecast. However, since the special needs of different 
sectors of trade in different regions can be answered on the grounds of 
                                               
97 The bodies currently involved in the formulation of harmonized or unified legal regimes to 
regulate trade can be broadly grouped into governmental or public bodies and non-
governmental or private bodies. Public bodies can be international, such as agencies of the 
United Nations (the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law – UNCITRAL – 
occupies a special position here), UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law) and the Hague Conference on Private International Law.  They can also be 
regional bodies such as the European Union, Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Private bodies include business 
groupings, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, trade associations and 
institutions formed by learned people, e.g. Lando Commission (see in regard to the latter: 
<http://webh01.ua.ac.be/storme/CECL.html> accessed 29 April 2011). 
98 See Chapter Four, Sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
99 The European Parliament pronounced on the subject of European private law for the first 
time as early as 1989 and then 1994, 1999, 2001 and 2003. See M Röttinger, ‘Towards a 
European Code Napoléon/ABGB/BGB? Recent EC Activities for a European Contract Law’ 
(2006) 12 European Law Journal, 807; and M J Bonell, ‘Do we need a Global Commercial 
Code?’ CISG Database Pace Institute of International Commercial Law: 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/pace/do_we_need_a_global_commercial_code_michael.joachim_bone
ll/portrait.letter.pdf> accessed 29 April 2011 
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practice, it is possible to assert that the lex mercatoria will continue to exist 
independently of the work of formulating agencies.  
Lando – with a broad interpretation – provides a non-exhaustive list of 
elements of the lex mercatoria:100  
1) Public international law; 
2) Uniform laws for international trade (e.g. CISG);101 
3) General principles of law; 
4) The rules of international organizations and projects to unify 
commercial laws, such as UNIDROIT and the Commission on 
European Contract Law; 
5) Customs and usages of international trade;102  
6) Standard form contracts;  
7) Reporting of arbitral awards. 
 
Evidently, it is difficult to nominate one by one all the elements of the 
lex mercatoria; this effort of synthesis made by Lando is, therefore, relevant. It 
must be added that it would be convenient to consider the practical element of 
the public policy of the country in which the enforcement of the award is likely 
to be requested.103 This is self-explanatory since an award based on the lex 
mercatoria but against the public policy of the country in which it must be 
enforced will remain, in the best of the cases, as an excellent disquisition on 
law.104 Besides, the first element of the list – public international law –
generates concern, since, in theory, only the states are subject to international 
                                               
100 Lando (n 47) 751. 
101 According to the authors who favour the existence of the lex mercatoria, under CISG the 
lex mercatoria is the chief source of the applicable law for the international transactions, either 
directly as trade usages, or indirectly through the application of the principle of party 
autonomy in contract. The Convention itself, they maintain, purports to qualify as an 
expression of the lex mercatoria. Cf., inter alia, J H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational 
and Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (3rd edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2007) 404. 
102 In this category there are some ‘codified’ customs, for instance INCOTERMS, Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) and the Force Majeure and Hardship 
Clauses issued by ICC in 2003. 
103 This is implicit in Lando’s contribution (n 47) and this is also the explicit position of Lord J 
Mustill in ‘The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years’ in M Bos and I Brownlie 
(eds), Liber Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987) 149. 
104 Art. 1502 n. 5 French Code of Civil Procedure states: ‘An appeal against the decision, 
which grants recognition or enforcement, will be available only in the following cases: 
 5° if the recognition or enforcement is contrary to public international order’. French law 
recognises the lex mercatoria as the basis of an award in article 1496 of this Code.  
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public law. Commercial relations, however, usually take place between private 
parties or between a private party and a state. Thus, in seeking to make 
sense of Lando’s position, the diverse roles of the state participating in 
arbitration are considered here. 
The state can be part of a commercial arbitration process divested of 
its sovereign authority, acting in its private capacity (jure gestionis) when 
engaged in a contract with a private party. By contrast, investment treaty 
arbitration implies a state’s relation with foreign investors in which the former 
is acting in its function as sovereign authority (jure imperii).105 The concept of 
‘internationalized’ contracts has been elaborated for these cases. Modern 
practice generally prefers an approach that denationalizes the applicable 
substantive law and applies general principles of law. Paradigmatic in this 
sense is the award rendered in 1963 in the Sapphire v National Iranian Oil Co. 
(NIOC) case.106 Under Article 38, para.1, of the Concession Agreement the 
parties undertook to carry out the provisions of the contract in accordance with 
the principles of good faith and good will. The sole arbitrator had several 
reasons for dismissing the application of a national law to the substance of the 
dispute – particularly that of Iran, which appeared in principle as the most 
suitable. First of all, the arbitrator stated that these concessions gave the 
contract a particular character, which lies partly in public law and partly in 
private law. Secondly, Iranian law was considered incapable of offering 
adequate guarantees for the Canadian company (Sapphire). Thirdly, the 
aforementioned clause contained in article 38 was considered as ‘scarcely 
compatible with the strict application of internal law of a particular country’.107 
Consequently, the arbitrator applied the rules of law, based upon reason, 
which are common to civilized nations ‘such as are formulated in their statutes 
or are generally recognized in practice’.108 
In this context, another interesting case is Kuwait v AMINOIL 
(American Independent Oil Company).109  
                                               
105 The distinction is made by G Van Harten, ‘The Public-Private Distinction in the 
International Arbitration of Individual Claims against the State’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 371.  
106 (1967) 35 ILR 136. See Chapter Five, n 18 and accompanying text. 
107 Ibid 173. 
108 Ibid 175 
109 (1982) 21 ILM 976.  
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In 1948 Kuwait and AMINOIL concluded a concession agreement. In 
1961 the parties entered into a Supplemental Agreement, which 
fundamentally contained in Article 9 a ‘renegotiation clause’.110  
In July 1973 an ‘Interim Agreement’ was made in order to incorporate a 
number of changes required by OPEC resolutions. This agreement was never 
signed by the government. 
In November 1974, OPEC resolutions determined that some changes 
were necessary. However, negotiations failed and no agreement took place. 
In September 1977 the government by decree-law n.124 terminated 
the agreement with AMINOIL. 
In July 1979 the parties signed an arbitration agreement providing for 
an ad hoc arbitration in Paris. On 24 March 1982 the arbitral tribunal rendered 
an award of compensation for the nationalization by the state of Kuwait of the 
oil concession and local assets of AMINOIL.  
 The substantive law applicable to this case, according to the decision 
of the arbitral tribunal, was that of Kuwait and international law, understanding 
that the latter is part of the former. However, it is submitted here that it seems 
clear that the parties in their agreements retreated from applying the 
traditional sources – municipal and international law111 – but intended to apply 
a third source made up of customs and general principles of law, the lex 
mercatoria. This view relies on the following grounds: 
- The will of the parties. The 1973 agreement contains the following provision: 
 
 The parties base their relations with regard to the agreements between them on the 
principles of goodwill and good faith. Taking account of the different nationalities of 
the parties, the agreements between them shall be given effect, and must be 
                                               
110 Renegotiation clauses provide for cases in which the economy of the contract evolves to 
put in risk the equilibrium between the parties. In international arbitration the interpretation of 
clauses of renegotiation is restrictive, i.e., the absence of such a clause allows presuming that 
the parties are against renegotiation. See, inter alia, award n. 5953 of 1989 in (1990) 117 JDI 
1056. Original in French. The case is also reported in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-
1990 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague) 437. 
111 The TOPCO case (Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v the Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic) (1978) 17 ILM 1. is paradigmatic in the field of the principle of internationalization of 
the law applicable to contracts between a state and a public entity. The tribunal stated that 
contracts between states and private parties can be ‘internationalized’ in the sense of being 
subjected to public international law. Such a decision resulted from the jurisdictional immunity 
of states that prevents the arbitral tribunal from ruling the proceedings according to the law of 
another state. In addition, it is stated in the award that, ‘The parties also “intended from the 
outset to remove their differences from the jurisdictions of the local courts”’. 
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interpreted and applied, in conformity with principles common to the laws of Kuwait 
and of the State of New York, United States of America, and in the absence of such 
common principles, then in conformity with the principles of law normally recognized 
by civilized states in general, including those which have been applied by 
international tribunal. 
 
- The parties stated in the arbitration agreement that, ‘The law governing the 
substantive issues between the parties shall be determined by the tribunal, 
having regard to the quality of the parties, the transnational character of their 
relations and the principles of law and practice prevailing in the modern world’. 
- In addition, other concession agreements between Kuwait and foreign 
nations referred to general principles of law.  
Therefore, it is considered in this case that the arbitral tribunal took a 
step back to apply what did appear to be the logical legal system in this 
context.112 
Here, Maniruzzaman reveals a trend to free the arbitrator, even in 
cases related to foreign investment agreements, in the search for the 
applicable law.113  
From the sources enumerated by Lando a variety of principles and 
rules has been derived. Among the several principles encompass by the lex 
mercatoria, there are the following suggested by Lord J Mustill:114 
1. A general principle that contracts should prima facie be enforced according 
to their terms: Pacta sunt servanda; 
2. Rebus sic stantibus serves as an exception to the first general principle 
when performing the obligation would be too onerous to bear because of 
the changed conditions; 
3. The first general principle may also be subject to the concept of abus de 
droit, and to a rule that unfair and unconscionable contracts and clauses 
should not be enforced; 
 
 
                                               
112 Cf. Pierre-Yves Tschanz, ‘The Contributions of the AMINOIL Award to the Law of State 
Contracts’ (1984) 18 Int’l L 245. 
113 See A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘Conflict of Laws Issues in International Arbitration: Practice 
and Trends’ (1993) 9 Arbitration International 371, 401. 
114 Lord J Mustill (n 103). 
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4. Culpa in contrahendo;115 
5. Good faith; 
6. Bribes render a contract void or unenforceable; 
7. A state entity cannot be permitted to evade the enforcement of its 
obligations by denying its own capacity to make a binding agreement to 
arbitrate;116 
8. The controlling interest of a group of companies is regarded as contracting 
on behalf of all members of the group, at least so far as concerns an 
agreement to arbitrate;117  
9. If unforeseen difficulties intervene in the performance of a contract, the 
parties should negotiate in good faith to overcome them, even if the 
contract contains no revision clause;  
10.  ‘Gold clause’ agreements are valid and enforceable (by courts). Perhaps 
in some cases either a gold clause or a ‘hardship’ revision clause may be 
implied (parenthesis added); 
11.  One party is entitled to treat itself as discharged from its obligations if the 
other has committed a breach, but only if the breach is substantial; 
12.  No party can be allowed by its own act to bring about a non-performance 
of a condition precedent to its own obligation; 
13.  A tribunal is not bound by the characterization of the contract ascribed to it 
by the parties; 
14.  Damages for breach of contract are limited to the foreseeable 
consequences of the breach; 
15.  A party which has suffered a breach of contract must take reasonable 
steps to mitigate its loss; 
16.  Damages for non-delivery are calculated by reference to the market price 
of the goods and the price at which the buyer has purchased equivalent 
goods in replacement; 
                                               
115 See N Cohen, ‘Pre-Contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate’ in J 
Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1995). 
116 Cf. relating to this effect: B Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - The 
Lex Mercatoria’ in J D M Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1987) 113, 123. Lord J Mustill suggests that perhaps it should be 
classed as a principle of international ordre public rather than lex mercatoria.  
117 See ICC award n. 2375 (1976) 103 JDI 973. 
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17.   A party must act promptly to enforce its rights on pain of losing them by 
waiver; 
18.   A debtor may in certain circumstances set off his own cross-claims to 
extinguish or diminish his liability to the creditor; 
19.   Contracts should be construed according to the principle ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat;118  
20.   Failure by one party to respond to a letter written to it by the other is 
regarded as evidence of assent to its terms.119 
 
Lord J Mustill maintains that, ‘This list, incomplete as it may be, seems 
rather a modest haul for twenty-five years of international arbitration’.120 
However, Goldman asserts, ‘for the list he is suggesting encompasses and 
offers answers to a large number, if not to all, of the issues that are usually 
raised in disputes relating to international economic relations’.121 
It is remarkable that about half of the twenty principles cited by Lord J 
Mustill in his article were specifically linked to the overarching principle of 
good faith which appears as ‘the principle of the principles’.122 Surely, Mayer 
bore this in mind when he wrote, ‘Every equitable solution will be imposed in 
the name of good faith’.123 However, this is not the proper time to analyse 
good faith, as the next chapters are devoted to its study. 
Whatever the theory on the lex mercatoria, it is understood that general 
principles of law and general usages of international trade are the main pillars 
of it.124  
Fundamental legal principles are likely to be at the heart of all civilized 
modern legal systems. Further to it, Article 38 of the Statute of the 
                                               
118 According to this principle the interpretation of clauses must be orientated to give them an 
effect rather than make them fail. This principle looks towards the utmost preservation of 
juridical engagements. It is also enshrined in restatements of principles, e.g. PECL, Art.5.101 
and UNIDROIT Principles, Art 4.1. 
119 Cf. ICC award n. 3344 (1982) 109 JDI 978.  
120 Lord J Mustill (n 103) 177. 
121 Carbonneau (n 42) p. xx. Cf. B Goldman, ‘Nouvelles Réflexions sur la Lex Mercatoria’ in C 
Dominicé, R Patry and C Reymond (eds), Études de Droit International en l’Honneur de 
Pierre Lalive (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bâle/Francfort-sur-le Main 1993) 243. 
122 The following principles of the list are linked to good faith: 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 
15. 
123 Cfr. Mayer (n 53) 554. 
124 See J Lammers, ‘General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations’ in Frits 
Kalshoven et al (eds) Essays on the Development of the International Legal Order (Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, Rockville 1980) 68-9. 
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International Court of Justice includes among the sources for adjudication by 
the Court the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
 In domestic laws, especially of the codified variety, general principles 
are often hidden, but they come into their own again in the lex mercatoria. For 
instance, pacta sunt servanda is a general principle of law which is at the 
basis of national legislations as well as in international law. 
Drobnig highlights the relevance of general principles in their role of 
filling the gaps existing within the various individual pieces of unified contract 
law.125 General principles of contract law may also serve directly as a source 
of law. This occurs when the parties agree upon them as governing their 
contract.126 
Dasser states that the process of elaborating general principles of 
contract law consists in a comparison of national systems of contract law.127 It 
is considered that the method for tracing general principles of law cannot be 
that of pure abstraction from particular norms until more comprehensive 
determinations are reached. The reason – as inspired by Del Vecchio128 – is 
the following: from general principles it is not possible to derive, by deduction, 
all particular norms of a legal system. The reason for this is that they have 
empirical and contingent elements. In the same way, from particular norms it 
is not possible to obtain adequate knowledge of such principles, which in their 
generality would overcome every particular application.   
Del Vecchio bases these principles upon ius naturae, since ‘The idea of 
natural law truly is one of those ideas which accompany humanity in its 
developments’.129 He reinforces this thought with Vico’s opinion that ‘this 
                                               
125 U Drobnig, ‘General Principles of European Contract Law’ in P Sarcevic and P Volken 
(eds) International Sales of Goods: Duvrovnik Lectures (Oceana, New York 1986) 305, 308. 
The essay is also available at the Institute of International Commercial Law Pace Law Library 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/drobnig.html> accessed 5 March 2008. 
126 For example, the Preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts states that they are not binding upon the parties or the states, unless ‘the parties 
have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or 
the like’. To like effect, article 1:101 PECL. 
127 See Dasser (n 46) 135. 
128 G Del Vecchio, ‘Sui Principi Generali del Diritto’ (1921)  85 Archivio Giuridico 33. 
129 G Del Vecchio, General Principles of Law (F Forte tr, Boston University Press, Boston 
1956) 33. 
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civilized world certainly was made by man and, therefore, its principles must 
be found in our human mind’.130 
Other important elements of the lex mercatoria are custom and usages 
of trade.131  
It is considered that the essentiality of custom in the lex mercatoria 
derives from the fact that international commerce implies the interaction of 
traders, i.e., lex mercatoria is not a summary of commercial concepts and 
institutions in various legal systems, but it is primarily made by the 
spontaneous, continuous and binding repetition of conduct in trade.132 
It is all too easy to gather in one expression ‘custom and usages’. The 
question is whether they are interchangeable. The answer is that, in fact, in 
international commercial law those terms have been unified. Nonetheless, the 
terms ‘usage’ or ‘usages’ are those generally used and for those terms, 
experts understand a settled practice which has acquired normative force and 
thus is equated with custom.133 
Usages receive a prominent treatment in the CISG. Article 9 gives 
greater weight to trade usages, regardless of whether the parties specifically 
                                               
130 Vico, Scienza Nuova (1a.), L. I, C. XI; (2.a), L. I, ‘De’principi’. The backdrop of natural law 
in the seventeenth century is to be found in the scholasticism. Francisco de Suárez wrote the 
greatest synthesis of scholastic moral-theory in De Legibus, ac Deo Legislatore (1612), where 
it is said that ‘the dictates of right reason dwelt within man’. K Haakonssen, Natural Law and 
Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Modern Enlightenment (Cambridge, CUP 1996) 19. 
See an interesting contemporary disquisition on general principles of law in T Koopmans, 
General Principles of Law as Part of a Common Law of Europe and Other Lectures (Wildy, 
Simonds and Hill Publishing, London 2008). 
131 On the nature of customary law in the Western law tradition from the eleventh century 
onwards, see: A Watson, The Evolution of Law (Blackwell, Oxford 1985) 43 ff. Contrary to the 
view held in this thesis, De Ly (n 20) 278: ‘Transnational usages are not a formal source of 
the lex mercatoria. Furthermore it seems that the lex mercatoria has hardly any rules on the 
status of usages’. 
132 See H J Berman and F Dasser, ‘The “New” Law Merchant and the “Old”: Sources, Content 
and Legitimacy’ in Carbonneau (n 42) 53-69. 
133 In national law the situation is different. English law, for example, distinguishes custom as 
being constant, voluntary, certain, consistent and reasonable. The rule nowadays is that it can 
be established by precedent. On the other hand, usages are factual patterns of behaviour that 
are generally followed, are quite certain and have been in existence for some time. 
Traditionally they have been held binding on the basis of the presumed intentions of the 
parties. Schmitthoff holds that standard contract may develop into custom by general constant 
use, e.g., the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 1962. C Schmitthoff, 
‘The Unification or Harmonisation of Law by Means of Standard Contracts and General 
Conditions’ (1968) 17 Int’l & Comp.L.Q., 551, 554. 
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designated an applicable law. Thus, the Convention grants to the usages the 
character of an implied term.134  
The requirement of the binding character of the usages is patent in all 
provisions that enshrine them and also in judicial and arbitral decisions,135 e.g. 
the aforementioned article 38 (1) b) of the Statute of International Court of 
Justice provides:  
 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.  
 
There must be a conjunction of usus and opinio iure atque necessitatis 
or, in other words, what is generally regarded as necessary and binding, in 
order to set up a rule of customary law. This aspect is rightly expressed by 
Goode:  
 
Perhaps the most satisfactory way of capturing the element of obligation without 
reference to law is to say that the usage relied on must be one which is considered by 
the relevant mercantile community to bear on the making, proof, interpretation, 
performance or enforcement of the parties’ commercial engagements towards each 
other.136 
 
Usages, as it is logically understood, diverge from one sector of trade 
to another. There are usages applicable to international sales of goods – they 
can be particularly related to a specific commodity like coffee or grain –, 
usages applicable to oil agreements and those peculiar for the construction 
                                               
134 Article 9 (1) CISG provides that parties are bound by usages to which they have agreed 
and by any practices they have established between themselves. In the case of silence of the 
parties, article 9 (2) declares that parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have 
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew 
or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly 
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned. See B 
Audit, ‘The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria’ in Carbonneau (n 42) 193. 
135 Among the numerous cases in national jurisprudence, see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v 
Bankers Trust Co. [1989] Q.B. 728. In international arbitration, see ad hoc award of 29 of May 
1979 in: (1982) 7 Yb Comm. Arb’n 81. This international case, involving two Dutch traders of 
an Indian commodity with destination to the United Kingdom, was solved exclusively under 
the consideration of the existence of determined trade usages.   
136 Goode (n 17) 10. 
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industry, just to name some examples. This distinction is relevant in practice 
on the grounds of proof, ‘for the more general the asserted usage the greater 
its affinity with a general principle of law and the lower the burden of showing 
that it is generally known’.137 An example of a usage that acquired such a 
general character to become a general principle of law is the rebus sic 
stantibus principle.138 
 
As regards regional expressions of the lex mercatoria, Kilian Bälz 
writing on Islamic financial law – which has formulated general principles and 
standards whose claim to validity is not dependent on the support of any 
national legal order – raises the question in terms of regionalism versus 
universalism of the lex mercatoria.139 
The author holds that internationalization, not only increases 
harmonization and promotes standardization at a global level but also, 
generates a new pluralism in its own right, based on regional or cultural 
common ties.  
It is submitted here that it is not correct to present the lex mercatoria in 
terms of opposition to non-national manifestations of commercial law in the 
regions. The lex mercatoria, as a spontaneous phenomenon, springs from the 
common sense and the practice of the business and legal communities, rather 
than from governmental intervention; therefore, it includes regional 
expressions. Islamic finance law would be an expression of the lex mercatoria 
in a particular area of commerce. Thus, if it would appear that the parties have 
not specified the particular rules of the lex mercatoria, for example the 
UNIDROIT Principles, the financial Islamic law would supply the solution. 
 
1.1.1.5  APPLICABILITY 
 
In practice, arbitrators sometimes apply a national law and, additionally, 
in order to corroborate their findings, they also refer to a particular norm of the 
                                               
137 Ibid 12. 
138 See n 85. 
139 Kilian Bälz, ‘Islamic Law as Governing Law under the Rome Convention. Universalist Lex 
Mercatoria v. Regional Unification of Law’ (2001) 6 Unif.L.Rev. 37. 
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lex mercatoria.140  This denotes the level of approval that the lex mercatoria 
currently enjoys among traders, as it is considered by arbitrators in order to 
validate their decisions.141 
Legal experts insist unanimously on the difficulty of finding out reliable 
data about the applicability of the lex mercatoria. Based on limited data only, 
such as the publication of awards by the ICC, some authors have been able to 
form conclusions. Dalhuisen, for instance, holds, ‘The empirical evidence 
suggests that parties do not specifically apply the general principles of the lex 
mercatoria as proper law in their arbitration agreement or, if so, do it to 
supplement rather than displace national law’.142  
Lord J Mustill offers a new argument that excuses the researcher from 
seeking the explicit mention of the lex mercatoria as the applicable law: 
 
Whether an arbitrator who approaches the matter in this way feels it necessary to 
employ the lex mercatoria or some established technique of a national system, some 
of the implication of a term, or whether he does not rationalize what he is doing but 
simply goes ahead and does it, is unlikely to make any difference in all but small 
minority of cases.143 
 
Indeed, practitioners and arbitrators usually apply the lex mercatoria 
without taking into consideration that they are doing so. Lowenfeld, who is an 
experienced arbitrator, states: ‘I think in fact many arbitral decisions make use 
of this approach, often without fully articulating it, and without an express 
discussion about whether an international law merchant really exists’.144  
Lowenfeld does not explicitly support the lex mercatoria as an 
autonomous system of law but believes in the existence of an ‘international 
way’ or ‘international solution’ to solve some matters differing from national 
                                               
140 See Y Derains, ‘New Trends in the Practical Application of the ICC Rules of Arbitration’ 
(1981) 3 Nw.J.Int’l L.& Bus. 40. See also ‘Cours d’Arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce 
Internationale. Chronique des Sentences Arbitrales’ (1982) 109 JDI (Clunet) 968. 
141 Cf. in www.unilex.info the following awards: ad hoc arbitration held in Helsinki at 
28.01.1998 where the arbitrator based the decision on article 36 of the Nordic Contract Law 
and, in addition, referred to article 7.4.13 (2) of the UNIDROIT Principles. Another interesting 
case is the ICC arbitral award n. 8540 of 04.09.1996 where the UNIDROIT Principles were 
used to confirm the conclusion reached by applying the law of the State of New York. 
142 Dalhuisen (n 101) 604. 
143 Lord J Mustill (n 103) 182. 
144 A Lowenfeld, ‘The Two-Way Mirror: International Arbitration as Comparative Procedure’ 
(1985) 7 Mich. YBI Legal Stud. 163, 182. 
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laws,145 such as: force majeure, the obligation to mitigate damages and 
dealing in good faith. Specifically, he states that: 
 
The elements of good faith or fair dealing, as seen by the arbitrators, came not from 
the internal law of a given state, but from perceptions of the arbitrators about how 
merchants in international transactions generally do behave and expect each other to 
behave … I see the denomination of lex mercatoria as an attempt, only partly 
successful, to give doctrinal support to what arbitrators actually do.146  
 
What Lowenfeld missed in his analysis of 1985 is that nowadays good 
faith is one of those areas where there is more agreement than discord 
between national laws.147  
Vogenauer adds data in the line of parties upholding the applicability of 
the lex mercatoria:  
 
The empirical evidence shows that businesses hardly make use of the existing 
possibility to ‘opt into’ soft law instruments, such as the PICC and the PECL, if they 
subject their cross-border transactions to international commercial arbitrations. But 
this evidence also highlights that businesses are not averse to the idea of an optional 
instrument as such and would appreciate the possibility to choose a neutral contract 
law regime.148 
 
A concrete example that reflects this trend is the choice of law clause 
contained in the Channel Tunnel contract, one of the most important 
infrastructures of modern times. Clause 68 of this contract provides: 
 
‘[t]he construction, validity and performance of the contract shall in all respects be 
governed and interpreted in accordance with the principles common to both, English 
                                               
145 Though, according to the author, in the majority of cases the result reached by legal 
systems does not radically change. Zimmermann and Whittaker edited a book where 30 
cases concerning good faith were analysed by jurists and lawyers coming from different 
European jurisdictions. The results revealed that, despite quite different points of departure, 
there is convergence in the solutions offered by national laws. See R Zimmermann and S 
Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law (CUP, Cambridge 2000). 
146 Lowenfeld (n 144) 184.  
147 See Chapter Two. 
148 S Vogenauer, ‘Common Frame of Reference and UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Coexistence, Competition, or Overkill of Soft Law?’ (2010) 6 ERCL 
143. The paper can be obtained from the Social Science Research Network electronic library 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581352> accessed 29 April 2011. The quotation is from p. 39 of 
the digital version. 
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and French law, and in the absence of such common principles by such general 
principles of international trade law as have been applied by national and 
international tribunals. Subject in all cases, with respect to the works to be 
respectively performed in the French and in the English part of site, to the respective 
French or English public policy provisions (emphasis added).149 
 
The lex mercatoria means an alternative, not only for national law but 
also, to the sound unification of laws by states. The dilemma that this 
phenomenon invariably faces is: the unification regional or universal? In the 
lex mercatoria the adoption of customs and rules has been determined by the 
necessities of trade; therefore, some of them will be of universal application, 
some others, regionally implemented. Lex mercatoria accepts the peculiarities 
of legal training and legal traditions.  It will be seen in Chapter Four of this 
thesis that states, on purpose or not, recognize this advantage of the lex and, 
for that reason, they recall the UNIDROIT Principles as a model for their own 
unification of law process.150    
Furthermore, the applicability of the lex mercatoria by arbitrators is 
accepted by national procedural rules. For example, in previous years the 
prevailing view in England was that English arbitrators must apply English 
conflict of law rules to find the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, and 
that they could not apply any substantive law other than that of a fixed and 
recognisable system.151 Even in 1993 the lex mercatoria was not included in 
                                               
149 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. and Another v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. and Others 
[1992] Q.B. 656, 664-5. See K P Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (2nd 
edn Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2010) 57. 
150 See the analysis of the Uniform Act on Contract by OHADA in Africa and the Inter-
American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts by CIDIP in Chapter 
Four, Sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
151 Justice Megaw in Orion Cía Española de Seguros v Belfort Maatschappij [1962] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 257, held that arbitrators are bound, in general, to apply a fixed and recognisable 
system of law. When the same clause came before the Court of Appeal in Eagle Star 
Insurance Co. Ltd. v Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 357, Lord Denning said of 
Justice Megaw's decision, at p. 361: ‘He was of opinion that such a clause was invalid and 
should be given no effect. Despite its presence, the arbitrators were to decide in accordance 
with the ordinary rules of law. If the arbitrators did not do so, their award could be set aside by 
means of a case stated’. As regards this orthodox doctrine, C Clarkson and J Hill in The 
Conflict of Laws (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 254-5 states: ‘At common law, it was assumed 
that English arbitrators were bound to apply the choice of law rules which were binding on the 
English courts. This rule was the consequence of the traditional English approach that awards 
could be reviewed by the courts on points of law, including choice of law issues’. Further to 
this last aspect, Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 KB 478 reads: ‘Arbitrators must 
understand that parties before them have a right to take the opinion of the Court as to 
whether the arbitrators should be given the guidance of the Court in matters of law, and that 
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Dicey and Morris – one of the leading works on private international law in 
England – because it was not considered a fixed and recognisable system.152 
However, the new Arbitration Act 1996 has changed English law on this point. 
As a premise to explain this Act, it is necessary to set forth article 28 (1) of the 
UN (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 
which provides: 
 
The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the 
rules of law as are chosen by the parties. 
 
 The emphasised rules of law include the lex mercatoria; in other words, 
the parties may choose the lex mercatoria to govern their contract.  
 
 Section 46 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides:  
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute 
(a) in accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to 
the substance of the dispute, or 
(b) if the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations 
as are agreed between them or determined by the tribunal. 
Section 46 (3) provides that: if or to the extent that there is no such 
choice or agreement, the tribunal shall apply the law determined by the 
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
 
In the explanatory notes to the Act (July 1995) made by the 
Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration it was stated that the cited 
                                                                                                                                      
they must not attempt to stop the action of the Courts by interfering with or hindering such a 
right of parties’. As regards the choice of law rules binding on the English Courts, see the 
following cases: Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceutical Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 
19, [2004] 1 WLR 1784; and Halpern v Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ 291, [2007] 3 WLR 849.  
See the explanation of the traditional approach of English Courts in: O Lando ‘The Lex 
Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 ICLQ 747, 758-9; and R 
Coulson, ‘International Arbitration a World of Options’ in Arbitration under International 
Commercial Contracts (Oceana, New York 1982) 49. 
152 O Lando, ‘Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws: A Review’ (1998) 47 Int’l & Comp.L.Q. 
394.  
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section corresponds to Article 28 of the Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.153  
The fourteenth edition of Dicey & Morris (year 2006) notes the changes 
made by the Arbitration Act 1996 stating: 
 
In England, prior to the 1996 Act (emphasis added), it was axiomatic that an English 
arbitrator was bound to apply English law, including the English conflict of laws rules 
to decide the substance of any dispute, and many of the most important cases in the 
conflict of laws arose by way of appeal on matters of law from arbitral awards. The 
other consequence of this approach was that, just as in the English courts (emphasis 
added), an English arbitrator could only apply a national legal system, designated as 
applicable by the relevant choice of law rule. The tribunal could not apply non-
national rules, still less decide the dispute ‘ex aequo et bono’ or as an ‘amiable 
compositeur’, on the basis of general principles of justice and fairness.154 
 
Pursuant to s.46 (1) (b), Dicey & Morris state: 
 
This option allows the parties the freedom to apply a set or rules or principles which 
do not in themselves constitute a legal system. Such a choice may thus include a 
non-national set of legal principles (such as the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts) or, more broadly, general principles of 
commercial law or the lex mercatoria.155 
 
Additionally, there is recent evidence of jurisprudential recognition of 
the lex mercatoria in English law. The English courts have recognized that on 
the basis of the Arbitration Act 1996 Section 46(1) (b) the parties are allowed 
the freedom to apply the lex mercatoria. In Musawi v RE International (UK) 
Ltd.156 it was decided that section 46(1) (b) of the Arbitration Act had entitled 
the parties to require the arbitrator to apply to the subject matter of the dispute 
and its resolution the principles of Shia Sharia law. A paragraph in this 
judgement states: 
 
                                               
153 Department of Trade and Industry, Consultative Paper on Arbitration Bill (July 1995), 
Section 1 and Section 2: Draft Clauses of an Arbitration Bill, 38.  
154 Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws Vol 1 (14th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2006) para. 16-047. 
155 Ibid para. 16-053. 
156 [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. (Ch) 326.  
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[S]ection 46 (1) (b) allows the parties the freedom to apply a set of rules or principles 
which do not in themselves constitute a legal system. Such a choice may thus include 
a non-national set of legal principles (such as the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts) or, more broadly, general principles of 
commercial law or the lex mercatoria.157 
 
The lex mercatoria has been recognized by the European Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration (Geneva 21 April 1961) which allows 
the parties to determine by agreement the law applicable to the substance of 
the dispute; consequently, national courts must enforce arbitral awards 
rendered in accordance with the lex mercatoria. In addition, this kind of award 
has not been set aside by the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958.  
 
The most notable of the major international arbitral rules sanctioning 
the lex mercatoria are the ICC Rules in which article 17 (1) provides that: 
 
The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by 
the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any 
such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which 
it determines to be appropriate. 
 
To like effect: articles 14.2 and 22.3 of the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules.  
These norms of the ICC and the LCIA allow the parties and arbitrators 
to apply whatever rules of law they consider appropriate. It is important to note 
that the arbitral tribunal is not required to choose the applicable ‘rules of law’ 
by reference to a rule of conflict. It may apply the rules of law that it considers 
appropriate. Furthermore, these norms allow the application of the lex 
mercatoria, as has been widely recognized.158 
                                               
157 Though, it must be said that issues concerning the arbitration agreement itself were 
governed by English law. 
158 See J Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and 
Trade Law. Vol. 1 (4th edn Oxford, Hart 2010) 181; and also Y Derains and E Schwartz, A 
Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2nd edn Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2005) 
233. 
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Particular attention must be paid to the reception of the lex mercatoria 
in France where a government decree of 12 May 1981 has added new 
provisions on international arbitration to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
According to article 1496 the arbitrator applies to the contract the rules of law 
which the parties have chosen and, when no choice has been made, those 
which he considers appropriate (celles qu’il estime appropriées). The expert 
also takes into account all customs in commercial activities. 
Leading French authors state that the new provisions of Title V 
International Arbitration of the Code of Civil Procedure in France 
acknowledge, not only the principle of party autonomy in international trade 
but also, the existence and development of rules of law other than those 
contained within the narrow framework of a single national legal system.159 
The Dutch Code of Civil Procedure of 1986 (Book Four: Arbitration, 
articles 1054 and 1065) considers the application of the lex mercatoria by 
arbitrators. In this case the reference to the lex mercatoria is without doubt on 
the grounds of the Explanatory Report that defines the lex mercatoria as 
generally accepted usages in international trade which are autonomous from 
national law. Furthermore, a second Report added that lex mercatoria 
encompasses transnational rules and principles of law.160 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(Rome 1980) does not permit the application of a law which is not a state one. 
In Europe the Convention was improved by the European Commission 
through the Regulation n. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation (Rome I).161 
                                               
159 Cf. E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1999). See also 
Dalhuisen (n 158) 181. P Fouchard in ‘L’Arbitrage International in France après le Décret du 
12 Mai 1981’ (1982) 109 JDI (Clunet) 374, 395-6 states that by the expression ‘rules of law’, 
article 1496 enshrines what scholarship tends to designate today with the general term lex 
mercatoria. 
160 Cf. De Ly (n 20) 250. This modern trend of arbitration laws, which allows arbitrators to 
apply the lex mercatoria, is considered by Mistelis to have a positive impact on arbitration. He 
calls this option ‘Voie directe, backed by a lex arbitralis materialis’ in L Mistelis, ‘The 
UNIDROIT Principles applied as “Most Appropriate Rules of Law” in a Swedish Arbitral 
Award’ (2003) 8 Unif.L.Rev. 631, 634. 
161 This Regulation, which entered into force on 24 July 2008, converted the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community instrument. 
See Nils Willem Vernooij in (2009) 15 Colum.J.Eur.L. Online 71. In regard to the notable 
improvement contained in article 4 of the Regulation, which specified the general and vague 
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However, national law remains the applicable law, i.e. the lex mercatoria 
cannot be chosen by the parties as the applicable law to their contract.162 
The situation is different in the Americas, where the lex mercatoria is 
particularly vigorous today. The Fifth Inter-American Specialized Conference 
on International Private Law of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
approved the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts (Mexico 1994).163 In this Convention, even if the law 
regulating international contracts is the law of a certain state, in two articles 
rules of international or non-national character have been mentioned. In other 
words, the supplementary role of the lex mercatoria is accepted. The norms 
are: article 9, which mentions amongst the criteria that judges have to take 
into account in order to determine the state law applicable, ‘the general 
principles of international commercial law recognized by international 
organizations’; and article 10, which provides: 
 
In addition to the provisions in the foregoing articles, the guidelines, 
customs, and principles of international commercial law as well as 
commercial usage and practices generally accepted shall apply in 
order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity in the 
particular case.164 
 
                                                                                                                                      
‘Rome’s rule’ of application of the law with which the contract was more closely connected, 
see the Guidance on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations on: 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/guidance-law-contractual-obligations-romei.pdf> 
accessed 29 April 2011 
162 However, the proposal of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) adopted in Brussels 15/12/2005 foresaw the possibility to 
include the UNIDROIT and the PECL as the applicable law: ‘To further boost the impact of the 
parties' will, a key principle of the Convention, paragraph 2 authorises the parties to choose 
as the applicable law a non-State body of law. The form of words used would authorise the 
choice of the UNIDROIT principles, the Principles of European Contract Law or a possible 
future optional Community instrument, while excluding the lex mercatoria, which is not precise 
enough, or private codifications not adequately recognised by the international community’. 
Although this exclusion seems categorical, in practical terms this proposal accepted the lex 
mercatoria, since the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL enshrine the essence of the lex 
mercatoria (See Chapter Four, Sections 4.2 and 4.3) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/resume.jsp?id=5301232&eventId=922934&backToCaller
=NO&language=en> accessed 16 February 2010.  
163 See the content summary of the Convention in: (1994) 33 ILM 732.  
164 See a further analysis in Chapter Four, Section 4.6 
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1.1.1.6 PROCEDURAL LEX MERCATORIA 
 
 
According to national and international regulations the pattern is that 
the parties have the right to fix procedural rules for the arbitration. If they fail to 
do it, the arbitrator has the power to decide the best way to conduct the 
process, taking account of the needs of the case and the expectations of the 
parties.  
The aforementioned regulations enshrine what were once normal 
practices. All of them demonstrate certain level of globalization of arbitral 
procedure, e.g.: IBA Rules on Evidence, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 
other Institutional Arbitration Rules.165  
Undoubtedly, the globalization of procedural rules of international 
arbitration is a fertile field to explore.166 However, as the present work has a 
substantive approach to the lex mercatoria, focusing on a particular principle –
good faith –, this issue will not be further developed. Instead, under the 
present heading the role of the arbitrator in the development of the lex 
mercatoria is examined.167  
This outlook entails an important phenomenon that is taking place in 
international trading dispute resolution and which could be labelled as the 
‘supremacy of the iurisdictio over legislation in the global society’.168 The 
global community of merchants confers on the arbitrator the power/duty to 
decide on the basis of what this society freely accepts as binding. Here, 
Cremades in an article ahead of its time states: 
 
Arbitral decision making has introduced a new commercial ethic into the international 
business community. The constant flow of arbitration awards is nourishing a new 
                                               
165 Cf. G Kaufmann-Kohler ‘Globalization of Arbitral Procedure’ (2003) 36 Vand.J.Transnat’l L. 
1313. 
166 See ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure of May 2004. The proper 
text reads, ‘These Principles are standards for adjudication of transnational commercial 
disputes’. There are 31 principles prepared by academics with the aim to reconcile 
differences among national rules of civil procedure. The purpose of that work is to serve as a 
model for the reform or elaboration of national procedural codes and for application – by 
analogy – to commercial arbitration processes. 
167 Schmitthoff rightly asserts: ‘The new law merchant as an autonomous legal regulation is 
founded on the complementary interaction of party autonomy and arbitration’. C Schmitthoff, 
‘International Business Law: A New Law Merchant’ in Chia-Jui Cheng (ed) Clive M. 
Schmitthoff’s Select Essays on International Trade Law (Martinus Nijhoff, London 1988) 33. 
168 See F Galgano, La Globalizzazione nello Specchio del Diritto (Il Mulino, Bologna 2005). 
 56
legal order that is born of, and particularly suited to, regulating world business… 
Arbitration grants a true ‘opinio iuris’ to the practices regularly used in the business 
world (emphasis added).169  
 
The publication of arbitral awards constitutes an invaluable way to 
know the lex mercatoria. On the other hand, over the years there have been 
numerous attempts aimed to ‘formalize’ the lex mercatoria, e.g., the 
impressive list of rules called Transnational Law Digest and Bibliography 
(TLDB) which is compiled on a continuous basis by the Centre for 
Transnational Law (CENTRAL) at the University of Cologne, under the 
guidance of Klaus Peter Berger.170 Another example of standardization of the 
lex mercatoria is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts. Dasser commenting on Berger’s work in CENTRAL makes a 
distinction between the principles and rules here compiled – retaining them as 
part of the lex mercatoria – and the UNIDROIT Principles, which, according to 
him, may not be regarded as a codification of the lex mercatoria, but just as a 
source of inspiration due to their basis in comparative law and common 
sense.171 
Nottage, taking into account this formalisation of the lex mercatoria, 
announces an imminent return to less structured norms applicable to 
international contracts.172 
Since the work of arbitrators studying the facts, coordinating rules and 
exploring the needs of the parties and expectations of the international 
community is at the basis of this dynamic view of the lex mercatoria,173 is it 
possible to deduce that the substance of rendered awards should have 
precedential value? 
                                               
169 B Cremades, ‘The Impact of International Arbitration on the Development of Business Law’ 
(1983) 31 Am.J.Comp.L. 526. 
170 Available at <http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/> accessed 29 April 2011. 
171 F Dasser (n 46) 135. Cf. also F Rongeat-Oudin and M Oudin, ‘The Reception of the 
UNIDROIT Principles by the Lex Mercatoria: The Example of Good Faith’ (2009) 6 IBLJ 697. 
In Chapter Four, Section 4.2 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
shall be analysed at length.  
172 L Nottage, ‘The Procedural Lex Mercatoria: the Past, Present and Future of International 
Commercial Arbitration’ Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=838028>  accessed 14 February 2008, 
4 
173 Lando (n 47) 752 points out that the arbitrator is acting in this role as a ‘social engineer’.  
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There are different positions on the subject. Opponents of the lex 
mercatoria contend that the law-making process is exclusively a state political 
function and that arbitrators hired to solve a single case can never issue 
determinations that have the force of law or be sources of autonomous rules 
of law. Conversely, Carbonneau maintains that states have legitimised the 
procedure of arbitration, its autonomy and, by strengthening its results, 
enforce them; therefore the content of arbitral awards can have precedent 
value.174  
Then there is the issue about the character of the arbitrator when 
applying lex mercatoria: is he always acting as amiable compositeur and 
deciding ex equo et bono in these cases? The answer of all supporters of the 
lex mercatoria is categorical: those terms are not implied. It is not possible to 
equate amiable composition and ex equo et bono with the lex mercatoria, 
because that would make the lex mercatoria and equity identical – but those 
terms are not interchangeable; ‘the lex mercatoria obliges the arbitrator to 
base his decision on the law merchant even when equity might lead him to 
another result’.175 
Naturally, arbitrators acting as amiable compositeurs are allowed to 
apply the lex mercatoria. An illustration of this is the ICC award n. 3540 given 
on the 3 October 1980. An arbitral clause designated Geneva as the place of 
arbitration and stated the law of the Canton of Geneva as applicable to 
procedural matters. The arbitrators were to decide as amiable compositeurs. 
Of core significance to this purpose is that throughout the parties disagreed on 
the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. The defendant pleaded 
French law as the substantive law applicable. The claimant, however, 
submitting to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, wished that Swiss law be 
applied. The arbitral tribunal considered that it had to decide this with 
reference to the rule of conflict which it deemed appropriate, according to 
article 13.3 of the ICC Rules. Hence, the arbitral tribunal, deciding as amiable 
compositeur, stated that it would examine what the applicable law was by 
analyzing the indications given to it and by finding inspiration in the general 
                                               
174 Cf. Carbonneau (n 42) 12.  
175 Lando (n 47) 754-5. 
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principles developed in this respect by the recent case law of arbitral tribunals, 
particularly those constituted under the auspices of the ICC.176 
  
1.1.1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The lex mercatoria does exist in modern times as a real alternative for 
the regulation of controversies related to commercial contracts. This assertion 
is made in light of the effective application by parties to an international 
contract and by arbitral tribunals (this last aspect will be explored further in 
Chapter Five); and also in light of its recognition by national and international 
rules.  
The lex mercatoria must be articulated in connection with national laws, 
since there are fundamental aspects of contracts not included in the lex 
mercatoria, such as the capacity of the parties.177 
The lex mercatoria existed in Europe in the Medieval Age and in the 
Modern Era until it was included in national laws starting from the seventeenth 
century. The lex mercatoria of our day has prompted a new perspective of 
good faith, which is the subject of the chapters that follow. 
 As regards the future of the lex mercatoria some facts need to be 
stated as a premise. After the creation of states and the tenacious defence of 
their sovereignty, what prevails nowadays is the creation of zones of free 
trade and labour worldwide.178 It is stated here that the trend of 
internationalization of the economy seems very difficult to reverse. Therefore, 
since national regulations are not able to offer satisfactory answers to the 
challenges of international trade, the conclusion appears logical: the main 
instrument of innovation will continue being the contract – mainly the 
circulation of international models of contract – and what practitioners feel to 
be binding. The development of the lex mercatoria is unavoidable, although in 
its creeping mode, as has been evident in recent times. 
                                               
176 (1982) 7 Yb Comm. Arb’n 124. Article 13.3 of the ICC Rules was modified in 1998 and 
replaced by the new article 17. See n 159 and accompanying text. 
177 For example article 3.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles reads: Matters not covered. These 
Principles do not deal with invalidity arising from 
(a) lack of capacity; 
(b) immorality or illegality. 
178 Even zones in current dispute for their sovereignty attempt to create this zone of liberty.  
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1.2 OBJECTIVES 
 
Since there is no study explaining the meaning of good faith in the lex 
mercatoria, the inclusion of the principle in international conventions – such as 
CISG179 – and also the approval of initiatives containing it at international or 
regional level are hindered. The following is an example of this situation: on 
1st July 2010 the European Commission presented a Green Paper with policy 
options for progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and 
businesses180 based on the Draft of the Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR).181 As regards DCFR, the English position was that it involved too 
much discretion, and hence uncertainty, by the use of ‘an astonishing number 
of vague and ambiguous terms, concepts such as “reasonableness” and 
“good faith”’.182 It is submitted here that, if the lex mercatoria is to continue to 
prevail in the area of international transactions that has become aware of the 
particularity of its needs and the strength of its agents to produce adequate 
solutions, then at all costs good faith must be presented with clarity. This 
would be a useful means to enhance the harmonization of law as well. 
This study seeks to examine the nexus between these two 
developments in international trade: the emergence of the lex mercatoria; the 
evolution of good faith as its essential principle. It analyses the meaning given 
to good faith by practitioners and arbitral tribunals in contracts governed by 
the lex mercatoria. It seeks to demonstrate the hypothesis that this concept is 
objective (there is no attempt to search for the intentions of the parties) and 
that it is related to the needs of commerce nowadays.  
The argument is addressed through the study of the development of 
good faith in history and in particular national laws from the civil and common 
law areas in order to establish: 
                                               
179 Good faith in CISG has been included in article 7 for the interpretation of the Convention 
but not for the interpretation of the contract. See Chapter Four, Section 4.1. 
180 The consultation ran until 31 January 2011. 
181 C Von Bar, E Clive and H Schulte-Nölke (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law; Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (Sellier, Munich 2009). 
See the analysis of the DCFR in Chapter Four, Section 4.4. 
182 House of Lords, ‘European Contract Law: the Draft Common Frame of Reference’ (HL 
Paper 95) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/95/95.pdf> 
accessed 7 June 2010. 
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a) If good faith is a static or flexible concept, viz. whether it has evolved in 
history; 
b)  Whether good faith is understood in a different way in national laws; 
c) The points of contact between the extensive background of good faith 
in history and in national laws and the current meaning given to it in the 
lex mercatoria. 
Therefore, instead of operational standards to qualify good faith in the 
lex mercatoria – which have been offered by, for instance, North American 
authors like Summers, Burton and others from the time good faith was 
incorporated into the UCC, as it is explained in Chapter Two Section 2.5.1 – 
the purpose of this thesis is rather to depict the current panorama of good 
faith in the lex mercatoria and to determine the reasons for the current 
meaning of good faith. The philosophical foundations of the concept of good 
faith will be dealt with also.183 
The task is not free from difficulties. Good faith is a concept essentially 
difficult to define in immutable words simply because it represents the 
conceptions of ‘good’ and ‘fair’ in a determined culture and time. In national 
legal systems ruled by statutes and under the aegis of jurisprudence the term 
tends to assume a more or less established meaning or understanding. 
Undoubtedly, in the lex mercatoria such a meaning does exist;184 but it must 
be made explicit here due to the nature of this system made up of general 
principles and customs and applied by arbitral tribunals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
183 See Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
184 ‘The requisite of good faith is not in all places stipulated by words yet always by the 
principles of natural justice it is imperative’. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Ghest, ‘Natural Justice’, 
1973 (26) CLP 1, 7. 
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 1.3 IMPORTANCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
Berger, one of the most renowned supporters of the lex mercatoria, 
states that, ‘In the eyes of many practitioners, the notion of transnational law 
is limited to such general and vague principles as “good faith” and “pacta sunt 
servanda” which lack any concrete and workable content’.185 Advocates of the 
lex mercatoria have made scholarly efforts to overcome this through 
restatements of principles and internet platforms.186 However, there is a 
research gap in this regard, as the meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria 
(not only in particular representations of it or in national legal systems) is not a 
matter of current concern.  
In competent circles there is now essential agreement on each of the 
following propositions: 
- The emergence of customs and principles that are being applied to 
international contracts;187 
- The harmonization of law as a regional phenomenon, e.g.: EU, Africa 
(OHADA), the Americas (CIDIP) and the Caribbean (OHADAC); 
- Good faith is a principle present in national spheres188 and now in the 
aforementioned harmonized trade law. 
It just happens, however, that no one has connected these spheres in 
order to find out the current meaning of good faith in international contracts 
governed by the lex mercatoria. The aim of this study is to fill that gap by 
conducting an historical-comparative analysis of the principle. 
 
 
                                               
185 K P Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law International, 
London 1999) 5. This criticism comes from those who mainly point out the lack of 
‘definitiveness’ of the lex mercatoria, i.e., the fact that this has not been made in a set of rules 
directly applicable to resolve a dispute. 
186 Berger, for example, provides a list of 72 principles. The list comprises the following 
sources: the reception of general principles of law; the codification of international trade law 
by 'formulating agencies'; the case law of international arbitral tribunals; the law-making 
forces of international model contract forms and general conditions of trade; and finally the 
analysis of comparative legal science. It is available in the internet platform called the Trans-
Lex Principles <http://www.trans-lex.org/principles> accessed 30 April 2011. 
187 The dissension is whether they constitute an independent system of law. 
188 In civil law good faith is not only a classic theme – since it is the fulcrum of the legal 
system of obligations – but it is also increasing in importance: e.g. recently a number of 
sections inspired by good faith have been incorporated into §242 of the German BGB. In 
common law – as it will be seen – it is also gaining ground. 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
QUESTION 1: Is there a system of law called lex mercatoria? 
 
This question stresses the need to define the field where the main 
subject is developed. There is no agreement over the lex mercatoria’s 
existence and content. The debate about the existence of an autonomous set 
of rules that transcend national boundaries and is applied to international 
commerce by arbitrators seems infinite: is there a non-national lex 
mercatoria? Is it a law totally separated from the state? Is lex mercatoria a law 
beyond the state? The polemic and the hundreds of writings addressing the 
issue point, at the least, to the existence of a legal phenomenon based on 
international trading. Far from remaining impartial, a supportive view about the 
existence of the lex mercatoria is assumed here. 
 
 
QUESTION 2: Does the lex mercatoria exist as an absolute separate   
phenomenon from national laws? 
 
 It has been suggested that the lex mercatoria is not absolutely 
independent of domestic legislation. Firstly, important aspects, such as the 
validity of contracts and enforceability, are not covered by it. Secondly, traders 
and arbitrators interact in both fields. This is one of the reasons – the 
subjective element – that prompted the hypothesis that there could be some 
influence of national legislations over the concept of good faith in 
transnational law. The possibility of a unified concept of good faith in national 
and in international spheres shall be also explored. 
 
 
QUESTION 3: What is the meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria? 
 
This is the fundamental question of this project. The establishment of 
the understanding of good faith in the lex mercatoria is essential for the 
reliability of this transnational system of law. It will help parties to understand 
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the meaning and scope of the duty they undertake and by what standards 
their conduct will be judged. It will be useful for arbitrators as well. However, in 
order to answer this question, a number of concerns relating to the lex 
mercatoria and to the role of good faith in this context must be addressed. 
 
 
QUESTION 4: Is there a unified understanding of good faith in the lex 
mercatoria?  
 
The theory of good faith as a cooperative element that permeates the 
contract is proposed in this study.189 The fundamental thesis is this: the 
necessities of global trade, the intervention of arbitrators from different legal 
backgrounds and the development of the contract theory have influenced the 
meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria. Practical evidence and theory are 
considered in the following three chapters in order to prove these arguments. 
 
 
QUESTION 5: Is the current concept of good faith in the sense of cooperation 
a desirable outcome?  
 
Good faith is a wide principle, present in many institutions in national 
legislations, as has been stated in Section 1.1 of this Introduction. In the 
international sphere several intergovernmental instruments and all 
restatements of principles enclosing the lex mercatoria contemplate good faith 
as an essential principle. Thus, the relevance given to good faith in today’s 
law seems to suggest the convenience of its embracement. The historical-
comparative study will help establish the reasons for such an essential role.190 
With regard to its particular understanding as cooperation, in practice 
good faith is the rationale of a number of new forms of contracting, such as 
partnering, franchising, etc. Since good faith cooperation is attempting to 
move parties forward to the dedication of common goals, to the understanding 
and the sharing of culture in international trade, it would seem that it 
                                               
189 See Chapter Three. 
190 See Chapter Two. 
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represents a positive outcome. The analysis of arbitral awards will provide 
evidence for this hypothesis. However, it will also be argued that prior 
versions of good faith were not wrong but that they merely reflected the needs 
of their times. 
 
 
QUESTION 6: Is the concept likely to change over time? 
 
It will be proposed that good faith cooperation responds to the needs of 
global commerce; therefore, the probability of a change of meaning is 
associated with a change in the way to trade internationally.  
Is there any likelihood of a reduction or a radical change in the way of 
acting between traders from different nations? 
At this moment the certain datum is that global commerce governed by 
transnational law is increasing and, therefore, cooperation between merchants 
is likely to be emphasized. However, since it is proposed here that the notion 
of good faith in the lex mercatoria is also influenced by national laws, it is 
imperative to examine the trend followed by these systems in order to foresee, 
at least in the near future, what concept of good faith will prevail in 
transnational law.191 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The body of the thesis is divided into six chapters: 
Chapter One is introductory and helps to understand the lineaments of 
this study. Furthermore, this chapter provides an analysis of the literature on 
the lex mercatoria – the field in which this thesis is developed. 
Chapter Two is devoted to the study of the genesis of good faith as a 
legal concept from the historical perspective and to reveal how the principle 
works in civil and common law traditions. 
                                               
191 See Chapter Two, Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
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Chapter Three turns to the specific analysis of good faith in the lex 
mercatoria. It introduces the theory of good faith interpreted as cooperation. It 
also sets out the theoretical foundations of good faith cooperation.  
Chapter Four analyses the principle of good faith in international 
instruments representative of the lex mercatoria. 
Chapter Five examines the stance of arbitrators concerning good faith 
as part of the lex mercatoria. 
Chapter Six draws together the research answering the research 
questions proposed in the introduction and offering concluding remarks. 
 
 
1.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
For sixty years or so, the phenomenon of the ‘new lex mercatoria’ has 
been revived by scholarship and has proved a fertile ground of discussion in 
the literature. The principle of good faith has also been considered by myriads 
of studies in national legal systems and international instruments. However, 
the approach taken here is that the several points of view as regards good 
faith and the lex mercatoria need to be brought together in one coherent 
explanation in order to cover the totality of the principle. This thesis, by 
integrating national and transnational systems of law in the analysis and 
ranging over a variety of disciplines, inter alia, history, philosophy and political 
theories, offers a critical insight into the meaning given to good faith in the lex 
mercatoria from a practical point of view, in the face of emerging necessity for 
the parties’ contractual relationship. It also sheds light on the reasons for the 
current understanding. Hence, the principle is evaluated in its totality. 
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1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.7.1 PREMISES 
 
This literature review deals exclusively with the role of good faith within 
the lex mercatoria.192 It provides, from the perspective of scholarly 
contributions, a relatively general, synoptic overview of the subject of this 
thesis. This is a complex subject due to the long range of the principle of good 
faith and the debatable nature of the lex mercatoria. For this reason, some 
highly technical matters have been simplified at this stage. A further analysis 
is to be found in the pertinent chapters of this thesis. Hence this introductory 
synthesis of the literature is what experts call an ‘Integrated literature 
review’;193 it integrates contributions of scholars throughout the thesis – those 
cited in this review will be revisited and others not considered will be revealed 
during the thesis.  
This study offers a theory about the meaning of good faith in the lex 
mercatoria, a theory which mixes historical and comparative elements. 
However, this theory is not presented here but the elements that led to its 
elaboration are. The authors who provided the materials to lay the foundations 
of this theory are considered here. Of course, their contributions do not 
exhaust the modern discourse on the lex mercatoria and on good faith. Thus, 
as stated, numerous other relevant scholars will be cited throughout the 
thesis.   
What follows is an analysis of those works that have partially examined 
good faith in the lex mercatoria and in national laws. As expected, the 
discussion places the thesis in the context of the literature to show the need 
for this project; it also points the way forward for further research. 
 
1.7.2 GOOD FAITH IN TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCE TODAY  
 
 
Good faith is perceived in the lex mercatoria as a powerful tool to avoid 
rigid structures, allowing the arbitrator to adapt the contract according to the 
                                               
192 See a revision of the literature on the lex mercatoria in the Sub- section 1.1.1.  
193 D Ridley, Literature Review. A Step-by-Step Guide for Students (SAGE, London 2008) 7. 
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complex circumstances of the international trade.194 From a practical point of 
view, Carbonneau observes that,  
 
ICC arbitrators consider the good faith obligation as part of international commercial 
usages. They apply it as a matter of law. The view that good faith is a central element 
of cohesion in the operation of international commerce is supported by the generality 
of international awards and the accompanying scholarly commentary.195 
 
Despite this recognition, there is no clarity in professional and 
academic circles about the entire meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria. 
The studies only pursue the meaning of good faith in particular 
representations of the lex mercatoria and, therefore, they are limited to the 
specific instrument or set of principles where they are developed.196 This 
thesis fills this gap. 
In addition, this thesis postulates the influence of civil and common law 
on the development of the concept of good faith in the lex mercatoria. In order 
to prove this, it undertakes an historical-comparative approach inspired by 
Wieacker’s outlook that the history of law and comparative law are 
inseparable disciplines: ‘Since European law emerges from the interaction 
between new and vital kinds of law and the traditions of an ancient culture, 
one must know something of the relevant laws of general history in order to 
comprehend the process’.197  
                                               
194 Cf. D Corradini, Il Criterio della Buona Fede e la Scienza del Diritto Privato (Giuffrè, Milano 
1970). 
195 T Carbonneau, ‘A Definition of and Perspective upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate’ in 
Carbonneau (n 42) 17. 
196 For example: J Felemegas, ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sales of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’ (PhD thesis, University of 
Nottingham 2000); E A Farnsworth, ‘Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the 
UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions and National Laws’ (1995) 3 
Tul.J.Int’l & Comp.L. 47; A Hartkamp, ‘The Concept of Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principles 
for International Commercial Contracts’ (1995) 3 Tul.J.Int’l & Comp.L 65. 
197 F Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe. With Particular Reference to Germany (n 
80) 25; See also Wieacker, ‘The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and 
Western Legal Thought’ (1981) 4 B.C.Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. 257. When the author speaks 
about European law, he refers to the European legal culture or, according to Wieacker, ‘more 
precisely, the Atlantic-European. It includes, first of all, the whole continent in the 
geographical sense: between the seas in the North and the Mediterranean, between the 
Atlantic and the Ural Mountains. It includes further the European settlements in North 
America, as well as large parts of Central and South America, Northern Asia (Siberia), 
Australia, New Zealand, and the far South of Africa’. Wieacker, ‘Foundations of European 
Legal Culture’ (n 82) 5. 
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There are several texts addressing the subject of good faith in national 
laws: 
Among these is the book edited by Beatson and Friedmann Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law.198 It contains a number of contributions addressing 
the following issues: conditions for the creation of contractual obligations; 
contractual performance (good faith, control and adaptation); and remedies for 
non-performance. This wide spectrum of themes goes beyond the strict 
subject of good faith. Despite the fact that this book attempts an analysis of 
French law, German law and the law of the US, it is mainly focused on English 
law, as is clear from the book’s introduction. Besides, European rules are 
considered in order to assess their impact on English law. The authors’ target 
here is on private contracts with numerous national cases concerned with 
situations such as landlord and tenant, employer and employee and also 
consumer law. Accordingly, the commercial approach is absent. However, this 
thesis has been enhanced by the essays in this book in a number of ways.  
 The first of these is that, though it is outdated (for example, it does not 
consider the modification of the German Law of Obligations contained in the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB in 2002), the study of municipal legislations by 
the different authors has contributed to the realisation of the influence of 
national laws on the understanding of good faith in the lex mercatoria.  
 Secondly, this book has contributed to the elaboration of the theoretical 
background of this thesis, since it describes the reshaping of contract law in 
the modern period, especially in England where the inclusion of rules of 
exemption and unfair terms meant an increased control over the contractual 
regime – with the consequential limitation over the freedom of contract. The 
book also emphasizes the current phenomenon of the greater weight given to 
fairness in contract law. As regards this last aspect, it will be seen in this 
thesis that nowadays neither the Uniform Commercial Code in the US nor the 
Restatements of Principles embracing the lex mercatoria (such as, PICC and 
                                               
198 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995). 
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PECL) include the doctrine of consideration, which has been replaced, in fact, 
by the requirement of good faith.199 
 A modern classic in this area of good faith in Europe is the book edited 
by Whittaker and Zimmermann.200 The main scope of this book is to offer the 
perspective of different European legislations – by the analysis of scholars 
from different European legal systems – over thirty hypothetical cases related 
to good faith. Such an approach allows the contours of the concept to be 
identified through practical cases. This book also contains a number of articles 
written by leading experts in Roman law, medieval law and in the law of the 
US, and these have been useful for this thesis. The introductory article by the 
editors depicts excellently the current change in perspective regarding the re-
emergence of a European (as opposed to merely national) private law. The 
chapter also makes clear the difficulties in assessing a subject such as good 
faith and highlights its topical importance, since all member states of the 
European Union have implemented the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts.201  
The need for good faith in commercial transactions is an assumption of 
this thesis. This assumption will be founded on the history of law (Roman law 
and medieval law)202 and modern doctrine.203 In addition, court cases204 and 
arbitral awards reviewed (mainly) in Charter Five reveal that parties to a 
                                               
199 See J Gordley, An American Perspective on the Unidroit Principles (Centro di Studi e 
Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Roma 1996). 
200 Zimmermann and Whittaker (n 145). The same perspective – good faith considered in 
different European national laws – has been subject of commentary in a number of books and 
legal journals: See O Lando, ‘Good Faith in the Legal Systems of the European Union and in 
the Principles of European Contract Law’ in A Mordechai Rabello (ed), Equity in Civil Law and 
Mixed Jurisdictions. Papers presented at the Second International Conference on Aequitas 
and Equity (The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1993); G Morin, ‘Le 
Devoir de Coopération dans les Contrats Internationaux. Droit et Pratique’ (1980) 6 Droit et 
Pratique du Commerce International March 9. 
201 Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts of 1993 (ECC 93/13, 5 April 1993). See 
Chapter Two, n 190. 
202 Cf., inter alia, L Garofalo (ed), Il Ruolo della Buona Fede Oggettiva nell’Esperienza 
Giuridica Storica e Contemporanea: Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi in Onore di 
Alberto Burdese (Cedam, Padova 2003); W Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol. 5 (3rd 
edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1945); A Lattes, Il Diritto Commerciale nella Legislazione 
Statutaria delle Città Italiane (U. Hoepli, Milano 1884); P Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval 
Europe (2nd edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 1929).   
203 R Goode in Commercial Law (3rd edn Penguin, London 2004) 1208, for example, states: 
‘Commercial law is rooted in principles of good faith, the sanctity of the agreement, the 
recognition of trade usage as a source of contractual rights, and the maintenance of a fair 
balance between vested rights and the interests of third parties’. See Chapter Two n 244.  
204 See, for example, Socimer v Standard [2008] EWCA (Civ Div) 116 in Charter Two n 264 
and accompanying text. 
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commercial contract embrace good faith and also that judges apply this 
principle. However, there is an extreme position that rejects good faith in 
commercial matters, because it views good faith as ‘repugnant’ to the 
classical model of contract as self-interested exchange.205 This opinion, also, 
has a moderate version that accepts good faith as an ‘exception’. Brownsword 
explains that, according to this perspective, the requirement of good faith is 
introduced by a number of prohibitions against bad faith; such prohibitions 
serve to restrain the otherwise generally permissible pursuit of economic self-
interest in contract.206 
Other authors have also reflected on the extension of good faith in 
commercial law. An interesting, although arguable, view is that of Sims.207 
She elaborated an original theory about good faith as a layered principle or a 
principle composed by concentric circles: 
 
Each circle signifies one standard of good faith, and the distance of each circle from 
the centre determines its scope. The further away from the centre of the circle, the 
higher the standard of behaviour that will be expected from the parties. Commercial 
contracts, for example, are represented by a circle which is close to the centre, 
which means that the law will be relatively non-interventionist – it will require little 
more of the parties than actual honesty (emphasis added).208  
 
Sims’s argument, according to which good faith in commercial 
contracts must be reduced to honesty, cannot be sustained. It is an 
oversimplification. Although it may seem that law in this area is not 
interventionist, the truth is that a high degree of behaviour in good faith is 
asked of the parties, in the sense of the positive duties they have to fulfil. 
Steyn’s position, in fact, incorporates elements from Sims and the view held 
here in this thesis: 
                                               
205 Walford v Miles (1992) 2 WLR 174; [1992] 2 AC 128. 
206 R Brownsword, ‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1994) 7 JCL 197, 212. This view also fits 
with Summers’s analysis of good faith as an ‘excluder’ notion in R Summers, ‘Good Faith in 
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) 
Va.L.Rev. 54. See Chapter Two, n 160.  
207 V Sims, ‘Good Faith in Contract Law. A Comparative Analysis of English and German Law’ 
(PhD thesis, University of Cambridge 2003); and V Sims ‘Good Faith in Contract Law: of 
Triggers and Concentric Circles (2005) 16 KLJ 293. 
208 Sims, ‘Good Faith in Contract Law. A Comparative Analysis of English and German Law’ 
(n 207) 190.  
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Good faith has a subjective requirement: the threshold requirement is that the party 
must act honestly. That is an unsurprising requirement and poses no difficulty for the 
English legal system. But good faith additionally sets an objective standard, viz., the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the conclusion and 
performance of the transaction concerned.209   
 
In support of the view here proposed, Brownsword states:  
 
We should be careful, therefore, not to misconstrue Summers’s somewhat incautious 
remark that ‘a requirement of good faith is a minimal standard rather than a high 
ideal’. In practice, in certain commercial communities, even with good faith as an 
exception, a high degree of co-operation in contracting might be required. 210 
 
This statement is upheld in this thesis by the evidence found in the 
jurisprudence of English courts.211 
 
 
1.7.3 A BOOK ON GOOD FAITH AND THE LEX MERCATORIA 
 
A book called ‘Bona Fides und Lex Mercatoria’212 mainly explores the 
lex mercatoria in the European legal tradition, firstly, from an historical point of 
view and, afterwards, during the era of nationalization of laws. Bona fides in 
the modern lex mercatoria is also part of this book. However, despite the title, 
it is not central to Meyer’s book.213  Furthermore, it does not consider the 
effect of national laws on the meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria; 
likewise, arbitral awards are not considered in order to test pronouncements 
on this ambit; and sets of principles and international conventions are absent 
in the analysis. His book has a Europe-centric approach and, certainly, does 
not reflect upon manifestations of the lex mercatoria outside this ambit. This 
                                               
209 J Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 113 
LQR 433, 438.  
210 Brownsword (n 206) 213. 
211 See Socimer International Bank Limited (in liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd. 
[2008] EWCA (Civ Div) 116 in Chapter Two, n 264 and accompanying text. 
212 R Meyer, Bona fides und Lex Mercatoria in der Europäischen Rechtstradition (Wallstein 
Verlag, Göttingen 1995). 
213 Unfortunately, this book is confined to those who are able to read German. By contrast, 
this thesis, written in English, has the advantage of bringing ideas to a wider audience. See D 
Crystal, English as a Global Language (2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 2003). 
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thesis, on the other hand, considers manifestations of the lex mercatoria in the 
Americas, Africa and the Caribbean.214 However, there are points of 
coincidence between this book and this study, viz., the author’s position that it 
is not too hard to prove the importance of good faith in the development of 
commercial law: he says that, ‘it is a perennial element’.215 A point of 
fundamental difference between this book and this thesis is Meyer’s position 
that ‘A complete and definitive judgement on good faith in the 20th century’s 
commercial law is still not possible’.216 Sixteen years later, such a statement 
has been completely overtaken. This thesis means to offer an explanation and 
judgement on good faith in the modern transnational commercial law.  
 
1.7.4 A REVISED NOTION OF LIBERTY OF CONTRACT 
 
 Apart from history and municipal laws, there are a number of 
sociological and political theories which have influenced the concept of good 
faith in transnational trade law. Among those are: the ending of the nineteenth 
century’s theory of individualism; the consequential limitations imposed upon 
the freedom of contract; and the current cooperation between international 
traders.217 Atiyah in The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contracts and in 
‘Freedom of Contract and the New Right’ describes the beginning of the 
ideology of freedom of contract in the nineteenth century and its decline in the 
twentieth century.218 However, in the nineteen eighties freedom of contract 
seemed to have been re-established, at least, as the ideology of the common 
law.219  Nonetheless, during the same period the rules from the European 
Union started to exert influence upon national legislations in order to embrace 
good faith. 
The question is, therefore: is there a contradiction between freedom of 
contract and good faith? Strictly speaking there is no contradiction between 
                                               
214 See Chapter Four, Sections 4.5 and 4.6 
215 Meyer (n 212) 81. 
216 Meyer (n 212) 76.  
217 This thesis contains original reflections on cooperation in international trade. 
218 P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979); 
and P S Atiyah, Freedom of Contract and the New Right (Juridiska Fakulteten i Stockholm 
1988). 
219 Atiyah, Freedom of Contract and the New Right (n 218) 15.  
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those terms, because, as Atiyah recognizes, ‘It is impossible to ignore the 
idea of a fair exchange in contract law’.220 As stated before, this assumption is 
at the heart of this thesis. Most importantly, it stresses the fact that nowadays 
good faith is not seen as a restriction to freedom of contracts but as a result of 
a partnering approach in contracts.221 This feature is highlighted by 
Zimmermann who calls this the ‘Rematerialization of contract law’,222 to signify 
a renewed infusion into law of ethical imperatives. Collins is equally aware of 
this phenomenon: in his book, The Law of Contract, he considers that: ‘the 
concern about unjustifiable domination, the equivalence of the exchange, and 
the need to ensure co-operation … form the core of the interpretation of law of 
contract presented in this book’.223 Furthermore, there is evidence in the 
awards reported in this thesis about the effectiveness of this notion in the 
reality of international trade. For that reason, this theory defines the context of 
the present research and, ultimately, determines the answer of the main 
research question – the meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria.224
                                               
220 Ibid 11. 
221 See Atiyah, The Rise and Fall (n 218) 724; see Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
222 R Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition 
Today (OUP, Oxford 2001) 174. 
223 H Collins, The Law of Contract (4th edn LexisNexis, London 2003) 29. 
224 See Section 1.4 of this Introduction and Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER TWO – THE HISTORY OF GOOD FAITH AND ITS 
DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONAL LAWS 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 PREMISES 
 
It was suggested in Chapter One (Section 1.1.1) that the lex mercatoria 
arose as an alternative to international private law for the regulation of 
international contracts. Arbitral courts now are increasingly confronted with 
various types of problems which can be dealt with more efficiently by invoking 
the lex mercatoria and aided by national laws – in those matters not regulated 
by the lex mercatoria.  
The insufficiency of the lex mercatoria requires national laws to 
regulate certain areas. This has allowed the contact between both these 
systems and hence the transposition of their institutions. While the verification 
of this theory requires further research, the fact that practitioners who apply 
the lex mercatoria are acquainted with domestic regulations lends some 
instant credibility to it. Thus, these elements determine that this thesis on the 
meaning of good faith within the lex mercatoria should not disregard the 
national element. Yet, it was imperative to be selective about which national 
systems to consider. 
The following are the reasons for selecting particular jurisdictions of the 
civil and common law area. This thesis is mainly concerned with Western law 
traditions. France and Germany are generally used as the archetypical civil 
law jurisdictions and English Law as the main common law comparator.1 
These different traditions also represent different approaches to good faith. 
This thesis also examines the law of the United States which, being part of the 
common law area, has incorporated good faith in commercial contracts. 
The methodology used in the analysis of national laws is the systematic 
comparison proposed by Kamba.2 It consists of three phases: descriptive, 
identification and explanatory phases. The first takes the form of a description 
                                               
1 P De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Routledge-Cavendish, London 2007). 
2 W J Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 ICLQ 485, 511. 
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of the norms, concepts and institutions of the systems concerned. The second 
stage is concerned with the discernment of differences and similarities 
between the systems under comparative analysis. In the explanatory phase 
the resemblances and divergences are satisfactorily accounted for. Here, 
these phases are combined in the same discussion and are not dealt with as 
watertight compartments.  
However, for reasons which will be made explicit soon, the study of 
national laws was not sufficient. The evidence found during the preliminary 
research for this project suggested the need to investigate good faith in 
comparative legal history. This outlook helps discover the causes which 
underlie the origin, development and the present state of the concept of good 
faith in the lex mercatoria.3  
 
2.1.2 OBJECTIVES 
 
The previous sub-section delineates the aim of this chapter yet the 
following are more precise objectives – which show the link between this 
chapter and the following ones: 
 
- To establish the history of good faith. This knowledge is required in order to 
understand why good faith is such an essential principle and the reason for 
the meaning given to it in the new lex mercatoria. The historical dimension of 
good faith allows the thesis, not only to put in context the present situation but 
also, to predict future developments of the principle in the ambit of 
transnational law. 
 
- To determine how good faith is understood in civil and common law 
traditions and whether these traditions have different views of the concept 
                                               
3 Lambert at the First International Congress of Comparative Law held in Paris in 1900 
considered that comparative law had two purposes: ‘One is purely scientific, namely the 
discovery by means of a process of comparison of the causes which underlie the origin, 
development and extinction of legal institutions or, in other words, comparative legal history 
...The second domain of comparative law, i.e. comparative legislation, has, according to 
Lambert, a practical aim and is not a science but a form of legal technique’. H C Gutteridge, 
Comparative Law. An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study & Research 
(CUP, Cambridge 1946) 5-6. 
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nowadays. This discussion is essential to demonstrate the theory that good 
faith in the lex mercatoria is a juridical concept influenced by national laws. 
 
2.1.3 RELEVANCE 
 
The relevance of this chapter is twofold: theoretical and practical. 
In this thesis it will be demonstrated that the societas mercatorum4 
spontaneously understands and applies good faith as cooperation for the 
common good of everyone involved in the contract or affected by it. This is far 
from the moral concept of good faith in canon law, but closer to the utilitarian 
aim that prompted the inclusion of good faith into Roman law – in the ius 
gentium and in the bonae fidei iudicia – as will be seen in this chapter. 
Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, it is important to determine why 
good faith has been embraced in such a utilitarian way in some periods, 
whereas in others it has been the epitome of a set of values that the law has 
attempted to attain. 
Prima facie, it is possible to state that the structural role of good faith in 
all the periods of the law is explained by its connection with one of the guiding 
themes of all European legal and political philosophies – the dialogue 
between the theories of freedom and responsibility.5 At the basis of the 
contractual theory there is the individual and his freedom; integral to this 
premise is his responsibility towards the other party. Good faith stems from 
this tension because it is always in relation to another party. The following 
idea by Rodotà helps to understand how good faith concretizes responsibility 
towards that other: ‘If we want to turn to the old definition of contract by 
Durkheim as a “provisional truce between the parties” we can say that good 
faith is the rule of the rules of that truce. It is that that defines how this truce 
must be governed’.6 This judgement emphasizes the vital topicality of good 
                                               
4 Societas mercatorum or the international community of merchants 
5 Cf. F Wieacker, ‘Foundations of European Legal Culture’ (1990) 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 1. 
6 S Rodotà, ‘Il Tempo delle Clausole Generali’ in Il Principio di Buona Fede (Giuffrè, Milano 
1987). See also E Durkheim, La Divisione del Lavoro Sociale (Edizioni di Comunità, Milano 
1962) 218-224. 
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faith nowadays where both contractual liberty and also responsibility are 
prominent in international contracts.7 
However, good faith has constantly generated concern because of the 
paternalism that it could entail by imposing moral criteria in commercial areas 
where the most liberal determination of the parties should prevail. In England, 
for example, at the end of the eighteenth century economic liberalism blocked 
Lord Mansfield’s intent to apply good faith as a general rule to contracts.8 
Paradoxically, today the common law of the United States, whose economy is 
largely based on liberalism, has welcomed the principle of good faith. It is also 
embraced in the lex mercatoria in a world of international transactions 
characterised by liberalism. The logical question is what is happening? Does 
the general clause of good faith improve the economic efficiency in contract 
law or does it represent a deterrent for traders? Do traders need good faith in 
their contractual relationship? From a practical point of view, it is essential to 
clarify this before having recourse to good faith in contracts through reference 
to a national or non-national system that recognises it.  
 
2.1.4 METHOD AND STRUCTURE  
 
The current notion of good faith in the lex mercatoria is closer to the 
utilitarian version of good faith that emerged in the ‘universal context’9 ruled by 
the Roman law.10 
This period and the following developments of the principle in the 
Middle Ages and during the Modern Age are analysed based on the 
                                               
7 Further to the argument of contract law as prompting the fulfilment of obligations, see the 
analysis on Holmes’ risk allocation theory in Chapter Four, n 29 and accompanying text.  
8 See P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (OUP, Oxford 1979) 168. 
9 ‘Universal’ is considered here in the sense of ‘pertaining to the Roman world’. Cfr. Cic.Off. 3, 
17, 69; Gai 1,1. It is worth mentioning that Roman law was applicable to Roman citizens and 
also to foreigners or peregrini.  
10 It is important to make clear that, despite the thoroughness given to this historical account, 
it is not a comprehensive study of the issue. Previous studies on good faith in Roman law and 
the aim of this thesis release this project from undertaking such a task. See an excellent 
literature review on good faith in Roman law in: L Fascione, ‘Cenni Bibliografici sulla Bona 
Fides’ in Studi sulla Buona Fede (Giuffrè, Milano 1975). Nonetheless, time is taken to explain 
some ideas that would need no explanation in a work intended for a specialised audience in 
Roman law; many citations and some textual passages are included in the footnotes, 
primarily for those who want to pursue matters further. 
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information obtained from scholarly writings of all ages and primary sources, 
such as the Corpus Iuris Civilis and European codes.  
Regarding the second part of this chapter devoted to good faith in four 
Western law traditions, as it is the common method of comparative law 
scholars, the ‘important’ cases decided by appellate courts of foreign nations 
and the writings of their most important scholars will be examined. 
International arbitral awards based on these municipal systems will also be 
considered. 
The content of this chapter is organized under the following headings: 
- Good faith in history;  
- Good faith in civil and common law (an overview); 
- Good faith in civil law; and 
- Good faith in common law. 
 
2.2 GOOD FAITH IN HISTORY 
2.2.1 BONA FIDES IN ROMAN LAW 
 
The administration of justice in Rome in the field of private law was 
undertaken during the classic period by a unique institution, the Praetor. This 
magistrate supervised the decision-making of private judges (iudices privati), 
giving them the authority to collect evidence and to decide the case in 
accordance with his instructions (formulae). At the beginning of the praetor’s 
year of office, he informed the public of his intentions and procedural 
programmes by an edict.11 
At the outset of the formulary process (third century BC) the formula 
was based on the ius civile. However, the concept of good faith in iudicia 
stricti iuris, that is, in those claims to be decided according to the ius civile 
became important as a consequence of a standard clause inserted at the 
request of the defendant into the procedural formula. This clause was known 
                                               
11 For a brief résumé and, at the same time, rich account on the officium of the praetor and 
the relevance of the legal experts around him, the iurisconsultus, see: F Wieacker, ‘The 
Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and Western Legal Thought’ (1981) 4 
B.C.Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. 257; and R W Lee, The Elements of Roman Law with a Translation 
of the Institutes of Justinian (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London1956)10.  
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as the exceptio doli.12 This clause provided the judge the opportunity to assess 
and to decide the case in accordance with what appeared to be fair and 
reasonable.13 This meant an evolution from the previous situation where if the 
claim lay outside the ius civile then it could not be enforced. It is not known at 
what point the edict began to contain actions based, not on the old civil 
oportere but rather, on the oportere ex fide bona.14 
Ius civile in ancient Rome was the law for Roman citizens. When cives 
Romani started to increase relations with other communities – Latin 
communities at the beginning and Italian and Mediterranean afterwards – it 
was necessary to recognize trade agreements between Romans and 
members of these communities. That is now considered a decisive factor in 
the origin and development of the iurisdictio of the peregrine praetor15 and in 
the configuration of the ius gentium. Agreements and conventions in the ius 
gentium produced a binding relation between the parties based on fides, on 
the commercial ethic and customs of the trade.16 Thus, bona fides in the ius 
                                               
12 S Whittaker and R Zimmermann, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the 
Legal Landscape’ in R Zimmermann and S Whittaker (eds), Good Faith in European Contract 
Law (CUP, Cambridge 2000) 16, state: ‘The exceptio doli was worded in the alternative: ‘si in 
ea re nihil dolo malo AA factum sit neque fiat’ (if in this matter nothing has been done, or is 
being done, in bad faith by the plaintiff). It was particularly the second alternative (neque fiat – 
or is being done) that made the exceptio doli such a powerful instrument in bringing about a 
just solution, for it invited an answer which located dolus not so much in personal misconduct, 
but rather in an inequity or injustice that would flow from the action being allowed to succeed’. 
AA stands for Aulus Agerius and always refers to the plaintiff in the formula. 
13 See the developments of the exceptio doli generalis in German Law in: R Zimmermann, 
Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition Today (OUP, Oxford 
2001) 83. 
14 Oportere ex fide bona means what is necessary according to good faith.  
15 Further to the Praetor Peregrine, see F Serrao, La Iurisdictio del Pretore Peregrino. 
(Giuffrè, Milano 1954).  
16 Cfr. G Lombardi, Ricerche in Tema di “Ius Gentium” (Giufrrè, Milano 1946).  
The following is the meaning that modern doctrine, making reference to Roman sources, 
attribute to the expression ius gentium: 
a) A complex of norms and institutes related to the relations between peregrini and 
Roman cives and between peregrini from different countries in Rome. This complex 
of norms would afterwards regulate also the relationships between Roman citizens. 
Some modern authors, stressing the way by which great part of these norms and 
institutes have obtained explicit acknowledgement in Rome, maintain that the ius 
gentium is that created in Rome by the peregrine praetor, from the third century B. C. 
Almost everyone stresses how in this concept of ius gentium norms and institutes of a 
limited field of law are enshrined, that is, the mercantile law. 
b) It is a complex of norms and institutes common to all peoples. The basis of such 
community is the naturalis ratio existent in those norms and institutes.  
c) Complex of norms and institutes related to the relations between states. In modern 
terms it would be called International Public Law. 
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gentium presupposed, not simply a just conduct but also, the respect of the 
mercantile customs, according to the standard of that age.17 
The role of fides in Roman law was particularly important since it 
suppressed the ongoing tension between ius strictum and ius aequum.18 
Here, Wieacker states that the praetor ‘set up new ethical standards in bonae 
fidei iudicia. Similarly, the praetor adapted the sluggish law of an agrarian 
tribal society to the new needs of commerce’.19  
In the praetor’s formula the judge received the instruction to require the 
defendant, in the case where the plaintiff proved the default of a contractual 
obligation, to do everything the former has to give or do according to good 
faith.20 Those terms allowed the judge some grounds of freedom to determine 
the amount of compensation. 
 The big question hitherto is how the magistrate determined what the 
parties had to do to perform according to good faith. There were no general 
indications, but particular solutions and, since the principle could not find an a 
priori determination, the judicial way was essential for translating the concept 
into applicable law. This means that judges grounded the concept of good 
faith according to each particular situation before them.21 
In spite of the closeness between good faith and the formulary 
procedure, fides cannot be reduced to the procedural aspect. Fides was a 
                                               
17 F Wieacker, El Principio General de la Buena Fe (Original title: Zur rechtstheorestiche 
Präzisierung des §242 BGB, Editorial Civitas, Madrid 1982). 
18 ‘Ius praetorium est, quod praetores introduxerunt adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrrigendi 
iuris civilis gratia propter utilitatem publica’ (The pretorian law is what the pretors introduced 
helping, supplying or correcting the civil law for the public good) Pap. D. 1, 1, 7, 1. 
19 F Wieacker,The Importance of Roman Law (n 11) 266. Schulz in Classical Roman Law 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1954) 35 explains that, ‘The original meaning of a bonae fidei 
iudicium was as follows: the judge shall decide what as a matter of good faith (not ex iure 
quiritum) was due from the defendant to the plaintiff. In the time at which, for example, the 
formula venditi was created a formless contract of sale was not yet recognised by ius civile. 
Thus an actio venditi could not be founded on ius civile but only on good faith’. The praetorian 
origin of the iudicia bonae fidei has not achieved a consensus. A minority of the scholars 
maintains that iudicia bonae fidei had their origin in the ius civile and, consequently, that the 
imperium of the praetor had nothing to do with their creation. In other words, the praetor just 
shaped something pre-existent in the civil community. Cfr. as regards this topic, J Paricio, 
Rivista di Diritto Romano, Atti del Convegno Processo Civile e Processo Penale 
nell’Esperienza Giuridica del Mondo Antico: 
<http://www.ledonline.it/rivistadirittoromano/attipontignano.html>accessed 14 May 2011. Cfr. 
also A Carcaterra, Intorno ai Bonae Fidei Iudicia (Jovene, Napoli 1964) 144. 
20 The formula was: quidquid dare facere oportet ex fide bona. 
21 Cfr. R Cardilli, ‘La “Buona Fede” come Principio di Diritto dei Contratti. Diritto Romano e 
America Latina’ in L Garofalo (ed), Il Ruolo della Buona Fede Oggettiva nell’Esperienza 
Giuridica Storica e Contemporanea: Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi in Onore di 
Alberto Burdese (Cedam, Padova 2003) 342. 
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central idea in the legal and political thinking in Rome.22 Fides precedes bona 
fides. There was, however, a link between these two concepts.23 Fides was 
understood as remaining faithful to one’s word; whereas bona fides was 
applied to ascertain the implied content of contracts concluded. In this period 
the ethical character of good faith in the process was also important, since the 
bonae fidei iudicia were used predominantly to impose sanctions on 
fraudulent behaviour.24 However, fides (as a remote source of obligations) 
presented a remarkable practical character, since it was adopted in the ius 
gentium to base contractual relations between traders. This last feature of the 
principle has persevered in international contexts throughout the ages.  
 
2.2.1.1 SUMMARY 
 
Good faith in Roman law was characterised by a utilitarian character, 
as bona fides was invoked in the formula, not as a source of obligation but, in 
order to enlarge the discretion of the judge in arriving at his judgement.25 This 
practicality is a common feature with good faith in the modern lex mercatoria, 
as will be seen.  
 
The concept of good faith in the Roman procedure was made concrete 
through the activity of the iurisconsultus, the professional Roman jurist who 
assisted the praetor in the creation of the formula. This expert was able to 
abstract the essence of each case and to specify the essential legal problem 
as a questio iuris. In such a way, bona fides was one of the most fruitful 
agents in the development of contract law. Good faith in the new lex 
mercatoria is also shaped by the international arbitrator. 
 
 
                                               
22 Cfr. A D’Ors, Derecho Privado Romano (Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 
1968) 30. 
23 Further to the historical and conceptual link between the archaic notion of fides and the 
clause ex fide bona see: L Lombardi, Dalla “Fides” alla “Bona Fides” (Giuffrè, Milano 1961). 
24 Cfr. M J Schermaier, ‘Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law’ in Zimmermann and Whittaker (n 
12). 
25 For Wieacker the invention of the bonae fidei iudicium was essentially a procedural reform. 
Wieacker, ‘Zum Ursprung der Bonae Fidei Iudicia’ (1963) 80 ZSS 1. Cf C C Turpin, ‘Bonae 
Fidei Iudicia’ (1965) CLJ 260. 
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2.2.2 BONA FIDES IN THE POST CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW, HIGH 
MIDDLE AGES AND FIRST PART OF THE MODERN PERIOD 
 
 
The Corpus Iuris Civilis is a product of the Roman Empire in the East 
during the post-classic era. It is an epoch marked by strong central control. In 
fact, the Corpus Iuris Civilis is known as the work of the Emperor Justinian. At 
that time private procedure had changed from the antique formulae of the 
praetor to a central system, the cognitio extra ordinem. Such a system implied 
that the pronouncement in a case would come from the representative of the 
Emperor, similar to the administration of justice nowadays. The guidance of 
jurisprudence disappeared; consequently substantial institutions of law 
declined in the level of elaboration. This was due to the definitive instauration 
of absolutism by the Emperor Diocletian (284 A.D) and the radical decadence 
of the classical culture. As a result, the iurisconsultus who guided the 
elaboration and interpretation of the law disappeared. The writings of the 
preceding jurisprudence were called iura and were opposed to the 
prescriptions of the Emperor – named leges. However, the Justinian Corpus 
Iuris took place in an environment of revaluation of the classic jurisprudence 
by the Byzantine schools of law of the fifth and sixth centuries. It is during this 
post classic era that the principle of good faith assumed substantive meaning; 
it was a principle from which to derive rules of conduct for the parties and not 
any longer a characteristic of some type of process, those called bonae fidei 
iudicia in the old system – as studied earlier in this thesis. 
In continental European kingdoms the law of Justinian was ius 
commune, applicable everywhere in the absence of special regional sources 
of law.26 The revival of the classical Roman law took place in Italy at the 
beginning of the eleventh century with the work of the glossators in Bologna.27 
                                               
26 The ius commune was applied in continental Europe from the tenth century until the 
codification process in the eighteenth century. At the beginning, England was excluded since 
at the time of the Norman invasion there was a law devoid of Roman influence. However, this 
situation changed over time: see n 35 and accompanying text of this chapter. 
27 The scholars of the eleventh and twelfth century legal schools in Italy, France and Germany 
are identified as glossators. They studied Roman law based on the Digestae, the Codex of 
Justinian, the Authenticae (a reduced Latin translation of selected constitutions of Justinian, 
promulgated in Greek after the enactment of the Codex and therefore called Novellae), and 
his law manual, the Institutiones Iustiniani, compiled together in the Corpus Iuris Civilis. This 
title is itself only a sixteenth century printers' invention [See with regard to this name: S E 
Thorne, ‘Statuti in the Post-Gossators’ (1936) 11 Speculum 452]. The glossators conducted 
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The school of Bologna considered Roman law as applicable law. The method 
adopted would come to mean the one applied by continental legal systems 
even today: decision making by way of subsuming a case under the terms of 
an abstractly formulated authoritative text or statute.  
Italian commercial law permeated the whole of Western Europe.28 In 
this process the influence of Roman law was enormous. In a number of Italian 
cities (Como, Piacenza, Cremona, Bologna, Florence and Genoa) the 
merchants’ statutes expressly declared that the Roman law was to be 
followed whenever the statutes themselves were silent upon a point.29 The 
reasons for such a reference were the auctoritas (authority) of Roman law and 
the need to rely on a common law. Canon law was influential as well. The 
element of good faith was very strong here, sustaining the belief that the 
simple word of an honest man ought to be sufficient consideration to support a 
contract.30 Good faith as taken from the Church was associated with 
principles of the aequitas mercatoria aimed to provide merchants with elastic 
yet, at the same time, strong law to govern their contracts – mainly based on 
credit at that time. Good faith found an earlier acceptance within the law 
merchant to guard against fraudulent advantage from the technicalities of the 
law. Based on this principle mere consensus between the parties to a contract 
was enough to bind a contractor. Thus, in the evolution of law good faith 
facilitated commercial exchange and introduced social values within 
transactions.  
                                                                                                                                      
detailed text studies that resulted in collections of explanations. For their work they used a 
method of study unknown to the Romans themselves, insisting that contradictions in the legal 
material were only apparent. They tried to harmonize the sources in the conviction that for 
every legal question only one binding rule exists. Thus they approached these legal sources 
in a dialectical way, which is a characteristic of medieval scholasticism. 
28 The Italian cities laid the foundation of modern commercial and maritime law of Western 
Europe. The influence of Italian institutions and patterns of commercial and maritime tribunals 
was great upon Spanish seaport towns (Barcelona had particular importance which produced 
the famous body of laws known as Consolato del Mare); cities of Southern France such as 
Marseilles, Montpellier, Nimes and Narbonne were also influenced; as were cities and states 
of Northern Europe such as Champagne, Flanders, Geneva, Besancon, Frankfort on the 
Main, Leipzig and Cologne. Cf. W Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol. V (3rd edn Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 1945) 60-154.  
29 F R Sanborn, Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law (Hein & Co, 
Buffalo 2002) 199-200. 
30 See A Lattes, Il Diritto Commerciale nella Legislazione Statutaria delle Città Italiane (U. 
Hoepli, Milano 1884)123. 
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In England Roman law started to be felt from the twelfth century in the 
following ways: 
1) The teaching of the legal literature of the first Bolognese glossators. The 
doctrines of the glossators and even those of pre-Bolognese medieval Roman 
law influenced the intellectual organisation of English common law, and 
especially equity.31 During the medieval period there was a rapprochement 
between good faith (bona fides) and equity (aequitas);32 
2) Canon law, which was a synthesis of ecclesiastical sources and of a 
medieval interpretation of Roman law, was applied in English church courts 
whose jurisdiction included cases dealing also with contracts; 
3) The application of principles of civil law (i.e., a version of the ius commune) 
by the Court of Admiralty,33 the Star Chamber and the Ecclesiastical Courts.34 
In the light of the preceding remarks Wieacker states, ‘Common law 
and equity of the Anglo-Saxon orbit have shared, since the early part of the 
High Middle Ages, the tradition of European jus commune and jus 
utrumque’.35 
In general terms, it is possible to identify three periods of contact 
between the English legal system and civil law: a) during the early 
developments of centralised royal justice in the twelfth century; b) in the 
sixteenth century when the ‘process is made and justice is administered in the 
Admiralty Court according to the law civil’;36 and c) a final period of influence 
comes in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries under the 
leadership of Lord Mansfield.37 
                                               
31 See P Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (2nd edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1929).  
32 See B Fauvarque-Cosson and D Mazeaud (eds), European Contract Law, Materials for a 
Common Frame of Reference: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules (Sellier, Munich 
2008) 154. 
33 W Senior in Doctor’s Commons and the Old Court of Admiralty (Longmans, Green and Co., 
London 1922) 16, states: ‘The early history of the Admiralty Court is admittedly obscure. We 
do not know the year of its beginning. The best authority only tells us that its origin can be 
traced “with tolerable certainty” to between 1340 and 1357, and that it was instituted to deal 
with piracy or “spoil” claims made by and against foreign sovereigns’. 
34 Cfr. Wieacker (n 11) 259-260. 
35 Wieacker (n 5) 6. The same author explains: ‘The term ius utrumque refers to the 
combination of secular, neo-Roman law (fashioned by Glossators and Commentators at the 
University of Bologna) and the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church applied by the 
ecclesiastical courts of Europe’. 
36 Ibid 15. 
37 See C Donahue, ‘The Civil Law in England’ (1974-1975) 84 Yale L.J., 167. See also: S E 
Thorne, Henry de Bracton 1268-1968: A Lecture delivered in Exeter on 27th September 1968 
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In addition, in England in the fourteenth century the law applied in the 
merchant courts was the custom of merchants, a diverse body of rules with 
substantial civil law underpinnings. The law merchant and the law maritime 
were different from the common law.38 Here, Senior points out: 
 
[w]e may be sure that the good men of the town who dispensed justice on the quays 
of Ipswich and Bristol in the fourteenth century were unconscious of any connexion 
with the Digest. They knew that the law they administered was not the common law of 
England, though recognized and allowed; and they were acquainted with the pie-
powder courts of the fairs administering the law merchant, which was not common 
law either.39 
 
In the sixteenth century, as a result of the discoveries in the New 
World, trade was enlarged. For the first time maritime trade was made through 
new routes, reaching the most distant places of the world. The old mercantile 
society felt the effects of these events and underwent a metamorphosis; this 
marked the beginning of the modern era. 
In the seventeenth century Lord Mansfield absorbed much of the law 
merchant and with that law some ideas from the civil law tradition into the 
English law.40  
Despite the fact that the contact between civil and English law took 
place during this period through the lex mercatoria, each system of law 
continued on its own path: continental law embraced good faith as a general 
principle, whereas the law of England enshrined it only in particular cases, for 
example in the contract of insurance.41 
                                                                                                                                      
on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of the Death of Henry de Bracton (Exeter, 
University of Exeter 1970); and F Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance (CUP, 
Cambridge 1901). 
38 ‘Even as the roundness of the Globe of the world is composed of the Earth and Waters, so 
the body of Lex Mercatoria is made and framed of the Merchants’ Customs and the Sea 
Laws, which are involved together as the Seas and the Earth’. G Malynes, Consuetudo vel 
Lex Mercatoria (First published 1622, Professional Books, Oxford 1981).  
39 Senior (n 33) 20-1. 
40 For an account on the influence of civil and canon law on the English law, see Wieacker, 
Foundations of European Legal Culture (n 5) 6 ff. 
41 In insurance contracts the principle has been developed specially during the pre-contractual 
period, i.e., during the formation of the contract. However, lately good faith has been invoked 
in the parties’ dealings after the contract is made. More important, the House of Lords 
appears to have accepted that the making of claims under an insurance contract was subject 
to a duty of good faith. The reasons for the lack of development of good faith as a general 
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In the modern era Europe experienced a cultural development known 
as Humanism.42 This is a complex phenomenon that in law meant the 
rediscovery of the classical Roman law43 without interpolations and gloss; it 
also implied that humanists despised Justinian because of his work – the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis (these are known as the Anti-Tribonian).44 What they could 
not forgive of Justinian was that he collected only a part of the ancient Roman 
wisdom. They also severely criticized the jurists of the Middle Ages, since they 
hated to see the lines of the classical jurisprudence broken.45 
The modern period also witnessed good faith as dominating the scene 
of law merchant.46 Here, it was said: 
 
Bona fides est primum mobile ac spiritus vivificans commercii47 
 
2.2.2.1 SUMMARY 
 
The following general characteristics of good faith have been observed: 
1. The universal character of good faith was preponderant during all these 
periods, because it was an essential element of many branches of medieval 
law – civil law, canon law and the law merchant – which share this 
                                                                                                                                      
principle in English law and the recent developments of this principle in insurance contracts 
are explained in Section 2.5.2 of this chapter.  
42 Humanism was an intellectual movement in Europe which began in the fourteenth century 
and reached its peak at the time of the Reformation and Renaissance. Humanists reacted 
against medieval scholasticism by emphasizing human intellectual and cultural achievements, 
rather than such things as divine intervention, the brevity and misery of life and the need for 
escape. The movement began in Italy with a strong emphasis on study of the classics of 
ancient Greek and Roman civilization. The rediscovery of classical writings (not least the work 
of the Greek philosophers and scientists), and relaxation of the intellectual censorship which 
had been so characteristic of the medieval Church, led to a huge increase in philosophical, 
scientific and social study. It is no accident that the peak of humanist activity coincides with 
the first great period of European scientific research, with the work of such observers and 
thinkers as Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Harvey and Paracelsus. Bloomsbury Guide to Human 
Thought (1993) <http://www.credoreference.com/entry/bght/humanism> accessed 14 May 
2011.  
43 The classical period ran from roughly 27 BC to the middle of the third century AD. 
44 Tribonian (died 545) was a Byzantine jurist, president of the legal commission that compiled 
the codification of Roman law sponsored by the emperor Justinian I. 
45 See D Maffei, Gli Inizi dell’Umanesico Giuridico (Giuffrè, Milano 1956) passim. This author 
considers at p. 19 that Humanism in law started with the work of Irnerius (1050-1130), who 
discovered (that is, understood first) that law is all ‘hominum causa’.  
46 Sanborn (n 29) 262.  
47 ‘Good faith is the first motive and the spirit that gives life to commerce’ by Giuseppe 
Lorenzo Maria Casaregis, Discursus Legales de Commercio ed de Avariis (Genova 1707) 
144. 
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cosmopolitan feature. Here, the universal good faith reached also England, as 
part of the ius commune, the law merchant and canon law;  
2. During the post-classical era good faith assumed substantive meaning, i.e., 
it became a principle from which to derive rules of conduct; 
3. The canonist view of faith assisted the merchants and their tribunals to deal 
adequately with new forms of fraud and sharp practices and thus contributed 
to enforce high standards of good faith and fair dealing which are the life-sap 
of trade. 
 
 
2.2.3 GOOD FAITH IN THE CODES  
 
The codes found their foundation in the ius naturalism or the law of 
reason,48 which flourished during the early phase of the modern age. The law 
of reason undertook to deduce general rules or principles of law from the 
rational part of human nature. It sought for a law to be valid in the absolute 
and aimed to produce in codes a compendium of just norms.49 In this 
philosophy good faith is seen as ‘natural law’, therefore some norms impose 
the duty to perform agreements in bona fides and others refer to equity as a 
source of obligations. These norms are considered by jusnaturalists as 
universal and necessary.50   
 However, some manifestations of the law of reason regarding good 
faith were not enshrined in the codes. For example, Samuel Pufendorf,51 a 
jusnaturalist who wrote at the end of the seventeenth century, during the 
period that preceded codification, stated that if an original or subsequent 
cause made unequal the reciprocal obligations, natural law declared that they 
                                               
48 The modern School of Natural Law refused to derive its principles from external systems 
such as divine law or the Corpus Iuris. By means of rational study and criticism of human 
nature, the authors of this school searched for the self-evident and axiomatic principles from 
which they could deduce all other rules more geometrico. The title ‘law of reason’ is therefore 
more accurate than ‘natural law’, which has other connotations.  
49 See Wieacker (n 5) 15-18. 
50 To be a jusnaturalist means to be a supporter of the notion of natural law behind and above 
the positive law. For a debate about what does it mean to be a jusnaturalist today, see: Juha-
Pekka Rentto, ‘Between Clarence Thomas and Saint Thomas: Beginnings of a Moral 
Argument for Judicial Jusnaturalism’ (1992) 26 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 727. 
51 S Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium. Libri Octo. Translation of the 1688 edition by C H 
Oldfather and W A Oldfather (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1934). 
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must be modified.52 This view was neither embraced in the Code Napoléon, 
nor in the German BGB (where it appears as a later development).53  
The triumph of enlightenment, natural law and the law of reason are 
represented in the Napoleonic Civil Code.54  At the time of the enactment of 
the Civil Code reason had become the guiding principle and its universality 
made the Code to impose itself over the auctoritas of the still prestigious 
Corpus Iuris. Here, Van Caenegem states that, ‘The modern, more abstract 
method deliberately followed that of the abstract sciences, for the aim of the 
lawyers was to realize a universal science based on demonstrable 
propositions’.55 
In the Napoleonic Code, as in most codes of the civil law world, the rule 
on good faith is under the section named ‘The effect of obligations’ (effects 
des obligations) based, as stated before, on the jusnaturalist idea of the Code 
as a set of simple provisions with a general character to be accepted by all 
citizens.56 In consequence, the codes deal with good faith as a general 
principle.57 Even the German Civil Code is structured in this way (good faith is 
embraced as a general principle in Section 242 of the BGB), although the 
authors wanted to separate it from the jusnaturalism to align it with the 
Pandectists.58 
                                               
52 It is important to note that, nonetheless, Pufendorf (n 51) 388, upholds the basic validity of 
the rule pacta sunt servanda. He points out that faith and confidence demand that in human 
society we must live up to our promises, ‘Si quae autem inter homines ineuntur pacta, illa 
sancte observanda esse, sociabilis natura hominis requirit’. 
53 The related paragraph reads as follows: “Ipsa tamen naturalis ratio ostendit, contractus 
onerosos esse bonae fidei, seu laxiorem admittere interpretationem ex aequo et bono; ideo 
quod cum aequa in illis versetur obligatio, exinde neuter contrahentium gravetur. Contra 
autem benefici contractus stricti iuris videntur, nec laxam eiusmodi interpretationem admittunt, 
aut ut quis ad quid amplius, quam quod expresse significavit, adstringatur”. Ibid 697. 
54 Natural law had a preponderant role in the work of the drafters and theoretical fathers of the 
Code. During the Revolution natural law was also constantly invoked to justify new rules and 
new systems. Despite this background, the Code, in fact, came to establish the primacy of the 
statute and rejected all express reference to natural law.  
55 R C van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Private Law (CUP, Cambridge 1992). 
56 It is worth noticing that the Swiss Civil Code contains the wider norm on good faith 
declaring it as essential condition for exercising any right: ‘Chacun est tenu d’exercer ses droit 
et d’exécuter ses obligations selon les règles de la bonne foi’ (Rights and obligations must be 
exercised according to good faith). (Art. 2). 
57 The exception is the Austrian Code (ABGB), which does not consider good faith as a 
general principle. The closest provision for good faith is article 914 that reads: ‘The 
interpretation of contracts shall not be based upon the literal meaning of the expressions 
used, but rather upon the true intention of the parties, and the contract shall be construed in 
accordance with the customs of honest dealings’. 
58 Pandectists were German law professors of the nineteenth century. They studied Roman 
law based on the Digests or Pandects of the Corpus Iuris Civilis (534 A.D). Their achievement 
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A distrustful attitude of European scholars towards good faith became 
strong over the years because of the consciousness that it implies a value 
judgement to make it concrete. As a consequence of such a diffident attitude 
and also due to the decline of the école de l’exégèse59 the systematic method 
appeared in the civil law of Europe. The supporters, mainly in Germany, 
pursued and organized a harmonic portrait of the regulae iuris. However, here 
the influence of the jusnaturalism was still alive, because the interpreters, 
while not believing the postulate of the naturalis ratio, took from that theory the 
core of the legal phenomenon.  
 The Industrial Revolution, which changed Europe’s face, brought about 
a distrustful view of the rule of good faith. Therefore, in order to avoid the risks 
of elastic precepts, the German jurists of the nineteenth century preferred not 
to comment on this norm. The idea of removing attention from good faith in 
the contract is explained by: 
1) the fear of value judgments (necessary to materialize the norm); 
2) Individualism dominating the scene, which required consideration of the 
wish of the parties and denied that the judge could enrich or correct it.  
 
Despite the juspositivist premises propagated in nineteenth century 
Germany, good faith is present in the BGB. In spite of the sharp position 
against the postulates of the naturalis ratio, and although the Pandectists 
rejected any residue that arose from the memory of metaphysics, the scholars 
failed to exclude good faith from the legal language. Perhaps they believed 
that it would become just an aphorism without practical consequences. The 
reality would demonstrate that the result was exactly the opposite.60 
                                                                                                                                      
was to order systematically and logically the Roman law according to modern circumstances. 
The Pandectists’ work was highly influential on the preparation of the BGB from 1874 
onwards, since during the nineteenth century Roman law was still important and was the only 
common law in the many independent territories in the region. The Pandectists developed a 
specific method of interpretation called Begriffsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of terms) which 
deduced the solution of legal problems from preformulated provisions and terms according to 
the strict rules of logic. See U Magnus, ‘Some Thoughts on Germany’s Contribution to 
European and Comparative Law’ (2006) 38 Bracton L.J. 87. 
59 The principal task of this School was the exegesis of individual texts of the Corpus Iuris in 
order to harmonize them. In France and Italy the important role of exegesis is explained by 
the understanding of the codes as a body of rules and symbol of the national and political 
unity of the country, therefore the systematic method – which aims to deduce concrete rules 
of positive law from general concepts and axioms – did not fit well. 
60 See Section 2.4.2 of this chapter. 
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In England, nonetheless, the concept of good faith did not take off. This 
is usually explained by the presence of the subjective classical doctrines of 
freedom and sanctity of contract in the nineteenth century.61 (However, the 
reasons for this development are specifically analysed in the relevant part of 
this thesis).62 It was considered that all the consequences of a contract 
derived from the will of those who made it and that they were the best judges 
of their own needs and circumstances. It followed that the unfairness of the 
bargain was irrelevant. As Atiyah states: 
 
This equation of general principles of contract law with free market economy led to an 
emphasis on the framework within which individuals bargained with each other and a 
retreat from interest in substantive justice and fairness. The model of contract theory 
which implicitly underlay the classical law of contract was thus the model of the 
market. Essentially this model is based on the following principal features. First the 
parties deal with each other ‘at arm’s length’ in the legal phrase; this carries the 
notion that each relies on his own skill and judgement and that neither owes any 
fiduciary obligation to the other.63  
  
There is a later development in English law which is examined in the 
relevant part of this chapter.64 
 
2.2.3.1 SUMMARY 
 
 The codes, as the product of the law of reason, embrace good faith 
as a general principle. However, the extent of the embracement varies. In the 
French Civil Code, for example, some norms impose the duty to perform 
agreements in good faith and others refer to equity as a source of obligations. 
These norms were considered by jusnaturalists as universal and necessary, 
whereas in the BGB, although good faith was enshrined as a general 
principle, it was hardly considered by the jurists of the nineteenth century, 
since the necessary intervention of the judge to concretize the principle 
                                               
61 A F Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’ (2000) 116 LQR 
66, 70. 
62 See Section 2.5.2 of this chapter 
63 Atiyah (n 8) 402. 
64 See Section 2.5.2. This development of English law was foreseen by Atiyah in Freedom of 
Contract and the New Right (Juridiska Fakulteten i Stockholm 1988). 
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generated distrust. However, this reality would evolve over the years. 
Nowadays, it is considered that, ‘under the German law a contract appears as 
a kind of a living and dynamic organism which forms a cooperation 
relationship between the parties and contains a strong good faith/reliance 
element and additional implied obligations’.65 This evolution and the current 
state of national laws as regards good faith are the subject of the following 
section. 
 
2.3 GOOD FAITH IN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
 
The tendency of a legal system to embrace good faith or explicitly 
require it in a narrow range of particular situations is likely to be related to a 
number of historical, cultural and institutional factors. 
As has been shown hitherto, the concept of good faith is not static. For 
example, the notion of good faith has evolved recently in countries such as 
Canada and Australia, which have in the past tended to follow the distrustful 
English lead – with regards to good faith – in the development of their contract 
law.66 Another example is the mixed system of Scots law, in which good faith 
appears to be increasing its influence.67  
In civil law countries good faith is accepted as a general principle of 
contract law. However, it is not always understood in the same way.68  
Good faith has allowed continental judges to create new solutions 
without invading the area of the legislator. The German example where judges 
have overcome obstacles and legal gaps deriving the decisions under section 
242 BGB is conspicuous, as will be seen.  
                                               
65 Magnus (n 58) 98. 
66 Further to the distrustful approach of English law it has been said: ‘It is clear that fairness 
and certainty are often assumed to be opposed values in the English law of contract. The 
connection between good faith and uncertainty is generally cited as a logical or necessary 
one’. N Lomax, ‘The Future Role of Good Faith in the English Law of Contract’ (LLM thesis, 
University of Oxford 1996) 61. 
67 In Smith v Bank of Scotland [1997] SC 111 (HL) Lord Clyde considered the requirement of 
good faith as a better basis for the solution of the case than the English Equity concept of 
‘constructive notice’. See for a better understanding of this case and, in general, for the trend 
of Scots law on good faith: H MacQueen, ‘Good Faith in the Scots Law of Contract: An 
Undisclosed Principle?’ in A D M Forte (ed), Good Faith in Contract and Property (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 1999). 
68 Cf. J H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational and Comparative Commercial, Financial and 
Trade Law (3rd edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 284.  
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Sometimes contractual good faith reaches, in continental law, such 
levels of amplitude that, for example, in Italy its creative role has been 
recognized. Two leading scholars testify so. Galgano asserts, ‘The principle of 
good faith allows identifying other prohibitions and duties besides those 
foreseen by the law’.69 Massimo Bianca states that, beyond the role of 
integration that good faith plays, the principle prevails even over the 
determinations and clauses of the contract.70 The Italian courts have 
embraced this view as well: a recent verdict by the Corte di Cassazione has 
affirmed the criterion that good faith is an instrument in the judge’s hands to 
control and even to modify and integrate the agreement.71  
The award n.76/98 of 24 November 1999 is an example of the great 
extension attributed to this duty.72 This is an international arbitration decided 
on the basis of the Italian Codice Civile. The case was conducted before the 
Italian Arbitration Association in Florence. The claimant was an exclusive 
distributor (in Denmark) and the defendant, the licensor of distribution rights 
(in Italy).  
At the basis there was an exclusive distributorship contract concerning 
Denmark and Scandinavian countries entered into by the parties in August 
1995. The main obligations undertaken by the parties were: 
- Claimant: to keep defendant informed about its customers and 
promptly notify any act of unfair competition;73 
- Defendant: to invest 3% of the total sales volume in advertising in 
Scandinavia, to supply high quality goods and to protect the trademark 
in the exclusive distributorship territory. 
                                               
69 F Galgano, Diritto Civile e Commerciale Vol. 2 T. 1 (4th edn CEDAM, Padova 2004) 630. 
70 C M Bianca, Diritto Civile III. Il Contratto (2nd edn Giuffrè, Milano 2000) 499. The Italian 
Civil Code contains in article 1175 the duty of correctness. Here, there is a judgement from 
the Corte Suprema di Cassazione which sets forth that the violation of duties of protection, 
information and cooperation arising from the duty of correctness legitimates the plaintiff to 
propose the exception of non-performance of the contract. Cass. 16 November 2000, n. 
14.865 in Corr. Giur. 2001, p. 762. 
71 Sez. III, 18 September 2009, n. 20106 
<http://www.usarcicentro.it/download/CORTE_CASS_3_SEZ_SENT20106_08062009.pdf> 
accessed 13 July 2011 
72 (2000) 25 Yb Comm Arb’n 368. 
73 Unfair competition means an attempt to do better than another company by using methods 
such as importing foreign products at very low prices or by wrongly criticizing a competitor's 
products. 
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The controversy arose fundamentally as a consequence of the 
requested termination of the contract under allegations of partial and late 
deliveries by the respondent and refusal to accept returns of defective and 
late deliveries of goods. The claimant also alleged that there had been parallel 
imports of a specific product in the Scandinavian countries by exporters in the 
country of the original licensor. The defendant refused to act against the 
exporters, therefore the claimant sued on his own in the country of the original 
licensor. 
The arbitral tribunal granted the distributor’s claim based on the 
defendant’s failure to protect the trademark. The arbitrators held that, although 
the contract only provided that the distributor assist the licensor in the 
protection of the trademark, that did not mean that, in general terms, a similar 
duty of assistance and cooperation should not be fulfilled by the defendant as 
well. It was held that the defendant ought at least to have cooperated with the 
claimant, providing him with appropriate support. Such a conclusion is on the 
basis of article 1375 of the Italian Civil Code to perform the contract in 
accordance with good faith, ‘to be understood as an “undertaking in 
cooperation and protection of the interests of the other party to the contract”, 
operating “beyond specific provisions” of the agreement and not capable of 
exclusion by the will of the parties’ (quoted from Cass. 6 February 1997, n. 
1123; Cass. 11 January 1983 cites a duty of cooperation and mutual trust as a 
source of legitimate expectation)’. 
 
As stated above, the meaning of good faith has changed over the 
years. In Dutch law even the term good faith is not used in the Civil Code 
(which was substantially reformed in 1992) but 'redelijkheid en billijkheid' 
(reasonableness and fairness), which is considered more objective. This 
concept has been elevated to a rank above custom and statutory law and may 
affect and correct the application of both, at least in contract law, as provided 
in article 2 of book 6 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW).74 
                                               
74 Art. 6:2 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) 
1. A creditor and debtor must, as between themselves, act in accordance with the 
requirements of reasonableness and fairness. 
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Good faith in continental law is not just a well-established doctrine, but 
there is also increased sensitivity for the requirement of good faith. For 
instance, the past decades have seen a significant rise in the number of 
duties of disclosure in consumer contracts and even between entrepreneurs 
found by the courts.75 The courts of France and Germany have held that a 
contractor, badly advised by the other party or led to contract by the mere 
silence of the partner, may authorize an action for damages and the possibility 
to claim release from the legal consequences of the contract, even if the 
preconditions for fraud are not present.76 The new German law of obligations 
that came into force on 1 January 2002 is another example. This massive 
reform incorporated into the BGB theories already accepted praeter legem in 
the German legal culture. The following – newly incorporated – theories are a 
clear expression of the increased sensitivity towards good faith: 
- Culpa in contrahendo §311 II BGB;77 
- Change of circumstances (Störung der Geschaftsgrundlage) §313 
BGB;78 
- The possibility of terminating, for a compelling reason, contracts for 
performance of a recurring obligation §314 BGB; 
                                                                                                                                      
2. A rule binding upon them by virtue of law, usage or a juridical act does not apply to 
the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to criteria of 
reasonableness and fairness. 
Article 6:248 BW 
1.  A contract has not only the juridical effects agreed to by the parties, but also those 
which, according to the nature of the contract, result from the law, usage or the requirements 
of reasonableness and fairness. 
2.  A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not apply to the extent 
that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to criteria of 
reasonableness and fairness. 
75 The catalyst for this change has been, in many cases, EU law. For example, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive (1993/13/EEC) introduces a notion of good faith in order to prevent 
significant imbalances in the rights and obligations of consumers, on the one hand, and 
sellers and suppliers, on the other hand.  
76 Vid. H Kötz, European Contract Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 203. 
77 Section 311. Obligations created by legal transaction and obligations similar to legal 
transactions. 
(2) An obligation with duties under section 241 (2) also comes into existence by 
1. the commencement of contract negotiations 
2. the initiation of a contract where one party, with regard to a potential contractual 
relationship, gives the other party the possibility of affecting his rights, legal interests 
and other interests, or entrusts these to him, or 
      3.    similar business contacts. 
78 See n 134 of this chapter. 
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- The duty to have regard to the other party’s rights and interests which 
may result from the content of the obligation §241 BGB; or the 
existence of such duties on the part of third parties.79 
 
In common law, good faith, as a general principle, is accepted by the 
law of the United States,80 whereas English law has refused to develop the 
principle as a general one.81  
As is widely known, English law has hitherto declined to adopt a 
general principle of good faith. It has been said by a leading author that, ‘the 
predictability of the legal outcome of a case is more important than absolute 
justice’.82 A civil law author, Hein Kötz, comments on this approach: 
 
The English do not seem to appreciate that the technique of going forward cautiously 
from this case or that case, as justice in each case requires, is equally possible where 
the judge has to work on the basis of a loosely – textured statutory formula, such as 
good faith principle. Some of them believe that such form would be positively 
dangerous.83 
 
Nonetheless, good faith’s force is also at work in common law. Outside 
the U.S., however, it is unlikely to be referred as good faith. Lord J Bingham 
maintains that, ‘English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such 
overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to 
demonstrated problems of unfairness’.84 Here, Collins’s position is that when 
the courts are confronted by a manifestly disadvantageous transaction, they 
could deploy a host of legal doctrines in order to avoid enforcement. Besides, 
courts deploy other tools to support transactions that are regarded as 
commercially beneficial.85 
                                               
79 Cf. R Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations. Historical and Comparative 
Perspective (OUP, Oxford 2005) 3. 
80 See Section 2.5.1 of this chapter. 
81 See Section 2.5.2 of this chapter. 
82 R Goode, The Concept of “Good Faith” in English Law (Centro di Studi e Ricerca di Diritto 
Comparato e Straniero, Roma 1992) 9. See n 244 of this chapter. 
83 H Kötz, ‘Towards a European Civil Code: The Duty of Good Faith’ in P Cane and J 
Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations. Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1998) 249. 
84 In Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433 (CA).  
85 Cf. H Collins, The Law of Contracts (4th edn LexisNexis, London 2003) 272. The various 
techniques used by common law judges to achieve similar results are, inter alia: 
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McKendrick postulates that good faith is recognized by English courts 
in the negotiation stage by the terms ‘best endeavours’ and ‘reasonable 
endeavours’. In the case of Terrell v Mabie Todd & Co Ltd.86 the licensees 
were required to use ‘all diligence’ to promote sales of inventions and designs 
and to use their ‘best endeavours’ to exploit these. The obligation to use ‘best 
endeavours’ requires the party to do what is commercially practicable; thus, 
McKendrick compares ‘best endeavours’ with what is reasonable and prudent, 
equating these concepts with good faith.87 This is a challenging idea since the 
House of Lords in the famous case Walford v Miles88 declared the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith unenforceable.  
                                                                                                                                      
consideration, undue influence, unconscionability, interpretation, implied terms, mistake and 
restraint of trade. The following are some simplified definitions of these theories:  
- Consideration: The traditional definition of consideration concentrates on the requirement 
that ‘something of some value in the eye of the law’ [see Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851, 
859] must be given and accordingly states that consideration is either some detriment to the 
promisee or some benefit to the promisor.  
- Undue influence: A transaction can be set aside in equity if, because it has been procured 
by undue influence exerted by one party (A) on the other (B), it cannot ‘fairly be treated as the 
expression of B’s free will’ (see Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2001] UKHL 44). 
- Unconscionability: Treitel in The Law of Contracts (11th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2003) 
420 explains that, ‘Equity can give relief against unconscionable bargains in certain cases in 
which one party is in a position to exploit a particular weakness of the other. The burden of 
justifying such a transaction is on the former party’.  
- Interpretation: is defined as the ‘Process of determining the sense or meaning of legal 
instruments or expressions within such instruments through the application of legal standards 
or rationality. Often used interchangeably with, but distinguishable from construction, which is 
also concerned with the legal effect of the instrument’ Dictionary of Conflict Resolution Wiley 
(2002) <http://www.credoreference.com/entry/wileyconfres/interpretation> accessed 21 June 
2011. 
- Implied terms are not written in a contract, but they are taken to be present in the contract. 
Implied terms may be divided into three main groups. The first consist of terms implied in fact, 
i.e., terms which were expressly set out in the contract, but which the parties must have 
intended to include. The second consists of terms implied in law, i.e., terms imported by 
operation of law, although the parties may have not intended to include them. The third 
consists of terms implied by custom. 
- Mistake: ‘Mistake negatives consent where it puts the parties at cross-purposes so as to 
prevent them from reaching agreement…It nullifies consent where the parties reach an 
agreement which is based on a fundamental mistaken assumption made by both of them…At 
law the effect of mistake is to make a contract void, but this rule is confined within very narrow 
limits’. Treitel (n 85) 286. 
- Restraint of trade is an attempt or intent to eliminate or stifle competition, to effect a 
monopoly, to maintain prices artificially, or otherwise to hamper or obstruct the course of trade 
and commerce as it would be if left to the control of natural and economic forces. Merriam-
Webster's Dictionary of Law (1996) 
<http://www.credoreference.com/entry/mwdlaw/restraint_of_trade> accessed 21 June 2011.  
86 (1952) 69 RPC 234 
87 E Mc Kendrick, ‘The Meaning of Good Faith’ in M Andenas, S Diaz, B Markesinis and 
others (eds), Liber Amicorum Guido Alpa. Private Law Beyond the National Systems (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 2007) 687-698, especially 694. 
88 (1992) 2 WLR 174; [1992] 2 A.C. 128  
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O’Connor maintains a similar position of good faith behind the scenes: 
‘The judicial imposition of good faith is still cloaked in technical devices. The 
invention of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to give effect to promises 
unsupported by consideration is another well-known, bolder example of 
judicial imposition of good faith’.89 
It has been suggested that the function of good faith is carried out in 
common law by equity: ‘Equity has played a major role as a stand-in for good 
faith in English commercial law’.90 However, equity is not a general concept 
allowing the entrance of general notions of fairness. Equity is used by judges 
as a last resort, except in areas entirely covered by it, like trusts, agency, 
company and bankruptcy law. Beatson and Friedmann point out that,  
 
Even before the European Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts of 1993,91 which imposes obligations of good faith, there were signs that 
the influence of other legal systems and the European environment were leading to a 
gradual recognition of the doctrine or at least to parallel solutions by other means’ (in 
English law) (parenthesis added).92  
 
In fact, the aforementioned Directive overlaps substantially with a 
previous regulation: the Unfair Contract Term Act 1977. Despite the name of 
the Act, it is concerned only with exemption clauses in contracts, providing 
that the validity of such clauses depends on what has been called ‘a 
reasonable test’.  
The Directive of 1993 provides that a term which has not been 
individually negotiated is unfair if, contrary to the requirements of good faith, it 
causes a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to 
the detriment of the consumer – taking into account the nature of the goods or 
services and the circumstances attending the making of the contract. As 
Atiyah states: 
 
                                               
89 J F O’Connor, Good Faith in English Law (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1990) 20. See Collier v 
P&M J Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2008) 1 WLR 643.  
90 W Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract. Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and 
Chartering’ (2004) 35 JMLC 561, 572. 
91 ECC 93/13, 5 April 1993. See the analysis of the Directive in Section 2.5.2 of this chapter. 
92 J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1995) 15. 
 98
In assessing good faith, particular regard must be had to the bargaining position of 
the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the terms, whether 
the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer, and 
the extent to which the seller or supplier has dealt fairly and equitably with the other 
party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account.93  
 
These requirements to assess good faith, especially the first three 
factors, were already included in the test of reasonableness under the 1977 
Act, as they appear in the Schedule 2 “Guidelines” for Application of 
Reasonableness Test. 
 
This tour d'horizon has been pursued in order to identify roughly the 
position of good faith in the main Western legal traditions considered in this 
study. In the following account the aim is to make clear their particular 
understanding of good faith in order to determine in the next chapters whether 
they have influenced the meaning of the principle in the lex mercatoria. In 
support of this theory about the influence of national systems, the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts state in art. 1.7 that good 
faith must be applied in accordance with its understanding in international 
trade, not in accordance with the usual criteria adopted in the different legal 
systems, ‘even though comparative analysis is, of course, the basis upon 
which the principle of good faith as now used in international trade was 
developed’.94  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
93 P S Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (5th edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 
315. 
94 Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud (n 32) 174. 
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2.4 GOOD FAITH IN CIVIL LAW 
2.4.1 GOOD FAITH IN FRANCE 
 
Despite the generality of the formula of article 1134 in its declaration 
that contracts ‘doivent être executés de bonne foi’,95 French law remains 
hesitant in its approach to good faith, even considering that article 1135 of the 
Code Civil contains also a general statement:  
 
Les conventions obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais 
encore à toutes les suites que l'équité, l'usage ou la loi donnent à 
l'obligation d'après sa nature.96 
 
In general, French law has used the concept of good faith in 
performance to avoid onerous conditions.97  It limits the use of the concept as 
a corrective of the contractual terms to particular areas by using the well-
established theory of the abuse of rights (abus de droit).98 
The unfruitfulness of good faith in French law is ascribed to ‘an attempt 
to put good faith on too high a moral plane’.99 Here, Yves Picod emphasizes 
the contrast between the obligatory force of the contract on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the necessity to reconcile it with the exigencies of the moral 
order. He makes the point based upon line 1 and line 3 of article 1134 of the 
Code Civil. He calls the latter a ‘frein harmonieux’100 of line 1.101  
                                               
95 ‘Agreements must be performed in good faith’. The Project of the Code Civil contained an 
article according to which: ‘Les conventions doivent être contratées et exécutées de bonne 
foi’. The reason why good faith was excluded during formation was the accidental fact that 
article 1134 is part of the chapter ‘De l’effet des obligations’. Cf. D Tallon, Le Concept de 
Bonne Foi en Droit Français du Contrat (Centro di Studi e Ricerca di Diritto Comparato e 
Straniero, Roma 1994) 3. 
96 ‘Agreements are binding not only as to what is therein expressed, but also as to all the 
consequences which equity, usage or statute give to the obligation according to its nature’. 
97 See M Fabre-Magnan, ‘Duties of Disclosure and French Contract Law’ in Beatson & 
Friedmann (n 92) 99; see also J Ghestin, Traité de Droit Civil, Les Obligations, Le Contrat: 
Formation (2nd edn Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris 1988) para 608-2.    
98 See B Jaluzot, La Bonne Foi dans les Contrats (Dalloz, Paris 2001) 506-7. B Nicholas in 
The French Law of Contract (2nd edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 153 warns that, ‘The 
French courts have made very little express use of article 1134. There is indeed a 
considerable number of decisions which are seen by doctrine as applications of the 
requirement of good faith in the performance of the contract’. 
99 R Powell, ‘Good Faith in Contracts’ (1956) 9 CLP 16, 37. 
100 ‘Harmonious brake’. 
101 Y Picod, Le Devoir de Loyauté dans l’Exécution du Contrat (Libraire Générale, Paris 1989) 
9. 
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The following is the English translation of article 1134: 
 
Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those 
who have made them. 
They may be revoked only by mutual consent, or for causes authorized 
by law. 
They must be performed in good faith. 
 
The moral aspect of good faith in French law is due to the canonist 
tradition and the doctrine of Domat, one of the inspirers of the Civil Code of 
1804.102  This was reinforced by the moralizing notion of natural law.  
In the twentieth century, specifically in the 1930s, scholars saw good 
faith as a tool in the judge’s hands for adjusting the contract to new and 
unforeseen events in opposition to the inflexibility of articles 6 and 1134 line 1 
of the Civil Code.103 To the question of whether such flexibility of the contract 
could bring more trouble than benefits, the scholars answered that they rather 
feared a ‘révolte des faits contre le Code’.104 Ripert in ‘L’Ordre Économique et 
la Liberté Contractuelle’ considered that the regulation of the contract had 
passed from flexible to semi-rigid.105 In his view, the legislator had supplanted 
the parties in the regulation of contractual obligations under the pretext of law 
and order. To avoid the limitation of contractual freedom, he advocated for a 
tool in the judges’ hands which allows shaping the contract according to the 
circumstances. Ripert stated that it is difficult to find a technical way for that, 
but he imagined several ones in the theory of imprévision, which is a theory 
that had been applied on numerous occasions by the Counseil d’Etat and 
                                               
102 Cf. J Domat, Les Loix Civiles dans leur Ordre Naturel. Le Droit Public et Legum Delectus 
T. 1 (Chez Michel Brunet, Paris 1735). 
103 Josserand, for example, in ‘Le Contrat e la Loi’ in Recueil d’Études sur les Sources du 
Droit. En l’Honneur de François Gény (Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris 1934) states that the 
same law (articles 1134, para. 3 and 1135 Code Civil) directs the judge towards good faith in 
order to find new obligations and adapt the contract according to individual, economic and 
social phenomena. In this sense, according to the author, ‘C’est qu’en effet, dans le droit 
modern, tous les contrats sont de bonne foi’, i.e. ‘The fact is that, in modern law, all contracts 
are in good faith’. See also: R Vouin, La Bonne Foi (Libraire Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, Paris 1939).  
104 ‘A rebellion of the facts against the Code’. 
105 In Recueil d’Études sur les Sources du Droit. En l’Honneur de François Gény (Librairie du 
Recueil Sirey, Paris 1934). 
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other administrative courts, allowing the adjustment of administrative contracts 
due to the public interest involved.106 
At the end of the fifties and during the sixties good faith started to be 
accepted by courts.107 
It is submitted here that the germ of the relevance of good faith had 
been always there. Portalis, for instance, in the Preliminary Discourse of the 
Project of the Civil Code put good faith on the same level as equality of 
agreements when he said, ‘Il faut de la bonne foi, de la réciprocité et de 
l’égalité dans le contrats’.108  
In the eighties the idea advanced by authors in the fifties and sixties – 
i.e., good faith as an element in the judge’s hands to adjust the contract – is 
established among scholars109 and recognized by some judicial decisions. 
E.g. Mestre in the Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil stated that: 
 
The contract has become a place of necessary equilibrium, which the legislator and 
the judge must not hesitate, in certain cases, to restore, by eliminating abuses related 
to economic or technical inequalities…Would not the contract become the juridical 
instrument for collaboration between the parties? (emphasis added)110  
 
The author considered that, without doubt, the duty to collaborate has 
its roots in the requirement of good faith contained in article 1134 line 3 of the 
Civil Code, ‘which recently has had a particular favour in the courts’.111 
                                               
106 In this regard, the case Compagnie Générale d’Éclairage de Bordeaux is well known, CE 
30 March 1916, Sirey 1916, 3, 17. In March 1904 the city of Bourdeaux had given the gas 
supply’s concession for the entire city to a private company. The gas was used for public 
lighting. The price was fixed at 8 cents per cubic meter. The beginning of the First World War 
caused the coal’s price to rise sharply, making burdensome for the concessionaire to provide 
the service under the current circumstances. The attempt to deal amicably failed. Therefore, 
the case was taken to the Administrative Court which rejected the claims aiming to modify the 
contract. However, the Conseil d’Etat held for the plaintiff in the last instance.  
107 Among other cases, see: Dijon 11 April 1967: Gaz. Pal. 1967, 2, 52; Cass. Com. 7 Oct. 
1953: Bull.Civ. III, n. 290, p. 205; Cass.Civ. I, 14 March 1956: Bull.Civ. I, n. 133, p. 107; 
Colmar 25 Jan. 1963: Gaz.Pal. 1963, 1, 277. 
108 ‘Good faith, reciprocity and equality in contracts must be considered’. J E M Portalis, 
Discurso Preliminar del Proyecto de Código Civil Francés (EDEVAL, Valparaíso 1978). 
109 G Ripert, La Règle Morale dans Les Obligations Civiles (4th edn Librairie Générale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris 1949) 151 & 156; Ghestin, Les Effets du Contrat (3rd edn 
Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris 2001) 533. 
110 J Mestre, ‘Obligations et Contrat Spéciaux’ (1986) RTD Civ. 100-1. 
111 Ibid. See Gaz.Pal. 8-9 March 1985, Panorama 20 obs. J Dupichot; see also Tallon (n 95) 
4. 
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Morin regrets the lack of development of a more objective construction 
of the good faith enshrined in article 1134 of the Civil Code in the following 
terms, ‘Although French courts rarely invoke article 1134 of the Civil Code to 
sanction a party’s failure to cooperate during contractual performance, this 
article may be applied more often as commercial transactions requiring the 
parties’ cooperation multiply’.112 
Here, in recent years it is possible to notice in courts’ decisions a 
deepening of this perspective due to the influence of solidarism, which is a 
minority theory in French law but still influential.  
The political doctrine of solidarism was formulated by Léon Bourgeois 
in his work ‘Solidarité’;113 Durkheim and Duguit,114 among others, introduced 
the concept of ‘Contractual solidarism’. This doctrine seeks to reconcile the 
classic imperatives of stability and legal certainty with, inter alia, principles of 
solidarism, proportionality and coherence. 
Solidarism in contract law seeks the adaptation of those relations that 
are not equal, giving the judge the power to adjust them. It requests of the 
parties a form of collaboration and mutual help. It is based on good faith and 
loyalty.115 
It is possible to consider the evolution of the theory of imprévison116 in 
French law as an example of the return of solidarism in contracts. At the 
beginning (after the Code Napoléon) jurisprudence was reluctant to intervene 
in cases of contract that became extremely onerous for one of the parties. The 
case ‘Crapone Canal’ (1876) is famous. The Tribunal declared: 
 
                                               
112 G Morin, ‘Le Devoir de Coopération dans les Contrats Internationaux. Droit et Pratique’ 
(1980) 6 Droit et Pratique du Commerce International 9, 18. 
113 Léon Bourgeois (1851-1925) was a French statesman and prime minister (1895-96). He 
was the chief theorist of solidarism, the concept that an individual's rights in society must be 
balanced by his responsibility to it. Prominent in the League of Nations, he won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1920. The Macmillan Encyclopedia (2003) 
< http://www.credoreference.com/entry/move/bourgeois_l%C3%A9on_1851_1925> accessed 
15 May 2011 
114 See R Bellah (ed), Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society (The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1973) 63 ff. Duguit is the more radical. He points out that the targets of 
individualism are unrealistic. See L Duguit, Les Transformations Générales du Droit Privé 
depuis le Code Napoléon (Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris 1920). 
115 See L Grynbaum and M Nicod (eds), Le Solidarisme Contractuel (Economica, 2004). 
116 See n 106 and the text that accompanies it. 
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Il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux, quelqu’équitable que puisse leur paraître leur 
décision, de prendre  en considération le temps et les circonstances pour modifier les 
conventions des parties et substituer des clauses nouvelles à celles qu’elles ont 
librement acceptées.117  
 
However, nowadays there are some decisions on the duty to 
renegotiate based on good faith118 and there is also a French Reform 
Proposal providing for renegotiation of the contract in the case of change of 
circumstances.119 
Picod maintains that the judges in France recognize the duty of good 
faith (in its form of cooperation) of creditor and debtor. The author provides 
several examples in which they have recognized the creditor’s obligation to 
facilitate to the debtor the performance of his obligations.120  
There is an interesting case: the Court of Appeal of Colmar declared 
that a farmer, who at the moment of installing himself had found buildings 
dilapidated, land abandoned and, who consequently, has spent huge sums of 
money, is protected from being asked the immediate payment of a higher rent. 
That would be against good faith.121  
 Furthermore, from the point of view of the performance of the contract 
solidarists consider the abus de droit, not only as the intention to damage but, 
as including the absence of cooperation. The arbitral award in Klöckner v 
Cameroon illustrates this. Here, relying on what it is considered a general 
principle of French law, the majority boldly stated: 
 
We assume that the principle according to which a person who engages in close 
contractual relations, based on confidence, must deal with its partner in a frank, loyal 
                                               
117 ‘It is not for the courts, although it seems equitable, to take into consideration the time and 
circumstances in order to modify the parties’ agreements and substitute new clauses to those 
that they have freely accepted’. Cass.Civ. 6 March 1876 DP 1876.I.197. 
118 See Cass. Civ. 3 March 1992 and its comment by Mestre RTD Civ 1993, 124. For Mestre 
the importance of this decision is the recognition of: ‘Good faith enshrined in article 1134, 
which requires the party to modify, during the life of the contract, a system of obligations 
freely or conventionally fixed at its origin due to new circumstances that make the fulfilment 
more onerous and leave it in a precarious situation’. 
119 See Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud (n 32) 189 n. 145. See the avant-projet de réforme 
du droit des obligations et de la prescription  translated into English in:  
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rapportcatatla0905-anglais.pdf> accessed 8 May 2011. 
120 Picod (n 101) 108. 
121 Ibid 109 n 34. 
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and candid manner is a basic principle of French civil law, as is indeed the case 
under the municipal codes which we know of. 122 
 
Particularly enlightening in the ambit of international transactions is an 
arbitral decision given by the ICC applying French Law.123 In this award the 
duties of confidentiality and information are considered as stemming from the 
general duty of good faith, understood as cooperation.  
The claimant was a licensor (France) and the respondent, a licensee 
(U.S.). The parties of the dispute were company M (claimant), which had 
developed a specific type of equipment to produce its trademark product and 
a United States corporation (respondent), which had been granted the license 
for the manufacture and sale of the product in the United States and Canada. 
The corporation agreed to pay an ongoing royalty to use any improvement of 
the know-how and/or the patents. 
The dispute arose between the parties regarding the following issues: 
In 1997, the respondent sold the product to a company in country X 
without informing the claimant of such sale. Shortly thereafter in 1997, the 
respondent was contacted by another country X’s company inquiring about 
the availability of the product for distribution in country X. The respondent sent 
a sample shipment of 15,000 units of the product. Later, in 1999, this second 
country X’s company provided samples to an institute which used them in a 
comparative study.   
The product delivered by the respondent to the second country X’s 
company was rated extremely poor. The claimant then learned that the 
samples in the study had been supplied by the second country X’s company 
and that that company had presented itself as the agent for the product in that 
region. 
The claims in summary were: breaching of the contractual obligations 
by selling the product outside the contractual territory; continuation of sale of 
                                               
122 For a translation of the annulment in Klöckner v Cameroon see (1986)1 ICSID Rev - FILJ 
89. Delaume dissented from this award because he denied the existence of the duty of full 
disclosure that goes beyond the elementary requirement of good faith. He stated that, ‘The 
tribunal made no specific reference to French law or other municipal codes to substantiate its 
determination. Unfortunately, the determination finds no support in French law’. G Delaume, 
‘The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts’ in T Carbonneau (ed) Lex Mercatoria 
and Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, London 1998) 122. 
123 This is award n. 12127 in (2008) 33 Yb Comm. Arb’n 82. 
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the trademark product after the termination of the contract; breaching the 
confidentiality agreement; and, inter alia, damages for the publication of the 
study.  
The arbitral tribunal upheld the claimant’s position on the territory 
limitation. The tribunal found that it was ‘common practice of exclusive license 
agreements to entitle the licensee to perform both production and distribution 
and to include a territorial limitation of the licensee’s activities’. Moreover, the 
arbitrator found that the respondent had failed to inform the second country 
X’s company that it had no authority to appoint agents or representatives for 
the product in that region. The arbitral tribunal also rejected the respondent’s 
argument that, because deliveries had taken place FOB in the United States, 
they did not constitute a violation of the territorial restriction. The respondent’s 
actions were considered as violation of article 1134 of the French Civil Code 
which requires parties to perform their obligations in good faith, which is not 
satisfied when a party knows that it is circumventing the intention of the 
contract. 
In respect of the duty of information, even though the contract did not 
expressly provide for a clause obliging the licensee to inform the licensor of 
facts and circumstances pertinent to the trade-mark and patent’s protection, 
the tribunal believed that the respondent was effectively under such 
obligation. The importance of this part of the award is that such information 
obligation was considered as a general consequence of article 1134 of the 
French Civil Code, according to which contracts have to be performed in good 
faith. This demonstrates the trend pointed out before, i.e., that, as a matter of 
fact, case law and scholarship are agreed that good faith performance implies 
a degree of cooperation between the parties. 
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2.4.2 GOOD FAITH IN GERMANY 
 
The terms used in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) to mean good 
faith are Treu und Glauben. Altogether they mean objective good faith, that is, 
a standard of conduct or, better, a general principle.124  
Good faith in the German law of contract is fundamental and has had 
an enormous impact without adversely affecting the certainty of the law. The 
basic norms in the BGB are §§157 and 242.125 The core disposition, §242, 
reads as follows:  
 
The debtor is bound to perform according to the requirements of good 
faith, ordinary usage being taken into consideration 
 
Since 1920 courts in Germany have shown a tendency to quote both 
provisions simultaneously.126 
§242 is a general principle of the law of obligations; it is a general 
clause which does not enunciate any precise duty, although it is possible to 
deduce parameters of behaviour susceptible of definition at the time of their 
application: ‘The fides uberrima of §242 – as all general clauses in proper 
sense – is a reference to experiences, rules and maxims to be updated in 
foro’.127 The general clause contained in §242 allows each decision based on 
it to contain elements of a new creation of law. It is a ‘law in making’, in 
Wieacker’s wording.128  
                                               
124 What is the real nature of good faith: legal standard or general principle of law? Standard 
is an instrument of method; typical standard is the bon père de famille. The standard is built 
for a particular case. It is a tool of the arbitrator or judge to be used in a discretional way. The 
rule of law and the principles of law are elements of stability of law, imperative, abstract and 
non individual; they impose themselves on everyone, even the judge. Good faith has always 
had the general character attributed to principles of law. Though it is specified according to 
the circumstances of the case, it conserves its general aspect and abstraction. See Vouin (n 
103) 93. As regards the necessity of having general rules and principles, see W Frankena, 
Ethics (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey 1973). 
125 §157 BGB: Contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirement of good faith, 
ordinary usage being taken into consideration. 
126 For an account of cases see B Markesinis, W Lorenz and G Dannemann, The German 
Law of Obligations. The Law of Contracts and Restitution Vol. 1 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1997) 544 ff. 
127 Wieacker (n 17) 40. 
128 Ibid 39. 
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 It has been said that what an English judge deduces from the contract 
and calls ‘implied condition’ is added to the contract by the German judge by 
virtue of the principle of good faith.129 Such generality has allowed §242 BGB 
to act as a source of duties that later become independent.  This is what has 
been called Ergänzungsfunktion.130 Section 242 has given rise to a creative 
construction and, therefore, ancillary duties derived from good faith have even 
become new prescriptions of the BGB.131  
A further problem in the original BGB was the absence of consideration 
of the change of circumstances. This was a consequence of the hostile 
position of the nineteenth century legal science towards the clause rebus sic 
stantibus,132 which confronted the freedom of contract and economic 
liberalism prevailing then. Therefore, the interpretation of §242 by courts in the 
aftermath of the First World War brought about the ‘Doctrine of Contractual 
Basis’ (Lehre von der Geschäftsgrundlage): 
 
 According to this theory, which is based on the traditional notion of clause rebus sic 
stantibus, the ‘basis’ of the contract is the assumption shared by the contracting 
parties that certain circumstances which they regard as important are either existing 
or will come about, even though this assumption was not expressed in their 
declarations exchanged when making the contract (emphasis added).133  
 
The ‘assumption shared’ was highlighted in the foregoing quotation 
because the original formulation of Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892), 
possibly the most influential of the Pandectists of the nineteenth century and 
chief drafter of the first version of the Civil Code, did not consider this aspect 
of shared perspective of the ‘inchoate condition’ which became known as 
Lehre von der Voraussetzung. This defect affected those who considered that 
                                               
129 K Larenz, Base del Negocio Jurídico y Cumplimiento de los Contratos (Editorial Comares, 
Granada 2002). 
130 See M Hesselink, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ in A S Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards 
a European Civil Code (3rd edn Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2004). Available at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098856> accessed 9 May 2011. 
131 §§ 554 a, 626, 723 BGB have come to be seen as specific statutory emanations of the 
principle of good faith. 
132 See Chapter One n 85. 
133 V Sims, ‘Good Faith in Contract Law. A Comparative Analysis of English and German Law’ 
(PhD thesis, University of Cambridge 2003) 12. 
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this would allow one party to pass its own risks onto its co-contractor. The 
theory was ‘corrected’ by Oertmann, who established that,  
 
The basis of the transaction is the ‘assumption made by one party which has become 
obvious to and acquiesced in by the other’ that certain circumstances which they 
regard as important are either existing or will come about, even though this 
assumption was not expressed in their declarations exchanged when making the 
contract.134 
 
German contract law has given importance to the change of 
circumstances on the basis of the good faith principle, to the point of 
modifying the foundations of the contract. The German reform of the law of 
obligations in 2002 embodied such considerations, introducing the new §313 
in the BGB.135 
Besides the aforementioned functions of Section 242 BGB, namely the 
function of allowing German jurists to create supplementary duties and to 
adjust contracts affected by new circumstances, there would be two other 
functions: 
 
The function of restriction has to be mentioned. Based on Section 242 BGB, the 
courts frequently prevent a certain right from being abused or carried to an 
extreme…In addition, Section 242 BGB functions as a platform for the applicability of 
the German Constitution, the so-called ‘Basic-law’ (Grundgesetz) into private law.136 
 
It is considered that German law has been highly influential in the ways 
to tackle the change of circumstances and ancillary duties in the lex 
                                               
134 Markesinis, Lorenz and Dannemann (n 126) 318. 
135 Section 313: Interference with the Basis of the Transaction 
(1) If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed since 
the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into the contract or 
would have entered into it with different contents if they had foreseen this change, adaptation 
of the contract may be demanded to the extent that, taking account of all the circumstances of 
the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory distribution of risk, one of the 
parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without alteration. 
(2) It is equivalent to a change of circumstances if material conceptions that have become the 
basis of the contract are found to be incorrect. 
(3) If adaptation of the contract is not possible or one party cannot reasonably be expected to 
accept it, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the contract. In the case of continuing 
obligations, the right to terminate takes the place of the right to withdraw.  
136 W E Joachim, ‘The “Reasonable Man” in United States and German Commercial Law’ 
(1992) 15 Comp.L.Yb.Int'l Bus. 341, 354. 
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mercatoria. Regarding the first aspect, even though the clause rebus sic 
stantibus finds its historical origin in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae,137 it was 
German law which – despite the initial opposition by the drafters of the Code 
to incorporate the change of circumstances – dealt with it in the aftermath of 
the First World War. This new way to face the issue is embraced in the lex 
mercatoria.138 For example, the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 
and the Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC or UNIDROIT 
Principles) have both introduced the concept of adjustment of the contract due 
to supervening events, though with fundamental differences in respect to 
Section 313 BGB.139 Schlechtriem offers a clear account of these differences: 
 
While PECL requires a change of circumstances after conclusion of the contract, § 
313 (2) BGB allows adjustment also in case of a mutual error of the parties as to the 
factual foundations of the contract. While the uniform law projects see as an initial 
step a request by the disadvantaged party for renegotiations, §313 BGB has no such 
requirement but allows an aggrieved party to claim adjustment of the contract without 
preliminary negotiations. Most important, while the uniform law projects allow the 
courts to adjust the contract affected by changed circumstances at their discretion, 
§313 (1) requires that the party asking for adjustment must claim for a specific 
alteration of the contract, which the court can either grant of deny. And while §313 (3) 
BGB envisages termination of the contract in these cases only as a remedy of last 
resort, the uniform law projects leave it to the discretion of the courts whether they 
terminate the contract or alter its terms.140 
 
As regards ancillary duties, according to Sections 280 (3), 282 and 241 
(2) BGB the creditor is entitled not only to receive performance but a proper 
one. From the point of view of both parties, each of them must be considerate 
                                               
137 Cf. P Voirin, De l’Imprévision dans les Rapports de Droit Privé (Ancienne Impr. Vagner, 
Nancy 1922). 
138 It is considered a new way to face the change of circumstances in comparison with other 
legislations rather scarce in effective solutions, e.g. French Civil Code regulates the 
fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract by events which occur after the 
conclusion of the agreement in a very severe manner through the theory of imprévision. 
139 These set of rules, with European and universal reach respectively, attempt to offer the 
common core of contract law to trade operators that want to abstain from national legislations. 
They have been made by private institutions and, therefore, are not binding over the parties. It 
is considered that they reflect in part the current lex mercatoria. See Chapter Four, Section 
4.2 and 4.3.  
140 P Schlechtriem, ‘The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the Context of 
the Common Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligation in Europe’ (2002) Oxford U 
Comparative L Forum 2 at <ouclf.iuscomp.org> accessed 15 May 2011, text after note 52. 
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with regard to each other’s rights and legal interests.141 This outlook, which 
considers that a proper performance includes those duties directed to facilitate 
the performance of the other party, reveals that there is a cooperative 
perspective of the contractual relationship in German law.  
This view is confirmed in the recapitulation of the classic book of 
Wieacker, Zur rechtstheorestiche Präzisierung des §242 BGB,142  where the 
author states: 
 
In the field of what has been called officium iudicis the current text of paragraph 242 
expresses its function in a clear and accurate way. Furthermore, the debtor must fulfil 
his duty and the creditor must require it according to good faith… In this manner, the 
paragraph 242 is better suited to the vanguard of the modern Law of Obligations and 
expresses in a better way the new perspectives on the all-inclusive character of the 
contractual relationship. 
 
Additionally, this vision is hugely applied in the lex mercatoria, e.g., 
article 1:301 (4) and the official comment to article 8:101 PECL specifically 
state that the violation of an accessory duty, or failure to fulfil the duty to 
cooperate in order to give full effect to the contract, is covered by the term 
‘non-performance’.143 
 
2.4.3 CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
In the French and in the German systems it is possible to appreciate an 
evolution of the concept of good faith as enshrined in the Codes. The reach of 
the concept has expanded in both systems and, most importantly, they are 
moving in the same direction in the understanding of the principle as 
collaboration between parties.  
In France, despite the embracement of article 1134, there was an initial 
hesitant approach towards good faith due to the attempt of jurists to put it on 
too high a moral plane. In the 1930s voices were raised in favour of a major 
                                               
141 These norms refer to supplementary obligations that not affect the performance of the 
main duty. The infringement of ancillary duties directly affecting the performance is covered 
by sections 280 (3) and 281 BGB. 
142 Wieacker (n 17) 97. 
143 Cf. Zimmermann (n 79) 55. 
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role of good faith, for example, as a tool for judges to adjust contracts to 
unforeseen events.144 Nowadays, the obligation is under the influence of the 
theory of solidarism, which seeks to adapt relations that are not equal, 
requiring the parties’ full collaboration.  
Moreover, in Germany good faith had an enormous development on 
the basis of §242 BGB. The most notable manifestations of this development 
are the embracement of the clause rebus sic stantibus (the principle of the 
collapse of the underlying basis of the transactions or Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage) and ancillary duties emanating from good faith.145 These 
manifestations accentuate the cooperative character that good faith imprints 
on the contract.  
 
 
2.5 GOOD FAITH IN COMMON LAW 
2.5.1 GOOD FAITH IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), keystone of the commercial 
contract law in the US, recognizes good faith.146 This instrument contains a 
general reference to good faith in what was Section 1-203.147 A kind of official 
acknowledgement of good faith came with the promulgation in 1981 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts,148 which in §205 provides: 
 
                                               
144 This can be attributed to the change of moralists’ view in the area of justice at that time. 
The interest of moralists was formerly confined chiefly to problems of individual right. But 
during that period they concentrated on obligations that were collective and social in nature. 
See E Lévy, La Vision Socialiste du Droit (M Giard, Paris, 1926); and Lévy, Les Fondements 
du Droit (Nouvelle Édition, Paris 1933). 
145 Cf. R Geiger, ‘The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements’ (1974) 23 
ICLQ 73. 
146 In the sixties the UCC was adopted by the fifty legislatures of the American states. See a 
contemporaneous (to the adoption) critical approach to good faith in this instrument in: H 
Orrin, ‘Good Faith under the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1961-1962) 23 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 754. 
147 The standard doctrinal formulation of good faith performance duty was first articulated in 
1933 by the New York Court of Appeals in Kirke La Shelle Co. v Paul Armstrong Co. 263  
N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933). 
148 ‘A restatement represents an attempt by the American Law Institute, a private organization 
of scholars, judges and practitioners, to formulate with some precision the leading rules and 
principles in major fields of American law, “in the aggregate”, so to speak, as if the United 
States consisted of only one, rather than fifty, state jurisdictions’. R Summers, ‘The 
Conceptualisation of Good Faith in American Contract Law: a General Account’ in 
Zimmermann and Whittaker (n 12) 119-20. 
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Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and enforcement. 
 
The most relevant provisions on good faith in the UCC are the 
aforementioned Section 1-203 which is today’s Section 1-304: 
 
Every contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement. 
 
It is worthwhile to make clear that, according to the official commentary 
of the UCC, ‘This section does not support an independent course of action 
for failure to perform or enforce in good faith’. The good faith principle directs 
a court towards interpreting the contract according to its circumstances.  
 
Section 1-201 defines good faith as: 
 
Honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing. 
 
This definition applies to the whole UCC, except Section 5 regarding 
letters of credit, which in article 5-107 (7) defines good faith as: 
 
Honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 
 
Section 2-103 is specifically applicable to merchants in sales: 
 
 Good faith means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing. 
 
The term ‘honesty in fact’ may seem to imply a subjective approach of 
good faith, but it has more a normative or objective meaning because of the 
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addition of the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing.149  
Against this view, Stankiewicz, who in his ‘Good Faith Obligation in the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Problems in Determining its Meaning and 
Evaluating its Effect’150 concludes, ‘This writer suggests that the courts have 
so far only dealt with one, viz., the canon law view of good faith as a morally 
based concept’.151 The author argues this based on the personal or subjective 
approach given to good faith by judges. 
Prima facie, it appears quite clear to scholars coming from both the civil 
and the common law traditions what the difference is between objective and 
subjective good faith. The first makes reference to a measurable behaviour of 
‘reasonableness’ between parties, whereas the second corresponds to the 
belief of acting honestly or rightly. It is also understood that just the first type 
of good faith is applicable in contracts as a general principle. In spite of this, 
Farnsworth draws attention to the fallibility of the common view that there is 
such a clear distinction. He makes the point in the following example: 
 
Suppose you are a publisher and I am a printer and we make a contract under which 
I am to print some books for you and you are to take them and pay me if you are 
‘satisfied’ with my printing. The contract gives you some discretion in deciding 
whether you are ‘satisfied’. You have to exercise that discretion in good faith. But is 
the test of your good faith objective or purely subjective?152 
 
This is a matter of interpretation, concludes the author:  
 
What does ‘satisfied’ mean? A court would probably decide that, because it is not so 
difficult to judge the quality of printing, the test should be objective. If a jury decides 
that you ought reasonably to have been satisfied, the court will hold that you have 
broken our contract even if you were honestly not satisfied.153 
 
                                               
149 Cfr. A Di Majo, ‘L’Osservanza della Buona Fede nei Principi UNIDROIT’ in M J Bonell & F 
Bonelli, Contratti Commerciali Internazionali e Principi UNIDROIT (Giuffrè, Milano 1997) 153. 
150 (1972-1973) 7 Val.U.L.Rev. 389. 
151 Ibid 412. 
152 A Farnsworth, The Concept of Good Faith in American Law (Centro di Studi e Ricerche di 
Diritto Comparato e Straniero. Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, Roma 1993) 6. 
153 Ibid. 
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It seems that this problem does not arise if the case is regulated under 
the UCC, since sections 1-201 and 2-103 provide for the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade, allowing the 
courts to consider the testimony of witnesses familiar with the behaviour of 
others in the trade. Thus, an objective criterion can be applied.  
The following is an example of what good faith as a commercial pattern 
of custom is: A expects that B will render payment at the conclusion of his 
work; B knows that he must render payment at this time because that is how 
C, D, E, F and G operate.154 
Section 1-302 allows variation of the provisions of the UCC by contract, 
but not of the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care 
prescribed by it. However, the parties may set the standards by which the 
performance of these obligations is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable. This shows that the concept is not completely 
mandatory. 
Several articles of the UCC and of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts refer expressly to good faith. Furthermore, it is postulated that good 
faith and fairness have permeated the private law of the United States beyond 
specific cases enshrined in provisions of these regulations. According to 
Gordley, good faith’s influence would have even reached the classical 
doctrine of consideration. He states that the doctrine seems to have lost its 
identity, since the role that it de facto fulfilled, policing the fairness of the 
agreement, is nowadays plainly concretized, taking into account the good faith 
of the agreements. An example will clarify the statement: 
 
One party agrees to sell all he makes or to buy all he needs of a particular commodity 
from the other at a fixed price. If there are no limits to how much one party could force 
the other to buy from or to sell to him, the arrangement is seriously unfair. Courts 
used the doctrine of consideration to invalidate such contracts on the grounds that a 
party who binds himself to sell or buy as much as he pleases does not really bind 
himself. The doctrine was a crude tool for preventing unfairness. Consequently, 
Uniform Commercial Code replaced the common law with a more sophisticated 
solution: the output or requirements in question must be those that ‘occur in good 
                                               
154 In agreement with this position: A Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith Performance and Commercial 
Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1963) 30 U.Chi.L.Rev. 666. 
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faith’ and ‘no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the 
absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or 
requirements may be tendered or demanded’ (Uniform Commercial Code §2-306 
(1).155 
 
It is considered here that there is no other alternative than to support 
Gordley’s position, since many of the contracts in which good faith 
performance is of central importance once would have been unenforceable for 
indefiniteness or lack of mutuality. 
Steven Burton unveils a gap in the literature and in judicial decisions 
given from the time of the introduction of the UCC.156 He affirms that neither 
courts nor commentators have articulated an operational standard that 
distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith performance.  
Burton reflects on the expectation interest, which is usually associated 
with the promisee’s expectation of receiving the promised benefit of the 
contract (property, services or money). He argues that it also encompasses 
the expected costs of the promisor, which consist in the opportunities 
foregone at the time of contract formation. This cost perspective allows 
identifying a standard of good faith performance. This theory is applicable to 
the duty to perform in good faith when one party exercises discretion in 
performance and thereby controls the other party’s anticipated benefits. There 
would be bad faith if the party uses such discretion to recapture foregone 
opportunities.157  
                                               
155 J Gordley, An American Perspective on the Unidroit Principles (Centro di Studi e Ricerche 
di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Roma 1996) 3. In Rodney Griffith and Carla Griffith v Clear 
Lakes Trout Co 146 Idaho 613; 200 P.3d 1162; 2009 Ida. LEXIS 13 (2009), the Supreme 
Court of Idaho declared that the parties entered into an output/requirements contract, since 
the quantity of fish under the agreement was not only subject to the Griffiths’ good faith output 
of market size trout, up to the stated maximum of two million pounds, but was also subject to 
Clear Lakes’s good faith requirements for trout in its resale market. Interestingly, the 
judgement quoted the language from comment 2 to Section 2-306 of the UCC: ‘Under this 
Article, a contract for output or requirements is not too indefinite since it is held to mean the 
actual good faith output or requirements of the particular party. Nor does such a contract lack 
mutuality of obligation since, under this section, the party who will determine quantity is 
required to operate his plant or conduct his business in good faith and according to 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade so that his output or requirements will 
approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure’.  
156 S Burton, 'Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ (1980) 
94 Harv.L.Rev. 369. 
157 See this thesis applied to the judge’s legal duty to uphold the law in S J Burton, Judging in 
Good Faith (CUP, Cambridge 1992). In brief, the good faith thesis claims that judges are 
under a legal duty in all cases to exercise discretion on the basis of reasons provided by the 
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Burton states that there are two potential justifications of the good faith 
performance doctrine – a legal and an economic one. From the legal point of 
view, by requiring a party who acts in bad faith – namely, by recapturing 
foregone opportunities – to compensate the other party, this increases the 
reliability of flexible contracts and, therefore, ensures the security of such 
transactions.158 From the economic point of view, the doctrine of good faith 
performance would enhance economic efficiency by reducing the costs of 
contracting: 
 
The costs of exchange include the costs of gathering information with which to 
choose one's contract partners, negotiating and drafting contracts, and risk taking 
with respect to the future. The good faith performance doctrine reduces all three kinds 
of costs by allowing parties to rely on the law in place of incurring some of these 
costs.159 
 
This theory is altogether acceptable. However, it suffers from two flaws. 
Firstly, it does not offer a positive standard to identify good faith; it only offers 
an excluder notion. Secondly, because the duty to perform in good faith is 
also applicable when all the terms of the contract are previously established 
and, therefore, no party exercises discretion, an operational standard to 
qualify as good faith in those cases still lacking. 
 
Summers is widely known for his ‘excluder’ notion of good faith, which, 
in brief, implies that this principle lacks content on its own and serves just to 
identify situations of bad faith. The author states that, ‘Once the relevant form 
of bad faith is thus identified, the lawyer can, if he wishes, assign a specific 
meaning to good faith by formulating an “opposite” for the species of bad faith 
being ruled out’.160 
This ‘excluder’ notion of good faith is encompassed in the official 
comment of the aforementioned §205 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts: 
                                                                                                                                      
law. Judges must refuse the opportunity to act on some kinds of reasons excluded by judicial 
duty or the law’s standards. Using judicial discretion to recapture such foregone opportunities 
is bad faith and a breach of judicial duty. 
158 Burton (n 156) 392. 
159 Burton (n 156) 393. 
160 Summers (n 148) 125.  
 117
The phrase good faith is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies 
somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the 
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct 
characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of 
decency, fairness and reasonableness. 161 
 
In addition, some types of bad faith mentioned here have been 
recognized by judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of 
diligence and slacking off, wilful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of 
power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the 
other party’s performance.162 
 
It is difficult to agree with the thesis of Summers which deprives good 
faith of any core concept. According to Summers’s view, good faith can only 
be understood by reference to what courts have in the past considered bad 
faith. One would be forced with this restrictive interpretation to conclude that 
good faith means what the courts say it means.  
 
Farnsworth considers the following relevant norms of the Uniform 
Commercial Code to show his view on the subject: § 2-305 Open Price Term, 
which states, ‘A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price to 
be fixed in good faith’; § 2-306 Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings 
(previously analyzed);163 and §2-603: Merchant Buyer's Duties as to Rightfully 
Rejected Goods, which, in short, states that if the merchant buyer is left in 
possession of goods that he has rightfully rejected, his obligation to effect 
salvage under the Code is one of good faith.164 Here the references are to 
                                               
161 Restatement of the Law, Second. Contracts. Vol. 2 §§178-315 (American Law Institute 
Publisher, St. Paul Minn. 1981). 
162 See the verdict of the Court of Appeal of Arizona on Airfreight Express Ltd. v Evergreen Air 
Center Inc. of 21 May 2007 in 215 Ariz. 103; 158 P.3d 232; 2007 Ariz. App. LEXIS 78; 504 
Ariz. Adv. Rep. 19; see also Rawlings v Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 153, 726 P.2d 565, 569 
(1986). 
163 See n 155 and the text that accompanies it. 
164 The text of §2-603 is as follows: ‘(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer 
(subsection (3) of Section 2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of business at the 
market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after rejection of goods in his possession 
or control to follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the 
goods and in the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them for the 
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objective good faith (in opposition to good faith purchase, which is purely 
subjective) and the standards to refer to are decency, fairness or 
reasonableness in performance or enforcement.  
According to Farnsworth, where good faith is necessary in order that 
the other might secure the expected benefits of the contract, it ‘represents a 
specific application of the general obligation of good faith – resulting in an 
implied term of the contract requiring cooperation on the part of one party 
to the contract so that another party will not be deprived of his reasonable 
expectations’ (emphasis added).165  
Apart from the most well-known theories, there are others proposals 
seeking to explain the meaning of good faith in the UCC. 
Gergen proposes a theory based on efficiency. He argues that the 
hypothetical parties at the contracting table – confronted with hypothetical and 
unexpected events – would agree to limit their discretion to make efficient 
changes. In other words, ‘neither contracting party would expect either party 
to exercise discretion in a way that would not be efficient, i.e., in a way that 
would inflict a greater injury to the other party than the gain to himself’.166  
White is sceptical regarding this theory. He states: ‘Who is to say that a 
cooperative antagonist will remain cooperative when discretion is 
unexpectedly given to it? In a world occupied by cooperative antagonists, I 
doubt that Professor Gergen’s hypothesis about expectations is true to life’.167  
How can one resolve this disagreement? 
Raiffa’s theory is an option. First of all, he poses the question, ‘What 
norms of behaviour do you expect of the others in your negotiation 
discussions?’ As a way to answer, he aptly distinguishes those who might 
                                                                                                                                      
seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily.  Instructions are 
not reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming. (2) When the buyer 
sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled to reimbursement from the seller or out of the 
proceeds for reasonable expenses of caring for and selling them, and if the expenses include 
no selling commission then to such commission as is usual in the trade or if there is none to a 
reasonable sum not exceeding ten per cent on the gross proceeds. (3) In complying with this 
section the buyer is held only to good faith and good faith conduct hereunder is neither 
acceptance nor conversion nor the basis of an action for damages’. 
165 Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness’ (n 154) 669. In 
England the term ‘reasonable expectations’ was used by Lord J Steyn in First Energy (UK) 
Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194.  
166 The idea is to be found in J J White, ‘Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist’ (2001) 
54 S.M.U.L. Rev. 679, 689. 
167 Ibid 690. 
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sign business contracts from others, from the strident antagonist (malevolent, 
untrustworthy) and from the fully cooperative partners (completely open to one 
another, totally honest, fully disclosing and not strategically posturing). He 
states that, ‘Cooperative antagonists recognize that they have differences of 
interests’.168 Once one is well aware about the distinction between a 
cooperative antagonist and a fully cooperative partner, the logical question is, 
how does the cooperation between traders become effective? It may be that 
the answer lies in the expectations of the parties when contracting. What a 
party can expect during the different phases of the contract is that the other 
party will do what the reality requires to attain the aim of the contract. During 
the fulfilment the antagonist’s interest is directed towards that aim, but it is not 
suppressed.169 
 
2.5.2 GOOD FAITH IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
The traditional view is that English law is far from the overarching 
principle of good faith in contractual dealings. English case law offers an 
example of the absence of the concept of good faith as a general one: in 
Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd Lord J Slade 
stated: 
 
The law cannot police the fairness of every commercial contract by reference to moral 
principles. It frequently appears with hindsight that one contracting party had 
knowledge of facts which, if communicated to the other party, would have protected 
him from loss. However, subject to well-recognised exceptions, the law does not and 
                                               
168 H Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Harvard University Press, London 1982) 18. 
R Axelroad explains in his book, The Evolution of Co-operation (Penguin, London 1990) 87 
that, ‘The live-and-let-live system that emerged in the bitter trench warfare on World War I 
demonstrates that friendship is hardly necessary for cooperation based upon reciprocity to get 
started. Under suitable circumstances, cooperation can develop even between antagonists’.  
169 Ebke and Griffin state a similar theory, but only for the case of lending contracts: ‘The 
covenant of good faith requires the co-operation of one party to the lending agreement where 
it is necessary in order that the other party might secure the expected benefit of the bargain. 
In the performance of a commercial lending transaction or the enforcement of a right arising 
out of a loan agreement, a party who evades “the spirit of the agreement” and so denies the 
other the benefits of the bargain commits a breach even if the evasive conduct is within the 
letter of the agreement’. W Ebke and J Griffin, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial 
Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond’ (1988-1989) 49 Ohio St.L.J. 
1237, 1239. 
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should not undertake the reopening of commercial transactions in order to adjust 
such losses.170 
 
The natural question is why good faith has not been embraced as a 
general principle in English law? 
 
- First theory: Weakness of English Law Merchant 
The lex mercatoria was absorbed into the law of England by Lord 
Mansfield in the eighteenth century.171 However, good faith, the essential 
principle of the lex mercatoria, was not embraced. This is due to the lack of 
development of the law merchant in the merchant courts of England. The lack 
of development of the merchant courts is usually attributed to the strength of 
the common law courts, which, in fact, took priority over the former.172 Stuart 
Sutherland adds other reasons for the lack of development of the merchant 
courts in England – while they were increasing in strength elsewhere. The first 
reason is the growth of the Admiralty Court, which rose to the height of its 
importance in the sixteenth century. The other cause of the failure of the law 
merchant to develop in the merchant courts was the division between traders 
and merchants, ‘The merchant was to the English essentially the exporter, 
with his organised market abroad. For this reason an English centre of 
exchange was slow to develop, and when it did was only a small offshoot of 
the great exchange market abroad’.173 
Furthermore, according to Farnsworth, in the eighteenth century – 
when the law merchant had been absorbed into the common law – the kind of 
good faith that found its way in commercial matters in the King’s courts was a 
                                               
170 (1989) 2 All ER 952 (CA); (1990) 2 All ER 947 (HL). Cfr. also Lord Atkin’s famous 
examples of permissible non-disclosure in Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd. [1932] A.C. 161, 224. 
171 It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to reassess this process, which may be 
checked in: J Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield (University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2004). The previous stage of co-existence of the law merchant 
and the common law may be illuminated by J H Baker’s work: ‘The Law Merchant and the 
Common Law Before 1700’ (1979) 38 CLJ 295. Baker suggests that the distinction between 
the lex mercatoria and the law of the Kingdom of England was only procedural. He also 
argues that the common law courts did not ‘incorporate’ the law merchant, but they operated 
a process of ‘refinement’ of the common law ‘which had always governed mercantile affairs’ 
(p. 322). 
172 Cf. Baker (n 171) 306. 
173 L Stuart Sutherland, ‘The Law Merchant in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries’ (1934) 17 Trans.Royal Hist.Soc’y 149, 154-156. 
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subjective good faith or the belief of acting honestly or rightly. This was 
because the courts were concentrated upon the development of a body of 
doctrine to encourage the free circulation of goods and commercial 
documents. Thus, good faith purchase, not good faith performance (as a 
standard of behaviour), was the concern in those days.174 
 
 
 
- Second theory: The Formation of the Doctrine of Consideration 
Renowned studies reveal the influence that canon law and civil law 
exerted upon legal ideas in all the nascent states of Western Europe in the 
Middle Ages.175  This influence was also felt in England. Holdsworth points out 
that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, ‘the influence of civil and 
canon law is perhaps the most important of all the external influences which 
have shaped the development of English law’.176 However, the principle of 
good faith was not embraced as a general one in English law. 
The clerical canon lawyers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
introduced the Roman canon law concept of conscience in England.177  Even 
during the fourteenth century ‘conscience’ was referred to and it was made 
the basis of an occasional decision.178 Holdsworth argues in favour of the 
influence of this notion over the shape of the Chancery courts.179 The same 
                                               
174 ‘The leading cases involved the test of good faith for a holder in due course of a negotiable 
instrument. In 1801, in Lawson v Weston, Lord Kenyon ruled that the holder need not make 
diligent enquiry when he takes the instrument, and – with the grim prediction that to require 
such an enquiry ‘would be at once to paralyze the circulation of all the paper in the country’ – 
he introduced the subjective test of actual good faith, the test of ‘the pure heart and empty 
head’. In 1824, in Gill v Cubitt, the subjective test was discarded for an objective test that 
required the holder to exercise the prudence and caution of a reasonable man. But in 1836 
Gill v Cubitt had been overruled in England’. Farnsworth (n 154) 670. 
175 See W Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol II (4th edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 
1936) 143 ff; D Seipp, ‘The Reception of Canon Law and Civil Law in the Common Law 
Courts before 1600’ (1993) Oxford J.Legal Stud. 388; and R Turner, ‘Roman Law in England 
before the Time of Bracton’ (1975) 15 J.Brit.Stud. 1. 
176 Holdsworth Vol. II (n 175) 146. Specifically, the canonical influence on English civil 
procedure is stressed by H D Hazeltine, Roman and Canon Law in the Middle Ages. The 
Cambridge Medieval History Vol. 5 (CUP, Cambridge 1964) 756 ff.  
177 See A Jeremy, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda: The Influence of Canon Law upon the Contractual 
Obligation of Good Faith’ (LLM thesis, UWC 1999) 41. 
178 Holdsworth Vol. II (n 175) 344 and 346. 
179 Holdsworth Vol. II (n 175) 346. The growth of a separate and distinct court of Chancery 
took place in the latter part of the fifteenth century and then in the sixteenth. 
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author states that equity was also administered by the common law courts.180 
However, in the latter half of the fourteenth century and then in the fifteenth 
the common law tended to become a fixed and rigid system due the lack of 
connection with the king – the royal discretion was at the basis of the 
equitable modification of the law. This rigidity determined the development of 
a set of equitable principles and ideas outside the common law and mainly 
administered by ecclesiastical chancellors.   
What was the theory of contract held by the ecclesiastical lawyers? 
The question can be answered by examining the nature of the test 
which they applied to identify a binding agreement. The canonists of that 
period emphasised the binding character of consent which imposed an 
imperative duty in conscience and good faith. An obligation, they said, is 
derived non ex nuda sed ex sola promissione.181 The canonists propounded 
the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda by which simple naked agreements and 
promises should be binding.182 To obtain recognition of such agreements 
canonists moved to the proposition that a naked pact was valid if it was 
‘clothed’ by an adequate causa – the ancestor of the continental causa.  
What was the theory of contract held by the medieval chancellors?  
Barbour says that probably the test applied to distinguish agreement 
from contract was the canonist idea of causa.183 The chancellors concluded 
that an agreement, because it was an agreement, ought to be enforced. This 
rose as a corrective to the rigidity of the common law and influenced it to 
                                               
180 W S Holdsworth, ‘The Early History of Equity’ (1915) 13 Mich.L.Rev. 293. He cites a 
number of authoritative studies to base his position at p. 294.  
181 Good faith influenced in the same way the law merchant. Here, Mitchell in: An Essay on 
the Early History of the Law Merchant (CUP, Cambridge 1904) 102 and 105 states: ‘Slowly it 
(good faith) undermined the Roman and Germanic principle that in general formless contracts 
are not binding …It is quite clear that in the fourteenth century the validity of the nuda pacta in 
commercial transactions was recognised in Italy by mercantile usage, and it seems probable 
that in commercial and local courts they were recognized in England’ (parenthesis added). 
182 See the definition of Bemardus Papiensis (+1213): ‘Pactum est plurium in idem dandum 
vel faciendum consensu’ in Summa Decretalium 1.26.1. E. A. T. Laspeyres (ed), Bernardi 
Papiensis Faventini Episcopi Summa Decretalium: ad Librorum Manuscriptorum Fidem, Cum 
Aliis Eiusdem Scriptoris Anecdotis (Graz, 1956) 21. Furthermore, ‘By the beginning of the 
fourteenth century Guido de Baysio, better known to many generations of canonists as 
Archidiaconus, could state in terms that secundum simplicitatem canonicam a bare pact in the 
canon law has precisely the same effect as a stipulation in the civil law’. The quotation is from 
J L Barton, ‘The Early History of Consideration’ (1969) 85 LQR 372, 379. See R Lesaffer, 
‘The Medieval Canon Law of Contract and Early Modern Treaty Law’ (2000) J.Hist.Int’l L. 178.   
183 See W T Barbour, History of Contract in Early English Equity. Oxford Studies in Social and 
Legal History Vol. 4 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1914) passim, especially 152-168. 
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extend the sphere of assumpsit (an action to recover damages for breach of 
an express or implied contract or agreement that was not under seal). 
For the sake of relations of confidence the notion of causa of the 
canonists was accepted by common law courts to give validity to parol 
agreement.184 Yet, it was called ‘consideration’. It had not that moral meaning 
of the canon law (‘let the Church manage that, if it can’),185 but it was based 
on a charge on the other party.186 There was, therefore, a difference between 
these two concepts – causa and consideration – in the suits for breach of 
contract brought to the church courts (fidei laesio) and to the royal courts 
(assumpsit). 
It is considered here that this differentiation – between the objective 
concept of consideration adopted by the common law courts and the original 
duty in conscience of the canon law – lies at the basis of the non-existence of 
good faith as an overarching principle in the common law of England.  
 
However, it is still possible to find some references to good faith in 
specific contracts in English law nowadays:187 
 
- Sales of Goods Act 1979 contains general references to good faith in 
different sections, such as section 61:  
 
A thing is deemed to be done in good faith within the meaning of this 
Act when it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or 
not. 
 
Another example is section 23 Sale under Voidable Title: 
                                               
184 A primary obligation of conscience and good faith – that agreements must be observed –
became the foundation of liability in English law with the development of assumpsit, which 
became a remedy upon all parol agreements. See J B Ames, ‘Parol Contracts prior to 
Assumpsit’, (1894-1895) 8 Harv.L.Rev. 252. 
185 P Vinogradoff, ‘Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence’ (1908) 24 
LQR 373, 382. 
186 Holdsworth (n 180) 301 states that, ‘From this point of view the ideas drawn from the 
canon law and the practice of the ecclesiastical Chancellors were the greatest of the forces 
which inspired the common lawyers to create the most distinctive of all the features of the 
English law of contracts – the doctrine of consideration’.  
187 In addition to those regulations analysed here, J Steyn in ‘The Role of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing in Contract Law: Hair-Shirt Philosophy?’ (1991) 6 Denning L.J. 131, mentions also: 
Copyright Acts of 1911, 1956 and 1988 and the Consumer Credit Act 1994.  
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When the seller of goods has a voidable title to them, but his title has 
not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title 
to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of 
the seller’s defect of title. 
  
In these precepts the reference is to a form of good faith ‘honesty’ or 
subjective good faith. This is explained by the matter regulated in the Act, 
since subjective good faith is associated with iura in re, specifically 
possession, in which there is the acknowledgement of acting rightly or not 
being damaging to the rights of others. By contrast, objective good faith is 
placed in the ambit of contracts; it means a measurable behaviour of 
‘reasonableness’ between the parties.188 
As regards this differentiation, Dalhuisen holds: 
 
The use of good faith notions in contract law signals a quest for more objective 
criteria to determine parties’ rights and duties, and as such it presents a challenge to 
the nineteenth century will theory and to the notion of each party’s psychological 
intent. Even if stronger in interpersonal relationships, it favours depersonalisation of 
contract law and limits the traditional anthropomorphic idea of contract. 189 
 
The phenomenon described by Dalhuisen, i.e., the depersonalisation of 
contracts, makes evident the necessity for an objective criterion of good faith 
– measurable beyond the intent of the persons behind a contractual 
relationship. Hence, the lex mercatoria embraces the objective concept of 
good faith cooperation, as will be seen. 
                                               
188 This objective aspect of good faith starts to be clarified at the end of the nineteenth 
century, although the objective concept of good faith was not extraneous to philosophical 
European thought. The doctrine of Vico, for example, contains good faith with an objective 
profile in the essay De universi juris uno principio, et fine uno (1720). Examining jusnaturalist 
theories, he identifies the societas veri (society of truth) and societas aequi boni (society of 
equal utility) and observes that the first proposes a number of obligations that imposes the 
duty to conclude and perform agreements with honesty. The motto of this society is ‘Let us 
act in good faith’ (bona fide agito). However, in the second type of society, societas aequi 
boni, Vico insists on the criterion neminem laedere and the virtue of diligence in the 
agreements inter privatos. Cfr. J B Vici, De Universi Juris Uno Principio, et Fine Uno 
(Neapolis 1720) 28; cfr. also the translation from Latin into English in G Vico, Universal Right 
(Rodopi, Amsterdam 2000) 187-8. 
189 Dalhuisen (n 68) 288. 
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The following examples contain a more objective form of good faith: 
 
- Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts has been in force in 
English law since 1995.190 The Directive contains norms as article 3, which 
states: 
 
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith. 
 
Prima facie, this could be considered a revolution in the traditional 
approach to good faith in English law. Steyn, however, thinks differently. He 
mentions the Unfair Consumer Terms Act of 1977 as an example of how the 
English legislature had set statutory standards of fair dealing before the 
Directive.191  
Collins argues that the Directive is not essentially concerned with the 
fairness of the contract between the parties: 
 
It has grander ambitions, which fit into the aspirations of the social market of the EC. 
In seeking to establish the necessary conditions under which citizens have access 
through markets to high quality goods and services at competitive prices, the 
legislators of the Community have recognized that a market which permits 
antagonistic individuals to pursue their own best interests is likely in the end to 
frustrate their aspirations by generating many market failures … A successful market 
                                               
190 The Directive was implemented in the UK via the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1994, which came into force on 1 July 1995. The Regulations of 1994 have been 
replaced with the Unfair Terms Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, Statutory Instrument 
1999 N. 2083. The relevant provision of the Directive which requires the member States to 
adapt their systems according to the new normative is article 10. It reads: 
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive no later than 31 December 1994. They shall forthwith 
inform the Commission thereof.  
These provisions shall be applicable to all contracts concluded after 31 December 1994.  
2. When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official 
publication. The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the Member 
States. 
3. Member States shall communicate the main provisions of national law which they adopt in 
the field covered by this Directive to the Commission. 
191 Steyn (n 187). 
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system requires the recognition of such bonds of solidarity between the parties to 
contracts. And this has been expressed as a requirement of good faith.192 
 
Nonetheless, according to Collins, the Directive poses a challenge to 
purely self-interested rationality which often is identified as the guiding value 
of the common law of contracts.   
This Directive meant the fulfilment of what Steyn predicted about the 
increasing importance of good faith in consumer law, by way of the influence 
of European legislation.193  
A judicial decision which clarified the meaning of ‘good faith’ for the 
purposes of these Regulations is Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank plc.194 The judgment of the Court of Appeal is particularly 
enlightening regarding the notion of good faith; it states that this is to be 
equated with open and fair dealing and has a procedural and substantive 
element. The procedural aspect implies an obligation to consider consumers’ 
interests;195 according to the substantive aspect a clause is not always against 
good faith, but it can be upheld if it is brought to the attention of the 
consumer.196  
This decision reveals that the fairness in the Act is a matter of 
cooperation between the parties, which is not a novelty in the English system 
of law. It is just more limited than in civil law systems. Common sense 
indicates – at the least in commercial contracts – that, ‘every business 
contract depends for its smooth working on co-operation. But in the ordinary 
business contract, and apart, of course, from express terms, the law can 
enforce co-operation only in a limited degree – to the extent that is necessary 
                                               
192 H Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford J.Legal Stud. 229, 
253-4. 
193 Steyn (n 187).  
194 (2000) 2 WLR 1353 (CA)  
195 Regarding this idea Collins states, ‘And the assimilation of social values embodied in the 
law suggests that the common law of contract, which Kahn-Freund once described aptly as 
‘designed for a nation of shopkeepers’ will eventually have to succumb to a more 
communitarian ideal which balances the interests of consumers against those of 
shopkeepers’. Collins (n 192) 254. The author quotes from: O Kahn-Freund, C Lévy, B 
Rudden, A Source-Book on French Law (OUP, Oxford 1973) 286. 
196 See H Beale, ‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts’ in Beatson and Friedmann (n 92) 245. 
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to make the contract workable’.197 In legal systems where good faith is fully 
recognized as a general principle, cooperation can be derived from this 
general clause. But that is not the case in English law. Therefore, it is 
important to identify case by case the existence of this necessity of 
cooperation. Such a duty in English law will normally be pleaded as an implied 
term of the contract, i.e., derived from the parties’ will. The establishment of a 
general principle of good faith would enable the identification and solution of 
problems without forcing the concept of implied terms. 
 
 
- Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the Coordination 
of the Laws of the Member States relating to Self-Employed Commercial 
Agents198 
 
The Directive was implemented in the UK by the Commercial Agents 
(Council Directive) Regulations 1993: Statutory Instrument 3053 of 1993 as 
amended by Statutory Instrument 3173 of 1993.199  
The main innovations that this Directive brought into the common law 
are twofold: first, it introduced the categorization of commercial agents – 
which did not exist in common law –; second, the type of control it introduced 
was completely new. 
Regarding the introduction of a new category, the commercial agent is 
defined in regulation 2 (1) as ‘A self-employed intermediary who has 
continuing authority to negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of 
                                               
197 This is Justice Devlin’s reasoning in: Mona Oil Equipment and Supply Company Ltd. v 
Rhodesia Railways Ltd. (1949-50) 83 Lloyd’s Rep. 178, 187. This case was based on a 
contract of supply of 75 oil tanks and the condition for the payment of the price was re-
negotiated during the life of the contract. The price was not paid finally and the judge was 
called to pronounce his decision on whether this was a breach. The judge solved the case on 
the basis of the level of cooperation shown by the defendant for the fulfilment of the condition 
that had effected the payment of the price. Here, it was considered that a sufficient degree of 
cooperation was shown (this would have been called good faith in a civil law country): the 
defendant had to ‘instruct’ its agents in London to ascertain whether the tanks were at the 
disposal of the defendant. It was not required to the defendant to ‘procure’ them to act. 
198 Official Journal 31-12-1986 N. L 382/17. 
199 It is stated in the Statutory Instrument 3173: ‘These Regulations may be cited as the 
Commercial Agents (Council Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 1993 and shall come into 
force on 1st January 1994’. 
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another person (the ‘principal’), or to negotiate and conclude the sale or 
purchase of goods on behalf of and in the name of that principal’. 
As regards the second innovation, in common law the traditional view 
was that the principal needed protection against misuse of the agent’s 
powers; therefore, fiduciary duties of the agent developed.200 The Directive, 
instead, is based on the civil law assumption that commercial agents are the 
weaker party in the relationship.201 Hence, the Regulations are meant to afford 
protection to the agents against the principals.202 
The Regulations do not require fiduciary duties, albeit they contain 
duties of good faith concerning the agent and the principal. The Regulations 
require of the former that:  
 
3 (1) In performing his activities a commercial agent must look after the 
interests of his principal and act dutifully and in good faith. 
 
Importantly, according to the Agency Regulations the principal is also 
required to act in good faith in his relations with the agent: 
 
4 (1) In his relations with his commercial agent a principal must act 
dutifully and in good faith. 
(2) In particular, a principal must 
(a) provide his commercial agent with the necessary documentation 
relating to the goods concerned; 
(b) obtain for his commercial agent the information necessary for the 
performance of the agency contract, and in particular notify his 
                                               
200 Agency has been defined as: ‘the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, 
one of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on his behalf so as to 
affect his relationship with third parties, and the other of whom similarly consents so to act or 
so acts’. F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (16th edn Sweet & Maxwell 
London 1996) §1-001. The strictness of the English rules on the agent springs from the 
strictness originally required by Courts of Equity in cases where the fiduciary relationship 
exists. See Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2KB 822. 
201 Saintier in ‘A Remarkable Understanding and Application of the Protective Stance of the 
Agency Regulations by the English Courts’ [2001] JBL 540, 547 n 7, states that ‘Civil law 
recognises the risk that once commercial agents have created or developed the customer 
base, manufacturers might terminate the contract, by-pass commercial agents and deal 
directly with the clients, which would deny commercial agents their legitimate share of the 
profit’. 
202 See Preamble to the Regulations.  
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commercial agent within a reasonable period once he anticipates that 
the volume of commercial transactions will be significantly lower than 
that which the commercial agent could normally have expected. 
(3) A principal shall, in addition, inform his commercial agent within a 
reasonable period of his acceptance or refusal of, and of any non-
execution by him of, a commercial transaction which the commercial 
agent has procured for him. 
 
Regulation 4 of the Regulations generally involves a duty to cooperate 
and this, therefore, represents a significant change from the traditional 
common law rules, which imposed no implied duties on the principal.203 
Saintier explains that the silence of the text of the Directive as regards 
the meaning given to the duty of good faith is regrettable, since it raises doubt 
as to the likely impact of good faith as a key principle of this regulation. This 
could affect the harmonization of law between member states. The author 
finds elements to illustrate this duty in the French legal tradition: 
 
Good faith/co-operation requires a more active stance from the parties. It requires, for 
instance, the promisor to refrain from acting in a way which would jeopardise the 
promisee’s interests. It requires that the promisee must provide the services best 
suited to the promisor’s particular interests. This is clear with the obligation of 
information, i.e. the obligation to mention to the other party any events, which s/he 
has an interest in knowing for the performance of the contract.204 
  
Despite the silence on the meaning of good faith, parties have invoked 
the principle205 and English Courts have applied it in this context. For 
example, in the case Graham Page v Combined Shipping and Trading Ltd.206 
the court – in an interlocutory matter – granted the injunction on the ground 
that ‘proper performance’ of the contract under regulation 17 (7) (a) could be 
                                               
203 See S Saintier, Commercial Agency Law. A Comparative Analysis (Ashgate, Aldershot 
2002) 123. 
204 Eadem 
205 There are a number of recent cases in which good faith has been invoked: Barnett Fashion 
Agency Ltd. v Nigel Hall Menswear Ltd. [2011] EWHC 978 (QB); Gledhill v Bentley Designs 
(UK) Ltd. [2010] EWHC 1965 (QB). 
206 [1997] 3 All ER 656. In this area, this is the first time an English court has referred to and 
applied the civil-law-based duty of good faith in its reasoning. 
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interpreted as meaning ‘normal performance’, i.e., performance in the normal 
manner in which the parties intended the contract to be performed rather than 
performance in accordance with the contract terms. To reach such a 
conclusion the court used the duty of good faith enshrined in regulation 4 (1).  
There are no doubts that the Directive and the Regulations introduced 
good faith into the English scene and that, as part of this regulation, good faith 
amplified the spectrum of duties of the principal towards the commercial 
agent. What does this incorporation mean? 
From a negative point of view, good faith has already been seen as a 
duty, meaning to protect one party – the agent. Markesinis, for example, 
points out that the EC Directive conferred upon the agents and their principals 
a legal regime which likens them more to employees than to the independent 
commercial traders which in reality they are.207 Good faith does appear in 
these Regulations as having a paternalistic feature close to the role of the 
principle in consumer and employment law.  
However, from a positive perspective, the Regulations require an 
objective evaluation of the conduct of the parties. This is in line with the 
current meaning given to the principle in national and transnational 
commercial law. Good faith is applied in the sense of cooperation, which 
implies the exigency of the parties to look after each other’s interests. This 
also requires them to disclose the necessary information which is relevant for 
their respective obligations.208 Here, Saintier states that, ‘the principal is also 
required to act in good faith in his relations with the agent. This generally 
involves a duty to co-operate and this therefore represents a significant 
change from the traditional common law rules, which imposed no implied 
duties on him/her’.209  
 
                                               
207 B S Markesinis and R J C Munday, An Outline of the Law of Agency (4th edn Butterworths, 
London 1998) 15. 
208 Saintier states that English and Scottish courts have succeeded in defining the scope of 
application of the Regulations and protecting commercial agents: ‘In fact, not only have they 
applied the Agency Regulations with relative ease but they also have ensured their 
effectiveness by emphasising their civil law inspired protective stance with a remarkable 
understanding. Such an understanding was not expected and is very welcome since, to a 
certain extent, it balances out some of the drawbacks created by (almost) replicating the 
Directive’. Saintier (n 201) 541 
209 Saintier (n 203) 63. 
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- Good Faith in Insurance Contracts in English law 
 
Historically the rules regarding contracts of insurance have in general 
developed through judicial decisions, i.e., the common law. However, over the 
years these contracts have been the object of numerous specific regulations. 
The most renowned example – since it has been considered the general 
‘codification’ for ‘insurance law’ in English common law – is the Marine 
Insurance Act of 1906. Other examples are life insurance210 and other types of 
insurances which are compulsory.211   
 Consumer insurance contracts have been affected by domestic and 
European regulations related to consumer contracts212 and, currently, there is 
the strong possibility of the reform of insurance law promoted by the Law 
Commission.213 
It is well-known that from the pronouncement of Lord Mansfield in 
Carter v Boehm214 in 1766 good faith has been present in insurance contracts. 
It is also embraced in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 in the 
following terms: 
 
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost 
good faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, 
the contract may be avoided by the other party. 
 
The obligation of utmost good faith concerns both parties, the insured 
and the underwriter. The scope of this norm has aroused fervent debate, 
because it is argued that this obligation has no consequences for bad faith’s 
                                               
210 Life Insurance Act 1774. 
211 Compulsory insurances are, for example, the motor vehicle insurance regulated by the 
Road Traffic Act 1988, ss. 143 and 145. See other compulsory insurances in J Birds, Birds’ 
Modern Insurance Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) 379 ff.  
212 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999. There are also attempts to unify the subject at the level of principles; the 
scholarly project group ‘Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law’ elaborated the 
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law:  
<http://aida-portugal.org/pdf/bc18d3af669a52ac20f164d7c9681d5d.pdf> 
See also: <http://www.restatement.info/> both sites accessed 16 May 2011. 
213 See further details about this reform below in this sub-paragraph.  
214 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
 132
insurer, since the remedy provided – avoidance of the contract – is, in 
practice, ineffective for the insured. What it needs is a remedy for damages. 
The theme of ‘Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of 
Good Faith’ has been proposed for discussion in the Issues Paper 6 of the 
Law Commission.215 In spite of the recognition that both parties to an 
insurance contract have mutual duties of good faith, in the case of either 
unduly refusing claims or late payment by the insurer, the insured can sue for 
payment of the money owed plus interest but, as has been stated, damages 
are not available.216 The verdict on Sprung v Royal Insurance confirms this 
position.217 This creates an injustice in fact and an open contradiction of 
general contract principles in the law of England and Wales 218 – Scottish law, 
however, does recognize damages in this case. 
The solutions proposed by the Law Commission are: to modify s. 17 of 
the Marine Insurance Act or; to reverse the decision in Sprung v Royal 
Insurance.  
On 18 November 2010 the Law Commission published a summary of 
the responses received to Issues Paper 6. The Commission received 32 
responses, which reveal strong support for change. Consultees emphasised 
that if an insurer has declined a valid claim and acted unreasonably, then 
insurance law ought to be brought into line with general commercial 
contractual principles and the policyholder should be offered an appropriate 
remedy. At this moment the Law Commission is developing proposals and it is 
due to publish a formal joint consultation paper by the end of 2011 or at the 
beginning of 2012.219 
                                               
215 Issues Paper 6 is retrievable at: 
<http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/consultation-papers-and-other-documents/> 
accessed 16 May 2011.  
216 This is due to a fiction, by reason of which the first obligation of the insurer is ‘to hold the 
insured harmless’. If the loss occurs, the insurer will pay the amount of the claim as damages. 
217 See Sprung v Royal Insurance [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 111, [1997] CLC 70. 
218 The general rule in England is that if one party breaks a contract, the other party may claim 
damages for the actual loss suffered, provided that it was foreseeable at the time the contract 
was made. This is subject to three main limitations: 
(1) The victim of the breach of contract must prove actual financial loss; 
(2) The victim must take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss; 
(3) The level of damages may be limited (or expanded) by the express provisions of the 
contract. 
219 Statement by James Sharpe on behalf of the Law Commission (Personal email 
correspondence 20 July 2011). The summary of responses is available at: 
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  On the other hand, the duty of utmost good faith of the insured has 
reached unexpected levels of amplitude. The criticisms arise from the key 
duty of disclosure,220 since ‘The basic legal doctrine of insurance clearly 
recognised that the insured can act honestly or in good faith and yet be 
penalised by application of the doctrine of utmost good faith’.221  
Steyn points out that minimum non-disclosure – which potentially could 
have not affected the decision to take the risk if disclosed before – may entitle 
the insurer to avoid the contract.222  
However, in Drake Insurance v Provident Insurance plc,223 the view of 
Lord Rix is that the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith can act to limit the 
remedy of avoidance. In other words, the insurer’s right to avoid for non-
disclosure or misrepresentation must be exercised in good faith, which implies 
that the insurer should not blindly rely on the avoidance without good reasons 
for seeking it.224 
In spite of this excellent analysis, Birds states that Brotherton v 
Aseguradora Colseguros SA225 is preferable as matter of current law. He 
points out that, ‘A right to avoid or rescind is not traditionally limited by any 
requirement of good faith and it could be argued that this is a better view of 
the law as it is than that seemingly expressed in Drake v Provident’.226 
Butcher proposes, in an extreme position, to dispense with the concept 
of good faith in insurance contracts. According to him, the doctrine of good 
faith has developed into a series of structured rules in the area of pre-
contractual disclosure in disadvantage to the assured. What Butcher proposes 
as a good solution for a future statute is that, without referring to good faith, a 
                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/ICL6_Damages_for_Late_Payment_respons
es.pdf> accessed 16 May 2011.  
220 The duty is enacted in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 s. 17-20. See a clarification on the 
duty of disclosure in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group [2002] EWCA Civ 
1642; [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 131. 
221 J Birds, ‘Good Faith in the Reform of Insurance Law’ (2004) 54 Amicus Curiae 3, 3. 
222 Steyn (n 187) 131. 
223 [2003] EWCA Civ 1834. 
224 See Strive Shipping Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association [2002] EWHC 203 
(Comm), [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 669. 
225 [2003] EWCA Civ 705, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746. 
226 Birds (n 211) 146. 
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clear determination of matters that have to be disclosed should be provided 
and the consequences of non-disclosure and of misstatements expressed.227 
Despite the commendable aim of this proposal, it is impracticable. Lord 
Mansfield was not wrong when he said in Carter v Boehm that, ‘Insurance is a 
contract upon speculation’. The information that could help the insurer to 
assess the risk is peculiar to each case; therefore, to elaborate a list with 
material facts to be disclosed is impossible – although there are some 
material facts which by the nature of the insurance policy can be predicted as 
important.  
Good faith is essential in insurance. If it is conceived as cooperation 
between the parties, it will give rise to two natural consequences: the insured 
will disclose the information that can help the insurer to assess the risk; the 
latter will use such information in a correct way, without using the remedy of 
avoidance in the case of a minimum non-disclosure. It is held here that this is 
the interpretation given to good faith by Lord Rix on Drake Insurance. It is 
interesting to note that this theory moves the attention from pre-contractual 
good faith to good faith in the phase of enforcement, requiring that remedies 
for breach become more thoughtful, focused, proportionate and flexible.   
Furthermore, the obligation of disclosure based on the utmost good 
faith has been extended during the life of the contract, upon condition of 
renewal of the contract.228 Here, Lord Hobhouse confirmed that ‘utmost good 
faith is a principle of fair dealing which does not come to an end when the 
contract has been made’. The issue that this duty creates is the remedy of 
avoidance of the contract ab initio, according to section 17 of the Marine 
Insurance Act, which may be disproportionate in many cases.229 
In the opinion of Aikens, s. 17 does not extend the duty of good faith 
post-contract: ‘All s.17 is doing is saying that the duty extends beyond specific 
ones placed on insured in ss. 18-20 and that it also places duties on the 
insurer as well’.230 The matter needs solution from legislation or from the 
                                               
227 C Butcher, ‘Good Faith in Insurance Law: a Redundant Concept?’ (2008) 5 JBL 375. 
228 See the leading case of Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni Polaris Shipping Co Ltd (The Star 
Sea) [2001] UKHL 1; (2001) 2 WLR 170. 
229 See Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd [1991] 2 AC 249 (HL). 
230 R Aikens, ‘The Post-Contract Duty of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts: Is There a 
Problem that Needs Solution?’ (2010) 5 JBL 379, 389. 
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Supreme Court. Aikens states that, ‘It would be a bold Supreme Court that 
introduced now a right to damages for breach of that duty’.231 
Moreover, on 9th July 2010 the Law Commission opened a consultation 
on the issue of the insured’s post-contract duty of good faith in Issues Paper 
7.232 The main aspect considered is the duty of good faith at the moment of 
making a claim and, consequently, what remedy would be available to 
insurers if policyholders act fraudulently.   
The courts have been keen to punish the fraud of the insured with the 
forfeiture of the claim – and not with the avoidance of the contract. The Law 
Commissioners support this position as follows: 
 
Thus if a policyholder suffers £18,000 of legitimate loss, but then adds 
a fictitious claim of £2,000 for an item which never existed, the 
policyholder loses the whole £20,000 claim. We think this is right. 
Policyholders should not be able to add invented items to claims safe in 
the knowledge that even if the fraud is discovered they will lose 
nothing. 
 
The point is whether the law should provide greater clarity on the 
remedies available to insurers when policyholders act fraudulently.  
The Law Commission itself states in the summary of responses to the 
Issues Paper 7: 
 
The law in this area is complex and confused. The duty of good faith was codified in 
section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, and provides insurers with the right to 
avoid the contract from the start. In other words, when a fraudulent claim is made, the 
insurer can ask the policyholder to repay all claims made under the policy, including 
perfectly genuine claims which were paid before the fraud arose. However, market 
practice has evolved and courts have navigated away from this position. Instead, 
courts have preferred to hold that a fraudulent policyholder forfeits the whole of the 
fraudulent claim, while leaving other aspects of the contract unaffected.233 
 
                                               
231 Ibid 392. 
232 <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/issues7_duty-of-good-faith.pdf> accessed 10 May 2011 
233<http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/ICL7_Summary_of_Responses.pdf> 
accessed 10 May 2011. 
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The Law Commission received 33 responses. The majority thought that 
the law was unnecessarily complex and that it would be helpful to introduce 
legislation to clarify the insurer’s remedy for a fraudulent claim.  
Undoubtedly, fraudulent claims are a serious problem.234 However, it 
must be noted that the construction of the problem and the solution searched 
for by the Law Commission convey an anti-fraud message. This implies that 
good faith is considered here in its subjective aspect of honesty – the same as 
the good faith purchase previously analysed. Therefore, this is very far from 
the commercial concept of good faith, which is currently applied in England – 
as will be seen below.235 
Here, some authors hold that good faith in the sense of fair dealing and 
reasonableness already exists236 or, at least, that it will play an important role 
in English law.237  
Tetley holds that there is some recognition, even in judicial circles, that 
a general good faith principle is, after all, not totally alien or anathema to 
English law.238  
MacQueen reports leading voices in England calling for 
acknowledgement of the principle.239 Among those voices, there is 
McKendrick, who reasons that, in fact, English law offers little by way of 
comfort to those who act in bad faith or who do not honour the promises which 
they make. The issue would be the unwillingness of scholars and judges to 
recognize good faith as a general principle. McKendrick claims that this is due 
to their distrust regarding general principles, rather than to their reaction to 
good faith itself. He warns about the necessity to align with the trend to accept 
good faith, as has been done in transnational law and in other European 
                                               
234 For example, according to the summary of responses to Issues Paper 7 (n 226), the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) noted that in 2009 insurers detected £841 million of 
general insurance fraud.  
235 See the views against good faith by Merkin and Hodgin in the summary of responses to 
Issues Paper 7 (n 233). 
236 This is the position of Sims (n 133). See also by the same author: ‘Good Faith in Contract 
Law: of Triggers and Concentric Circles’ (2005) 16 KLJ 293.  
237 See Lomax (n 66) passim. 
238 W Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contract of Arbitration and Chartering’ 
(2004) 35 J.Mar.L. & Com. 561, 583. 
239 MacQueen in his article ‘Good Faith in the Scots Law of Contract’ in Forte (n 67) 11 n 25 
cites, inter alia, an early proponent: Powell (n 99). More recently, J F O’Connor, Good Faith in 
English Law (Aldershot, 1990); J N Adams and R Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract 
(London, 1995).    
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jurisdictions, in order to avoid isolation and, most importantly, in order to 
permit English judges to give effect to the agreement that parties have freely 
reached – for example, to conduct preliminary negotiations in good faith or 
subsequently during the life of the contract.  
Generally, the parties to a contract of joint venture agree that they will 
endeavour by good faith efforts to resolve by mutual agreement any dispute 
arising in connection with their contract. This kind of clause responds to the 
need to preserve a degree of flexibility and cooperation in long-term contracts. 
McKendrick states that, if the judges in Walford v Miles would have 
considered this reality, ‘they might have been rather more ready to embrace 
the concept of an enforceable obligation to negotiate in good faith’.240 
Goode refers also to the argument of isolation of English law:  
 
The gradual movement towards the harmonization of commercial law in Europe, 
though creating additional problems for a purely national codification programme, 
also lends urgency to the task of restating the principles on which our own 
commercial law is based; and it has the additional advantage of providing an 
exportable product which can help to maintain, and indeed enhance, the influence of 
English law and English courts in international commercial transactions.241 
 
Goode recognizes that, ‘Commercial law is rooted in principles of good 
faith, the sanctity of the agreement, the recognition of trade usage as a source 
of contractual rights, and the maintenance of a fair balance between vested 
rights and the interests of third parties’.242 He advocates for a code of the kind 
like the UCC, restating, simplifying and modernizing the law in a small number 
of selected areas in order to make it more responsive to the practices and 
needs of modern commerce and finance while containing built-in mechanisms 
to allow for future development.243 It is noteworthy that this represents an 
                                               
240 E McKendrick, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?’ in Forte (n 67) 51. Walford v Miles 
[1992] 2 AC 128. See on joint ventures and horizontal cooperation agreements: D G Goyder, 
EC Competition Law (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 1998) 424. 
241 R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn Penguin, London 2004) 1208. 
242 Ibid 1203. 
243 Ibid 1208. 
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evolution of Goode’s thought since, in 1992, the author was radically against 
good faith.244 
In addition, Burrows identifies the existence of the principle with 
limitations as to the extension of the duty: it goes no further than to impose a 
duty to act if an express term of the contract cannot be fulfilled without that act 
being done. The criterion is necessity. The positive act must be ‘necessary for 
the business efficacy’. In his view, one party should not lightly be found to be 
under any unexpressed duty to help the other.245 
There is every likelihood that long-term and collaborative contracts 
mentioned by McKendrick – for example, joint venture contracts which are 
marked by a high degree of loyalty and good faith – will express the living 
orthodoxy of tomorrow’s international commerce, because business 
undertakings need, more and more, partners to share in their projects.246 The 
reality and the argument of isolation of English law raised by Goode highlight 
the importance of embracing good faith as a way to harmonize English law 
with the practice of international commerce. This is self-evident.247 
                                               
244 The author previously held: ‘The predictability of the legal outcome of a case is more 
important than absolute justice. It is necessary in a commercial setting that businessmen at 
least should know where they stand...The last thing that we want to do is to drive business 
away by vague concepts of fairness which make judicial decisions unpredictable, and if that 
means that the outcome of disputes is sometimes hard on a party we regard that as an 
acceptable price to pay in the interest of the great majority of business litigants’. Goode (n 82) 
9. 
245 J F Burrows, ‘Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term’ (1968) 31 MLR 390, 407.   
246 An example of this participative way of doing business is the Supply Chain Management 
(SCM), which is the management of a network of interconnected businesses involved in the 
ultimate provision of products and service packages required by end customers. Incorporating 
SCM successfully leads to a new kind of competition in the global market, i.e., competition is 
no longer of the company versus company but rather takes on a supply chain versus supply 
chain form. See: R H Ballou, Business Logistics Management. Planning, Organizing, and 
Controlling the Supply Chain (Prentice Hall International, Upper Saddle River 1999). There is 
also a cash supply chain among companies. International cash management is a common 
corporate practice nowadays. Furthermore, some companies are implementing 
interorganizational information systems (IOS) with trading partners that allow them to share 
data and software across organizational boundaries in order to bring cash flows in line with 
product flows. See C Holland and G Lockett, ‘The Evolution of a Global Cash Management 
System’ (1994) 36 Sloan Management Review 37; K Menyah, ‘International Cash 
Management in the 21st Century: Theory and Practice’ (2005) 31 Managerial Finance 3; and 
L Carvajal, ‘Il Finanziamento Intragruppo attraverso la Gestione Centralizzata di Tesoreria’ 
(LLM thesis, Università di Roma La Sapienza 2007). 
247 In the eighties and nineties the European Community promoted ECIP (European 
Community Investment Partners), a financial instrument whose aim was to stimulate joint 
ventures between communitarian companies and companies (mainly SMEs) from one or 
more countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. See: 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/finance/src/ecip.htm> A similar aim but only for Latin America is the 
programme called Al-Invest: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-
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There is an open recognition of the principle of good faith in 
performance in the project of Code of Contracts for England and Scotland 
drafted by McGregor in the sixties,248 equating good faith with what is 
reasonable to do: 
 
In the making of contracts less is said about good faith as such. The accent is rather 
on reasonableness, which can be said to be good faith in disguise. Here the most 
important section is section 104: ‘The express provisions of a contract are not 
exhaustive and provisions shall be implied…when required to enable the contract to 
operate reasonably’.249 
 
This very interesting section impels the courts to imply such terms 
every time it is reasonable in order to enable the contract to operate. The 
reasonable aspect in implied terms is already present in the jurisprudence. 
However, in fact, judges and courts have been reluctant to make implied 
duties of good faith in a wide way.  
In Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Tailored Roofing Systems Ltd 250 the judge 
states at para.14 that obvious commercial sense induces a particular type of 
conduct, namely a conduct of cooperation. The question is, ‘whether when 
cooperation ceases for whatever reason there are terms binding the parties to 
act in certain ways’. In other words, should the cooperation between the 
parties continue in case of a crisis during the performance of the contract? 
English courts imply such a term only when it is necessary in the business 
sense to give efficacy to the contract. Such a trend is likely to be overtaken by 
                                                                                                                                      
cooperation/al-invest/index_en.htm> Within the EU there is Joint European Ventures (JEV) 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/finance/src/jev.htm> See also the EC Merger Regulation of 20 
January 2004: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:EN:PDF> 
All sites accessed 31 January 2011. 
248 The McGregor Code was only a draft. The Law Commission never reached the stage 
when it could publish the contract code, although Parliamentary Counsel at the Commission 
spent a considerable time casting it into a form that might ultimately be suitable for a bill. 
McGregor's draft and commentaries have, however, been published, though not by the Law 
Commission. See M Arden, ‘Time for an English Commercial Code?’ (1997) 56 CLJ 516; and 
H McGregor, Contract Code Drawn up on Behalf of the English Law Commission (Giuffrè, 
Milano 1993). 
249 H McGregor, ‘The Codification of Contracts in England and Scotland (Equity and Good 
Faith)’ in A Mordechai Rabello (ed), Equity in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions. Papers 
presented at the Second International Conference on Aequitas and Equity (The Faculty of 
Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1993) 378. 
250 [2004] EWCA Civ 585. 
 140
new forms of contracting that enshrine the aforementioned cooperation: 
partnering, strategic alliances, joint ventures, among others. The parties to 
these types of contracts are more likely to continue the contractual 
relationship in cooperation rather than to terminate it.251  Here, Collins asserts 
in relation to English law that, ‘The law must impose certain duties of co-
operation in the formation and performance of contracts, which reflect the 
need to secure reliable and worthwhile opportunities for market exchanges’.252 
Cooperation in English jurisprudence is recognized as something 
different and superior to the mere reasonableness in the performance of the 
contract.253 A good example is Bournemouth and Boscombe Athletic Football 
Club v Manchester United Football Club.254  
The dispute involved a contract for the transfer of a football player from 
Bournemouth Football Club to Manchester United. The transfer fee was 
£200,000. £175,000 must be paid as initial fee with the remaining £25,000 to 
be paid if and when the player had scored twenty goals in first team 
competitive matches. Before the player had scored this number of goals he 
was sold to another club, West Ham United, for £170,000. Bournemouth 
argued that Manchester United were in breach of an implied term, effectively 
requiring Manchester to give the player a fair opportunity to score the goals 
that would trigger the £25,000 payment. The trial judge ruled in 
Bournemouth’s favour and a split Court of Appeal dismissed Manchester 
United’s appeal. If the management at Manchester United had transferred the 
player simply in order to avoid the bonus payment, then the Court would have 
certainly been unanimous, not only in treating this as bad faith but also, in 
agreeing that it was necessary to imply a term. However, the evidence was 
that the transfer was not motivated by any such reason but occurred simply 
because the player did not fit in with the new manager’s team plans. For the 
dissenting judge, Lord J Brightman, this was a perfectly legitimate reason for 
the transfer and he did not see how an implied term could restrict the 
manager’s discretion in relation to matters of team building. For the majority, 
                                               
251 See the analysis of these forms of contracting in Chapter Three, Section 3.2.   
252 H Collins, The Law of Contracts (4th edn LexisNexis, London 2003) 33. 
253 Cf. J Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 
113 LQR 433, 442. 
254 The Times 22 May 1980. 
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however, even a legitimate transfer of this kind defeated the legitimate 
expectation of Bournemouth to be paid. In other words, even though there 
was no dishonesty on Manchester United’s part, a duty of co-operation was 
necessarily implied.255  
A number of observations are triggered by this example. First of all, 
was this dispute in consequence of a bad drafting by the lawyers? They 
limited the absolute freedom that the Manchester United manager should 
have always retained. The most important deduction is that, since the contract 
was drafted in this form, the judges recognized the implied covenant of co-
operation that such a contract embodied; therefore without mentioning the 
general principle of good faith,256 they recognized what the principle was 
meant to accomplish.257 
This is a relatively new assumption in English law. However, some 
isolated early cases recognized the duty of cooperation. For example, in 
Mackay v Dick Lord Blackburn stated that,  
 
Where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed that something 
shall be done, which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, the 
construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done 
on his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to 
that effect. What is the part of each must depend on circumstances.258 
 
Another interesting case is Nissho Iwai Petroleum Co. Inc. v Cargill 
International S.A.259 On 13th December 1990 the sellers (Nissho) agreed to 
sell to the buyers (Cargill) one cargo of Brent blend crude oil for delivery in 
                                               
255 Cfr. R Brownsword, ‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1994) 7JCL 197, 206-7.  
256 In a very similar case, the New York Court of Appeals held that, ‘Every contract implies 
good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it’. In this case a producer of cattle food 
agreed to install, at considerable expense, a machine for drying and salvaging wet grain that 
was the by-product of a brewery. In exchange it received the brewery’s promise to sell it the 
used grain that it produced and salvaged for a period of five years or until half a million barrels 
had been brewed, after which the brewery was to become the owner of the machine. The 
brewery sold out its business before either of these events occurred. The New York Court of 
Appeals held it liable to the producer of cattle food for damages. A promise to remain in 
business for five years or until half a million barrels had been brewed was implied. Wiegand v 
Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 277, 118 N. E. 618, 619 (1918).  
257 Cf. H Collins, ‘Implied Duty to Give Information during the Performance of Contracts’ 
(1992) 55 MLR 556, 557. 
258 (1880-81) L R 6 App. Cas. 251, 263. 
259 (1993) 1 Ll Rep 80. 
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March 1991 FOB in Sullom Voe at U.S. $23.54 per barrel. The contract 
expressly incorporated the Shell 15-day Brent terms of July 1990. Clause 3 
(a) of the Brent terms provides: 
 
Seller shall declare to buyer the Lay days (one of a certain number of days allowed 
by a charter party for loading or unloading a vessel without demurrage) and the 
Cargo reference number in respect of the Cargo not later than, and time shall be of 
the essence in this respect, 17.00 hours London time on the 15th Day prior to the first 
Day of the Lay days. Buyers shall use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
appropriate facilities and sufficient authorised personnel are available for the proper 
receipt of declarations (parenthesis added). 
 
Justice Hobhouse mantained that: 
 
It was an inevitable inference from clause 3 (a) that, the buyer having made available 
the facilities and personnel to receive declarations promptly, they should then be 
used; and it was an implied term of the contract that one party should not obstruct or 
prevent the other from performing the contract; to delay in answering the telephone 
so as to prevent a seller from giving a valid nomination under the contract was a 
breach of an implied term in the contract. 
 
In these cases, although the judges did not mention good faith, they 
accepted what the principle is meant to accomplish. Here, Lando states: ‘Thus 
to some extent the good faith principle merely articulates trends already 
present in English law’.260 
In the lex mercatoria the creditor must choose the most appropriate 
solution for default before giving notice to the debtor;261 i.e., the creditor who 
                                               
260 ‘Good Faith in the Legal Systems of the European Union and in the Principles of European 
Contract Law’ in Mordechai Rabello (n 249) 337. 
261 In the ICC award rendered in case n. 5904 [(1989) 115 JDI 1107] the parties were a 
European company and a provider from a developing country. At the basis of the commercial 
relations there were some General Conditions of the Purchase (Conditions Générales d’ 
Achat CGA). The award applied the lex mercatoria on the grounds of the parties’ agreement: 
‘Les parties ayant opté pour l’application des principes généraux et des usages normaux du 
commerce international’ (the parties chose the application of general principles and practices 
of international trade). The core of the controversy relates to a complaint from the seller, who 
argued that, in spite of his default in dispatching the goods on time, the cancellation of future 
orders by the buyer was unfair and disproportionate. This paradoxical situation led the 
arbitrator to decide that the buyer’s cancellation as a sanction for the delays in the dispatch of 
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does not receive one of a several number of deliveries is forbidden to ask for 
termination of the contract straightaway. This situation – considered as a 
consequence of the cooperation required in international contracts – is also 
embraced in English jurisprudence. In principle, where there has been a 
breach of condition – as opposed to a breach of warranty – by one contracting 
party, the other party is entitled to terminate the contract. This is absolute, as 
the party who has suffered the default is under no obligation to act in good 
faith. However, it is possible to assert that English law has since Hongkong Fir 
Shipping Company Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd262 changed this by 
stating that, where the parties have not specified whether a contractual term is 
a condition or warranty, it is the seriousness of the breach which determines 
whether there is an entitlement to terminate.263  
 
This part devoted to the English law will be concluded with a more 
recent case which contains an express recognition of good faith in commercial 
contracts: Socimer International Bank Limited (in liquidation) v Standard Bank 
London Ltd.264  
This litigation arose from a sophisticated agreement between two 
banks which, before the failure of one of them, had been trading together in 
the securities of emerging markets. 
The appellant (Standard) appealed against a decision265 that it was an 
implied term of the forward sale agreement266 between Standard and Socimer 
                                                                                                                                      
the goods was abusive. The sending of a letter of termination without motivation and without 
previous notice is considered against good faith as a general principle of the lex mercatoria. 
Hence, the seller even obtained the right to be compensated of damages but ‘…le vendeur 
n’a pas prouvé les dommages…’ (the seller did not prove damages). 
262 [1962] 2 Q.B. 26 (C.A.) 
263 H McGregor, ‘The Codification of Contracts in England and Scotland (Equity and Good 
Faith)’ in A Mordechai Rabello (n 249) 381. 
264 [2008] EWCA (Civ Div) 116. 
265 [2006] EWHC 718 (Comm). 
266 J Hull in Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets (4th edn Prentice Hall International, 
Upper Saddle River 2002) 4, defines forward contracts as follows: ‘A forward contract is 
similar to futures contracts in that it is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a certain time in 
the future for a certain price. But, whereas futures contracts are traded on exchanges, forward 
contracts trade in the over-the-counter market’. Regarding to the over-the-counter market, not 
all shares are traded on the major exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange and the 
New York Stock Exchange. Instead of trading through the auction markets, some stocks are 
traded through a network of computers and over the telephone. This non-exchange market is 
known as the over-the-counter market. Shares traded in this way are often unlisted because 
they do not qualify for a listing. They tend to be more thinly traded and more volatile. In the 
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that on termination Standard had to carry out a reasonable, objective 
valuation of the designated assets. 
In this case Standard was the seller and Socimer was the buyer under 
forward sale transactions. Shortly before the failing bank, Socimer, was 
entered into liquidation, it was put into default; it owed its counter-party bank 
US$24.5 million in ‘unpaid amounts’ in respect of a portfolio of forward sales 
of securities which it had bought. That was on 20 February 1998, the 
‘termination date’. Under the ‘standard terms for forward sales transactions’ of 
8 November 1996 (the ‘agreement’), the creditor bank and seller (Standard) 
had to ‘liquidate or retain’ that portfolio (the ‘designated assets’) to satisfy the 
amount due to it. For these aims, it had to value the portfolio on the 
termination date. The critical sentence of the agreement that caused the 
litigation under analysis is to be found in clause 14 (a) (bb), which reads: 
 
The value of any designated assets liquidated or retained and any 
losses, expenses or costs arising out of the termination or the sale of 
the designated assets shall be determined on the date of the 
termination by seller. 
 
The problem was that Standard failed to value the portfolio of assets at 
the termination date; instead it realised the assets over a period of time and 
credited Socimer with the proceeds. 
Socimer sued and Justice Cooke held that the accurate construction of 
the agreement indicated that Standard had been obliged to value the assets 
as at the date of termination and to bring into the account the value as 
assessed as a credit against the amounts payable to Standard.  
The parties were unable to agree the valuation of the assets and the 
issue of valuation was tried before Justice Gloster who rejected the evidence 
of Standard's factual witnesses on valuation, even though Socimer decided 
not to cross-examine them. She held that Standard had been impliedly 
                                                                                                                                      
United States, trading in OTC or unlisted securities is monitored by the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD). Details of OTC shares and their market makers can be found in 
The Pink Sheets, published daily. Capstone Encyclopaedia of Business (2003) 
<http://www.credoreference.com/entry/capstonebus/over_the_counter_market> accessed 16 
May 2011 
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required by the contract, not simply to carry out an honest but otherwise 
subjective valuation exercise but, to take reasonable care to find the true 
market value of the assets.  
Standard submitted, on the one hand, that an implied term was not 
necessary but ran contrary to the agreement as a whole, which plainly gave 
the determination of value to Standard, in the exercise of its subjective 
judgment and subject to a wide discretion; on the other hand, it stated that 
Justice Gloster had erred in holding that certain other credits would have been 
set off against the ‘unpaid amounts’ so that, even on its own valuations, 
Standard would have had surplus assets which it would have returned to 
Socimer. 
 The appeal was allowed. The two main matters of the decision were 
the following: 
 
1. As regards the latter defence, it was held that Justice Gloster had been 
mistaken in concluding on the evidence that certain credits owed by Standard 
to Socimer would have been set off against the unpaid amounts at the 
termination date, before they were actually due, thereby giving rise to a 
surplus due to Socimer. There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that 
Standard would have credited Socimer with those amounts before the 
valuation exercise. 
 
2. As regards whether Standard’s valuation obligation was to carry out a 
reasonable, objective valuation, in Lord J Rix’s judgment the implied term – 
alleged by Socimer – was not necessary or sufficiently certain. In the judge’s 
words: 
  
Standard says that the valuation in question is not that of an expert at 
all: it is one to be performed by Standard … within its discretion and 
according to its subjective criteria. There are standard limits in that 
discretion and subjectivity, which are common ground: described by 
concepts such as good faith, honesty, rationality, arbitrariness, 
perversity, capriciousness …Thus in the specific context of a default 
and a forced retention of designated assets … Standard is entitled, it 
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may be said, to consult its own interest, subject, of course, to the 
requirement of good faith and rationality. 
 
 
Here, the following part of Lord J Rix’s judgement is an invaluable 
support for the position assumed in this thesis, namely the new approach of 
English courts towards good faith:  
 
In my judgement, the requirements of good faith and rationality are a 
sufficient protection. The danger to be guarded against, he says 
(Socimer says), is abuse caused by self-interest. That is precisely what 
implicit good faith deals with. Commercial contracts assume such 
good faith, which is why express language requiring it is so rare. 
(parenthesis and emphasis added). 
 
Ultimately, this express recognition of good faith in commercial 
contracts in English law determined the outcome of the appeal.  
 
2.5.3 CONCLUSION: US AND ENGLISH EVOLUTION 
 
The law of the US experienced an evolution with regard to good faith. 
This evolution is twofold. 
Firstly, there is the obvious evolution consisting in the embracement 
and acceptance of good faith by statutory law, doctrine and jurisprudence. 
Secondly, the US went beyond the distinction between subjective and 
objective good faith, merging them in the well-known definition: ‘Honesty in 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’. 
It is considered that this fusion reflects the current trend in contract law.  
From the scholarly point of view, there is a tendency to explain the 
meaning of good faith in the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
as an objective criterion of reasonable behaviour in order to achieve the aim 
of the contract.  
As regards the English law, the analysis starts with the rules that 
unquestionably embrace good faith, i.e., those related to the insurance 
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contract. All the reforms proposed by the Law Commission, and the following 
responses that strongly support its posture in order to stress and make 
effective the duty of good faith on both parties to the contract, are clearly 
reflective of the current trend that identifies good faith with cooperation. That 
this is not a mere conjecture may be demonstrated with the excellent 
judgment on Socimer. Here, Lord J Rix states that the idea to be guarded 
against in the case of non-existence of good faith is self-interest – which is the 
opposite of cooperation. Commercial contracts – the judge says – imply such 
cooperation, ‘which is why express language requiring it is so rare’. 
Does this represent an evolution from former ideas about good faith in 
commercial contracts? The answer is definitely positive. The radical position 
against good faith, formulated and adapted to meet the dimensions of an 
earlier state of trading, is no longer functioning in a way that correctly meets 
the requirements of commerce between traders.267 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has shown that good faith – from its origins in Roman law –
has always been a principle adopted in universal contexts, i.e., in the 
‘universe’ of the Roman empire and in the ‘universe’ of medieval traders – the 
European cities. During the nationalization of law in different countries good 
faith lost its universal character. 
 It is submitted here that the reason for the importance of good faith in 
universal contexts is its flexible or utilitarian character, which allows the judge 
to give a decision adapted to the particular circumstances of the case. Even in 
cases of national and political uniformity, e.g. England and France, it was 
found that there is a trend to embrace good faith or, at least, what the principle 
is meant to accomplish.  
                                               
267 The commerce in Europe between traders belonging to different nations led to the Draft of 
the Common Frame of Reference and the Commission Green Paper on Policy Options for 
Progress towards a European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses, COM (2010) 
348 final, which make a EU contract law instrument now highly likely. See the analysis of 
these instruments Chapter Four, Sections 4.4 and 4.4.1. 
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 A point of major importance revealed by this chapter is that the different 
countries studied adhere to a similar notion of good faith understood as 
cooperation.  
The current understanding of good faith is not accidental, but it is a 
consequence of the process of evolution of national laws applicable to 
commercial contracts. Hence, it is not surprising that they have adapted the 
notion according to the necessities of trade. In other words, since 
homogeneity is the first condition of all truth, cooperation – the truth of today’s 
commerce – has been embraced by the generality of systems of law.268  
The same rationale, i.e., the needs of international commerce, would 
explain the current understanding of good faith in the lex mercatoria as 
cooperation. The solution holds good. There are a number of reasons, 
however, which make it not completely satisfactory. That is why a second type 
of solution appears attractive: the influence of civil and common law systems 
on the notion of good faith in the lex mercatoria. The next chapter is devoted 
to demonstrate this point and also to show how the present state of good faith 
is the product of the development of the theory of contract. 
 
                                               
268 The similar interpretation given to good faith in different legal systems represents a 
‘voluntary convergence’ of legal regimes, which, according to Mistelis ‘can guarantee a 
commercial law framework that will assist economic development’. L Mistelis, ‘Regulatory 
Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform – Some 
Fundamental Observations’ (2000) 34 Int’l L 1055, 1069. 
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CHAPTER THREE – GOOD FAITH IN THE LEX MERCATORIA: THE 
CRYSTALLIZATION OF A NEW CONCEPT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
As the title of this chapter indicates, this discussion deals with the 
crystallization of a concept of good faith in the lex mercatoria – which 
responds to the inner necessity of international trade. This concept is also 
significantly shaped by the influence of national traditions and history, since 
good faith is neither an original concept of the present time nor merely an 
ongoing one. It has a history and it is actually present in national legislations.  
For reasons that derive from the very structure of this outlook, it is 
suggested in this thesis that the developments of good faith in national laws 
have influenced the international concept of the principle because of:  
a) The constant interaction between national laws and the lex mercatoria (for 
example, national laws regulate those aspects uncovered by the lex 
mercatoria; and the latter is influencing the process of unification and 
harmonization of national laws);1 
b) Practitioners and arbitrators applying the lex mercatoria who, at the same 
time, operate in national spheres. It is important to note that arbitrators are not 
totally disconnected from their own national legal conceptions when acting in 
the international arena.2 Furthermore, the parties and their defenders may 
come from diverse countries with different legal and cultural backgrounds, 
                                               
1 See Chapter Four, Section 4.5. 
2 The legal conceptions start to be grasped and become deeply rooted from the first 
acquaintance with the law of contracts. In this respect, the thoughts of Atiyah on legal 
education are opportune: ‘Nobody with any experience of legal teaching can doubt the power 
which legal concepts exercise over the minds of law students. Once a set of concepts falling 
into some overall pattern is grasped, the student often becomes incapable of seeing the 
physical facts themselves except through the conceptual process. The student learns to 
characterize and classify almost intuitively, and without conscious appreciation of the mental 
process involved; yet it is the initial act of classification which often determines the result of a 
case, while making it seem that the conclusion is deduced by inexorable logic from the facts’. 
P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979) 685. 
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contributing to emphasize the subjective component in the shape of the 
concept of good faith in the lex mercatoria.3  
This chapter is based on two hypotheses. 
The first premise is that good faith is the core principle of the lex 
mercatoria nowadays (as it was in the medieval times). This centrality is 
powerfully enshrined in the ICC interim award n. 9474 of February 1999,4 
where the tribunal, by the agreement of the parties, is called to decide ‘fairly’. 
This was interpreted as a reference to the general standards and rules of 
international contracts, that is, to the lex mercatoria. 
There is a strong connection between fairness and good faith. For 
example, the lack of a duty to negotiate in good faith means that there is less 
chance of liability for any pre-contractual misrepresentations, or for 
withdrawing capriciously from negotiations. However, in these cases Willett, 
the editor of Aspects of Fairness in Contract,5 acknowledges that there is a 
conflict with a fairness instinct. In the ICC award n. 9474, in fact, the arbitral 
tribunal called to decide ‘fairly’ considered good faith in order to base its 
decision of not depriving the Bank (plaintiff) of its rights to claim compensation 
for the violation of an agreement reached in 1993.6 
The second assumption is that the concept of good faith has 
meaningful substantive content. It is not an ‘excluder’ concept to rule out 
                                               
3 J Stankiewicz in ‘Good Faith Obligation in the Uniform Commercial Code: Problems in 
Determining its Meaning and Evaluating its Effect’ (1972-1973) 7 Val.U.L.Rev. 389, maintains 
that the quality of conclusions concerning the meaning and effect of good faith in the Uniform 
Commercial Code is totally dependent on the perceptual and conceptual abilities of the 
particular legal analyst. The main claim in his work is that to understand good faith as a 
general commercial concept the researcher should look for comparative sources and post 
code case law and avoid limiting it to common law sources. This is an application of his 
general theory which proposes that everyone involved with law has a conceptual core of legal 
reference. It is the subconscious sum of all prior cases (precepts) and legal theories 
(concepts) stored and categorized in one’s memory, which in turn is used to approach and 
make sense out of new legal problems or terms (new precepts). 
4 (2001) 12 Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull. 60 
5 (Blackstone, London 1996) 18. 
6 a) Firstly, it was recognized as a principle of commercial law that a vendor cannot rely on a 
buyer’s failure to inspect the goods (in this case, banknotes) and to give timely notice of 
defects. Especially, it is generally admitted that the vendor is precluded from asserting the 
non-conformity of the notice if it has concealed the existence of the defect. 
b) Secondly, it was asserted that the defendant knew that there had been flaws among the 
previous deliveries.  
c) Furthermore, the tribunal considered that there was bad faith in the defendant’s conduct, 
since it waited more than two years before it agreed to reimburse an amount it owed. This 
meant that the Bank was reluctant to give straightforward notice of the aforementioned 
defects in the banknotes, as it feared that the defendant might then refuse to reimburse the 
sum due. 
 151
various things according to context.7 Here, a French author has said, ‘Imagine 
defining love as lacking of hatred!’8 This implies that good faith requires 
particular conduct.9 Yet it is difficult to formulate a universal concept of good 
faith. In national laws the principle has given rise to different interpretations 
and authors – even belonging to the same legal tradition – are not in complete 
agreement as to what good faith means.10 However, it is possible to establish 
what the concept is meant to accomplish and what it requires of the parties.  
 
3.1.2 OBJECTIVES AND MEANS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to find out how good faith is understood in the 
lex mercatoria, considering the aspects already established in the previous 
chapters.  
 The theoretical foundations of good faith in international trade are 
regarded as vital in this study and are included in this chapter.11 
 
3.1.3 RELEVANCE 
 
Hein Kötz states that, ‘It would be a poor advocate who would simply 
cite §242 to the judge and invite him to dispense justice to his client according 
to the principles of good faith and fair dealing’.12 This opinion was developed 
in the context of German law where §242 BGB has given place to specific 
norms operating in each case (Ergänzungsfunktion). Thus, the author implies 
that on few occasions good faith will have a direct influence on the substance 
of the controversy.  
                                               
7 Cf. R Summers, ‘Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) Va.L.Rev. 54, 195.  
8 Y Picod, Le Devoir de Loyauté dans l’Exécution du Contrat (Libraire Générale, Paris 1989) 
25. 
9 See the analysis of Bournemouth v Manchester United The Times 22 May 1980 in Chapter 
Two, n 254 and accompanying text. 
10 See the three major doctrines on good faith in American law by Farnsworth, Summers and 
Burton in A F Farnsworth, The Concept of Good Faith in American Law (Centro di Studi e 
Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero. Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, Roma 1993). 
11 See Section 3.2. 
12 H Kötz, ‘Towards a European Civil Code: The Duty of Good Faith’ in P Cane and J 
Stapleton, The Law of Obligations. Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Clarendon Press 
Oxford, 1998) 250. 
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On the contrary, in the lex mercatoria the principle of good faith 
provides the solution. Thus, it is essential to determine the connotation of this 
general principle when solving commercial disputes. This chapter provides 
international practitioners with a clear account of the understanding of good 
faith in international contracting. This assumes particular relevance in the 
context of the lex mercatoria, whose very existence is determined by the 
opinio iuris atque necessitatis or, in other words, what is generally regarded 
as necessary and binding. 
 
3.2 THE THEORY: GOOD FAITH COOPERATION 
 
It is submitted in this thesis that, as a consequence of the evolution of 
the law of contracts, from a laissez faire view in the nineteenth century until 
the rise of a cooperative view in modern times, good faith in contracts 
governed by the lex mercatoria is interpreted as cooperation between the 
parties. 
In the eighties Mestre envisaged this evolution; he pointed out that, 
‘[t]his (the equilibrium of the contract) could be substituted tomorrow by a spirit 
of collaboration more rich because naturally bilateral’.13 The same author 
pondered whether the contract will become the legal instrument for 
cooperation between parties.14 This view, in fact, is currently embraced by 
arbitrators applying the lex mercatoria, as will be seen in Chapter Five. 
The collaborative view embraced in these new agreements created by 
the international commercial practice – such as franchising, engineering and 
transfer of technology – denotes a kind of cooperation that can be called 
‘affectio contractus’.15 
Good faith understood as cooperation in international trade is the 
outcome of the particular circumstances of global markets and of the influence 
of civil and common law traditions.16 The cooperative nature of good faith has 
been emphasized by several legal scholars from the civil and the common law 
                                               
13 J Mestre, ‘D’une Exigence de Bonne Foi à un Esprit de Collaboration’ [1986] RTD Civ 100, 
102. 
14 Ibid 101. 
15 See n 51 & 52 and accompanying text.   
16 See Chapter Two, Section 2.3. 
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traditions. For instance, two legal experts – one a scholar from the civil law 
tradition and the other a judge of the common law jurisdiction – agree, in fact, 
on these terms. Díez-Picazo considers good faith, not just as hindering acts 
that harm others but also, as imposing a positive behaviour of cooperation.17 
An Australian judge, Paul Finn, however, accepts that contracts are about the 
pursuit of self-interest but argues that good faith also requires a contracting 
party to take the other’s party interest into account.18  
This theory of good faith cooperation is deeply entrenched in what has 
been called by Atiyah ‘the decline of contract’ and its consequences: the 
avoidance of litigation and the smooth solution of conflicts.19 A hypothetical 
example can illustrate this assertion:  
 
Two companies which have a long standing commercial arrangement by which one 
provides supplies to another may end up by merging into a single corporate entity or 
group… The parties often proceed as though they were engaged on a joint venture, 
and not in a bargain in which they have mutually irreconcilable interests. In the event 
of default, an adjustment of the terms of the relationship for the future is far more 
likely than litigation.20 
 
The same author states, ‘We shall see too some signs of recognition 
that parties may owe duties of care to each other in the bargaining process, 
something utterly alien to the classical model of contract’.21  
Zimmermann speaks about the ‘rematerialization of contract law’ in the 
sense that there is an emphasis on loyalty, protection of trust, cooperation and 
concern about the interest of the other party and substantial justice.22 This is 
far from the exaggerations of Positivism and the predominance of will in the 
                                               
17 L Díez-Picazo, La Doctrina de los Actos Propios (Bosch, Barcelona 1963) 139. French 
author Demogue also emphasizes the cooperative nature of contracts in Traité des 
Obligations en Général T.6 (Rosseau, Paris 1931) 9. 
18 P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(Carswell, Toronto 1989). 
19 Atiyah (n 2) 716. 
20 Ibid 724-5. 
21 Ibid. 
22 R Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition 
Today (OUP, Oxford 2001) 174. 
 154
nineteenth century. This implies a renaissance of the ethical foundations of 
the theory of contract.23 
Therefore, the findings in national laws and the opinion of scholars 
hitherto suggest that nowadays good faith cooperation provides the optimum 
conditions for international commercial contracts. The background of this 
theory will be explored in the following section. 
 
3.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF GOOD FAITH COOPERATION IN 
THE LEX MERCATORIA 
 
The current state of good faith in the lex mercatoria is closely related to 
the globalization of trade in the second half of the twentieth century and the 
early years of the twenty first.24 In previous times, during the nineteenth 
century, contractual individualism was the theory in vogue in the ‘civilized 
world’.25 
Individualism has its antecedents in the eighteenth century26 doctrine of 
rationalism, described by Pope Leo XIII as ‘the supremacy of the human 
reason, which refusing due submission to the divine and eternal reason, 
proclaims its own independence, and constitutes itself the supreme principle 
and source and judge of truth’.27 
                                               
23 The idea of ‘Rematerialization of law’ is not originally attributable to Zimmermann. Max 
Weber had suggested the possibilities of a ‘Rematerialization of Law’. Teubner in ‘Substantive 
and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1982) 17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 239, 243, states that, 
‘Max Weber also pointed to some antiformal tendencies in modern legal development. In 
contract law, for instance, these tendencies manifested themselves in an “increasing 
particularization” of the law and growing legislative and judicial control of the material content 
of agreements. Weber interpreted this as a renewed infusion into law of “ethical imperatives, 
utilitarian and other expediential rules, and political maxims”’. Cf. M Weber, Max Weber on 
Law in Economy and Society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1954). 
24 Cf. Chapter One, Sub-section 1.1.1.1. For a good picture of the impact of globalization in 
the role of the state and in the world economy, see J Delbrück, ‘The Changing Role of the 
State in the Globalising World Economy’ in P Bekker, R Dolzer and M Waibel, Making 
Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy. Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts (CUP, 
Cambridge 2010). 
25 The movement that brought the interests of the individual to an extreme was reinforced by 
the tremendous influence that Darwinism and Spencerian individualism exercised at that time. 
As known, Darwin was the originator of the theory of evolution based on the concept of 
natural selection. Spencer saw himself as the defender of traditional liberal principles against 
the State which from 1880 onward started to assume a major role. See M Taylor (ed), Herbert 
Spencer and the Limits of the State (Thoemmes Press, Bristol 1996).  
26 The eighteenth century is called ‘Age of Enlightenment’. 
27 Encyclical letter Libertas Praestantissimum of 20th June 1888. 
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 Rationalism28 raised the doctrine of volonté générale or social contract 
as the basis for legal norms. Here, it has been said: ‘Rationalism which had 
begun by raising human reason to the throne of God, ended by abdicating 
unconditionally in favour of will, whether it is the will of the State, of the 
dictator, of the bourgeois individual or of the proletarian class’.29 
 However, things were destined to change under the new conditions 
that the economy would present at the beginning of the twentieth century: the 
growth of the population and the growing scarcity of resources. The business 
profit was not the only motive but there was also an intensification of the 
search for economic and social equality. England moved to this new approach 
before other nations. Perhaps this was because the Industrial Revolution took 
place in Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century before other 
nations (only from 1830 to the early twentieth century, the Industrial 
Revolution spread throughout Europe and the US, and to Japan and the 
various colonial countries). Hence, Britain had more time to assimilate the 
transition from a hierarchical society to industrialism (where classical 
liberalism reigned) and then to collectivism.30 Collectivism, in the sense of 
creation of a partial welfare state and a circumscription of liberties, took place 
in America, according to Carson, only during the twentieth century.31 
By contrast, collectivism has been ingrained in Eastern culture for 
millennia. For example, Confucian ethics is basically humanistic and 
collectivistic in nature.32 It is humanistic since its primary concern is the 
human condition. It is collectivistic because it places the importance of 
collective values and interests above individual ones. According to this theory, 
a Confucian person is essentially a social being. 
The core of Confucian ethics is constituted of three elements – ren, yi 
and li define what is morally acceptable in human society. Ren is the capacity 
                                               
28 The individual and its reason are two pillar of Immanuel Kant’s theory. See Britannica 
Guide to the Ideas that Made the Modern World (Constable and Robinson, 2008) XIV.  
29 John Wu, Fountain of Justice (Sheed and Ward, London 1959) 135. 
30 Dicey in his Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during 
the Nineteenth Century published in 1905, already speaks about the second half of the 
nineteenth century as the period of ‘collectivism’, while in America individualism still held 
sway. 
31 C Carson, The Fateful Turn. From Individual Liberty to Collectivism 1880-1960 (The 
Foundation for Economic Education, New York 1963) 71. 
32 Confucius (Kong Fuzi) was born in 551 BC. 
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of compassion or benevolence for fellow humans. It is essentially expressed 
in social relationships. Yi can be defined as righteousness and, according to 
Mencius (371?–288? BC) it is inseparable from human nature.33 Li represents 
the norms and protocols in personal and institutional lives. The legitimacy of li 
is based on ren and yi, and only under this condition are people obligated to 
follow it. Traditional Chinese culture and modern Chinese communities deem 
ren, yi, li, wisdom and trustworthiness as the five cardinal virtues of humanity. 
For this reason, Roebuck and Wai-Ip assert that the current law of China 
accepts the principle of good faith, not only because of the influence of 
German and Soviet law but, mainly because good faith fits Chinese traditional 
thinking.34 E.g. China’s current Foreign Economic Contract Law provides in 
article 3 that, ‘Contracts shall be concluded in accordance with the principles 
of mutual benefit and equality, and reached by unanimity by consultation’. 
However, Keung Ip points out: 
  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the communist authorities have 
tried hard to replace the old feudalistic tradition with the new socialist culture. Being 
perceived as the crown jewel of feudalism, Confucianism had been systematically 
demonized, suppressed and purged. Despite this harsh and brutal treatment, 
Confucianism recently finds a comeback, thanks to the endorsement by many top 
government officials … On the academic side, local and overseas scholars have 
been promoting the values of Confucianism in the building of a business moral order 
in China.35 
 
 To return to Western culture: during the aforementioned period of 
collectivism in the Western world, Spencer, a defender of liberal principles, 
                                               
33 H Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Confucianism, 
Leadership and War (Routledge, London 2007) 19. 
34 D Roebuck and W Wai-Ip, ‘A Step Away from the Market? The Autonomy of Negotiable 
Instruments and the New Negotiable Instruments Law of the PRC’ in W Guiguo and W 
Zhenying (eds) Legal Developments in China: Market Economy and Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 1996) 207. 
35 Po Keung Ip, ‘Is Confucianism Good for Business Ethics in China?’ (2009) 88 Journal of 
Business Ethics 463, 473. This author (at p. 467) reveals the dark side of Confucianism: 
‘Confucian reciprocity, in general, is asymmetrical as a result of the embedded hierarchical 
human relationships that Confucian (sic) sanctions and supports. Indeed, far from being 
benign, hierarchy when meshed with authoritarianism breeds a domination-subservient social 
structure that is harmful to the individual’s dignity and autonomy’. 
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argued against what he called ‘compulsory cooperation’,36 a form of 
cooperation imposed from above. Instead, he proclaimed a voluntary 
cooperation, as a consequence of the evolution of society. In short, he stated 
that, since liberal society evolved from a hierarchical society prior to the 
industrial revolution, to come back to collectivism would mean a regression.37 
Collectivism is, of course, where the state imposes rules for the good of the 
general population. 
Prima facie these theories about the role of the state could seem far 
from a theory of good faith in international contracts. However, the foundation 
of a more or less restrictive conception of contractual freedom and, as a 
result, the way to interpret good faith, both derive from the historical reality 
and the schools of thought in a particular time and place. It must be 
remembered that law is essentially an ordinance of reason directed to the 
common good. It is a teleological, not a mechanical, science.38 Consequently, 
the determination of what is good faith differs according to differing times, as 
has been seen in the previous chapter. 
Generally, good faith in international contracts was present from 1880 
onwards, the period known as collectivism,39 as a compulsory cooperation (in 
the way denounced by Spencer),40 since it was applied under the aegis of 
international private law. Good faith fulfilled its role in cross-border 
agreements guided by the strictness of municipal systems of law. By contrast, 
nowadays good faith in the lex mercatoria represents the voluntary 
                                               
36 B Malinowski in Crime and Custom in Savage Society (8th edn Routledge, London 1966) 64 
states that, ‘The fundamental function of law is to curb certain natural propensities, to hem in 
and control human instincts and to impose a non-spontaneous, compulsory behaviour – in 
other words to ensure a type of co-operation which is based on mutual concessions and 
sacrifices for a common end’. 
37 Spencer compared society to a biological organism. See R Carneiro, The Evolution of 
Society. Selections from Herbert Spencer’s “Principles of Sociology” (The University of 
Chicago, Chicago 1967) Chapter 2. 
38 This is the view of the sociological school of jurisprudence – followed here. The sociological 
school of jurisprudence studies the circumstances which create the legal institutions, and the 
relationship between those legal institutions and other social institutions which condition the 
scope and the operation of law. In this school of thought, law is thought of as a social 
institution which serves collective social purposes and interests (as opposed to merely 
serving individual purposes and interests). Another important element is that it believes that 
human experience is the basis of law and that law is designed to meet dynamic social 
needs. See R Pound, ‘The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence I’ (1911) 24 
Harv.L.Rev. 591; and R Pound, ‘The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence II’ 
(1911-1912) 25 Harv.L.Rev. 140. 
39 See Carson (n 31) Chapter 5.   
40 H Spencer, ‘From Freedom to Bondage’ in Taylor (n 25). 
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cooperation to which Spencer aspired. The societas mercatorum is – in fact 
and spontaneously – applying or understanding good faith as cooperation for 
the common good of everyone involved in the contract and affected by it. In 
this sense good faith could be considered as a moral principle,41 without 
fearing to introduce subjective parameters. Here, Max Nordau comments on 
Hegel’s ideas: ‘To act morally is to act so as to ensure the well-being of the 
community. The real categorical imperative is a social conscience’.42  
The understanding of good faith as cooperation in our particular time in 
the history of humankind implies that we are part of a society in evolution as 
the individual is in constant evolution – in an ontological sense: 
 
The industrial social type is made possible by an improvement in individual moral 
character which is the work of many generations. As individuals become more 
socialized, and develop ‘higher’ moral sentiments, like a love of liberty and a respect 
for the rights of others, so the social order come to be produced spontaneously by 
their voluntary contractual agreements.43  
 
Cooperation, as a particularity of the behaviour of parties in an 
international contract, is the product of the development of the contract theory, 
which is, at the same time, influenced by the changes in society. English law 
is a good illustration in this sense, since it has evolved from an initial liberal 
approach44 to the promotion of fairness.45 
                                               
41 Durkheim, an advocate of contract solidarity, held that moral rules are compulsory and also, 
desirable. Durkheim, Sociologie et Philosophie (Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris 1924) 50. 
42 The author refers to the categorical imperative of Kant, of course. M Nordau, Morals and 
the Evolution of Man (Cassell and Co., London 1922) 24. 
43 J A Hobson, ‘Introduction’ in Taylor (n 25) XVIII.   
44 For an example of this approach, see British House of Lords in Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v 
Noblee Thorl G.m.b.H [1962] A.C. 93, upholding the decision of the umpire to whom the 
dispute was originally referred, the board of appeal, Justice Diplock and the Court of Appeal, 
who all rejected the appellants’ contention (namely, that the contract of sale c.i.f. was 
frustrated because the usual and customary shipment route, Suez Canal, was blocked during 
the time established for performance). They held the appellants liable to the respondents. It 
was stated that, although the alternative route – Cape of Good Hope – involved a change in 
the method of performance of the contract, it was not such a fundamental change from that 
undertaken under the contract as to allow frustration. The following facts are worth 
considering to appraise the judgment: the distance from the original Port Sudan to the port of 
destination (Hamburg) via Suez Canal is app. 4,386 miles; via Cape of Good Hope it is app. 
11,137 miles. Besides, the freight surcharge placed on goods shipped on vessels proceeding 
via the Cape of Good Hope was increased from 25 to 100 per cent during the period of 
performance. Despite these elements, the alternative route was held a ‘reasonable and 
practicable route available’. 
45 See Chapter Two, Section 2.5.2. 
 159
 Collins offers the case of Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v 
Macaulay,46 where the House of Lords annulled a contract on the basis of 
unfairness of the agreement, as an example of the new trend of English courts 
to punish unjustifiable domination, to procure the equivalence of exchange 
and to ensure cooperation between contractual parties. The author justifies 
the enshrinement of these values with a new understanding of the market 
order, which implies a revised notion of liberty and autonomy where ‘the ability 
to enter into binding commitments is interpreted, not as a general licence but, 
as a power to be exercised for worthwhile purposes’.47 Collins considers this 
the philosophy behind his own work: ‘These three elements – the concern 
about unjustifiable domination, the equivalence of the exchange, and the need 
to ensure co-operation – which seem to me motivate the decision in 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay, form the core of the 
interpretation of law of contract presented in this book’.48 
When two or more parties meet to agree on a commercial contract their 
purpose is to profit from the business and their intentions are not assistance 
or charity. The logical question is, therefore, how does the cooperation 
between traders become effective? This gives rise to a host of observations 
and reflexions. The following is an attempt to condense them: 
The cooperation between traders becomes effective if the behaviour of 
the parties is directed towards the fulfilment of their reciprocal expectations 
when contracting. What a party can expect during the different phases of the 
contract is that the other party will do what the facts require to accomplish the 
aim of the contract. Even if the fulfilment of the purpose of the contract is not 
possible, good faith requires cooperating to contain the damages derived from 
the frustration of such aim. 
During the performance the parties’ interests are directed towards that 
aim. In this sense, the concept of ‘cooperation’ must not be confused with the 
idea of ‘collaboration’. As regards these notions, Williams suggests: 
 
                                               
46 [1974] 3 All ER 616; [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (HL). 
47 H Collins, The Law of Contract (4th edn LexisNexis, London 2003) 28-9. According to 
Collins, a contract is made for worthwhile purposes when it has the quality of contributing in 
an important way to the sense of meaning in a person’s life (p. 30). 
48 Ibid 29. 
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Collaboration can refer to group activity within any corporate conglomerate or 
subsidiary activity and can easily be little more than assent to authority according to a 
feudalistic, hierarchical organizational system. Cooperation, on the other hand, is 
rooted in a highly democratic, participatory, and group-directed process. Cooperation 
demands a move away from a mere collaborative attitude within a typical corporate 
command chain (emphasis added).49 
 
To paraphrase this impeccable explanation: cooperation in contracts 
means a move beyond, in the sense that it requires effective steps to fulfil the 
legitimate expectations of the other party – not only the proscription of 
undesirable conduct.50  
This movement beyond can be well appreciated in the trend of new 
forms of contracting that enshrine cooperation: partnering, strategic alliances, 
joint venture, franchising, construction,51 groups of companies and technology 
cooperation, among others. Consider here, for instance, partnering in the 
construction industry. It appears to be almost universally accepted that 
partnering requires, ‘changing traditional relationships to a shared culture … 
based upon trust, dedication to common goals, and an understanding of each 
other’s individual expectations and values’.52 Partnering documents contain 
the language of ‘good faith’ and pose to judges the challenge of interpreting it 
in a manner that complies with the expectations of the parties: 
 
For example under the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) Non-Binding Partnering 
Charter the parties agree to act in good faith; in an open and trusting manner; in a co-
operative way; in a way to avoid disputes by adopting a ‘no blame’ culture; fairly 
towards each other; and valuing the skills and respecting the responsibilities of each 
other.53  
                                               
49 R C Williams, Cooperative Movement: Globalization from Below (Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot  2007) Introduction. 
50 Similarly, Christian morality not always prohibits but asks ‘love your neighbour as yourself’. 
This is one step further, which departs from the suppression of the impulse of selfishness and 
prolongs its effects until it changes the impulse of selfishness and indolence into its very 
antithesis: love. 
51 See C Molineaux in ‘Moving Towards a Construction Lex Mercatoria, A Lex Constructionis’ 
(1997) 14 J.Int’l Arb. 55. 
52 ‘In Search of Partnering Excellence’ (1991) 17 Special Publication CII Austin TX. 
53 N Jefford, ‘“Soft Obligations” in Construction Law: Duties of Good Faith and Co-operation’ 
(Speech at the Seminar organized by Keating Chambers Barristers 12 May 2005) 
<http://www.keatingchambers.co.uk/resources/publications/2005/nj_soft_obligations_construc
tion_law.aspx> accessed 15 December 2009. 
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 The concept of cooperation in today’s commerce frequently surpasses 
the arena of economic exchange and enters into a field of long-term strategic 
considerations regarding relationships between companies. The concrete 
motives that lead companies to cooperative efforts can vary widely. For 
example in technology partnering, the motives go from reducing the cost of 
research in high-tech industries and the cost of advanced-system design, 
such as in telecom and aerospace, to the possibility of capturing some of the 
capabilities, knowledge or technologies of partners or the possibility to create 
new markets and products.54 The underlying current of all these contracts 
made to attain these objectives is cooperation, in the way proposed in this 
work.
                                               
54 See J Hagedoorn, ‘Understanding the Rationale of Strategic Technology Partnering: 
Interorganizational Modes of Cooperation and Sectoral Differences’ (1993) 14 Strategic 
Management Journal 371. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to explain the features of good faith as a 
principle in those instruments that enshrine the lex mercatoria. This is done 
through the analysis of the text of these instruments, arbitral awards given on 
their basis and real and hypothetical examples. 
 
 
4.1 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (CISG) 
 
Since 1980 new elements have been added to the substance of the lex 
mercatoria. Most notably among those elements is the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG);1 which, it is generally 
recognized, embodies universal principles applicable in international 
contracts.2  
Article 7 (1) is the only formal article on good faith: 
 
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.3  
 
                                               
1 The Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) was signed in 
Vienna in 1980 and came into force on 1 January 1989. As of 7 July 2010, UNCITRAL reports 
that 76 States have adopted the CISG. The methodology adopted by the Vienna Sales 
Convention is to embrace substantive rules specially designed for international transactions, 
that is to say, once it is ratified, it provides directly applicable rules. 
2 In ICC award n. 5713 it was stated: ‘The tribunal finds that there is no better source to 
determine the prevailing trade usages than the terms of the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sales of Goods of 11 April 1980, usually called “the Vienna Convention”. This is 
so even though neither the country of the buyer nor the country of the seller are parties to that 
Convention. If they were, the Convention might be applicable to this case as a matter of law 
and not only as reflecting trade usages’ (1990) 15 Yb Comm Arb’n 72 
3 Likewise, article 5 of the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by 
Letters of Credit of 1995 provides: ‘In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in the international practice of independent guarantees and stand-by 
letters of credit’. 
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This rule refers to the interpretation of the Convention, but not to the 
interpretation of sale contracts governed by it. The article is ambiguous 
because it is the result of a formal commitment between countries which 
wanted a general norm about good faith and those that did not accept such a 
norm. However, in this respect Tetley states, ‘Clearly, art. 7 (1) must be read 
more broadly, as imposing an obligation of good faith conduct in international 
trade. Generally there is support for the broad reading of article 7 (1)’.4  
In line with this position, here is an example drawn from a national 
common law jurisdiction where good faith is applied as a standard of 
behaviour for the parties to a contract on the basis of article 7. In Renard 
Constructions v Minister for Public Works, Justice Priestley mentioned CISG 
for the first time in Australia. He concluded that 'reasonableness in 
performance' was implied in the contract concerned and then likened this to 
notions of good faith in Europe and the US, and noted that, although such a 
concept was not yet fully accepted in Australia (because it is based on the 
English legal tradition), 'the time may be fast approaching'.5  
Although there is not an express reference to contractual good faith in 
CISG, it is an underlying principle of many of its norms.6 For example, the 
statements and conducts of the parties are to be ‘interpreted according to the 
understanding of the reasonable person’;7 article 77 illustrates the possibility 
to incur liability in cases of not using good faith in the mitigation of damages.8 
Here, Klein also identifies good faith in several articles of this Convention, for 
example: 
 
                                               
4 W Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering’ 
(2004) 35 JMLC 561, 589. 
5 The judgement of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Australia) of 12 March 1992 is 
retrievable in the website of Pace Law School CISG database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920312a2.html> accessed 31 May 2011.  
6 ‘The principle of good faith, as embodied not only in article 7 but also in the most specific 
provisions such as article 16 (2) (b), 21 (2) and 40 of the CISG, is acknowledged as one of 
the general principles on which the Convention is based’. N Hofmann, ‘Interpretation Rules 
and Good Faith as Obstacles to the UK’S Ratification of the CISG and to the Harmonization 
of Contract Law in Europe’ (2010) 22 Pace Int’l L.Rev. 145, 168. 
7 Article 8 (2) CISG. 
8 Art. 77 reads as follows: A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such 
measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, 
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a 
reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. 
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Under article 29, the modified agreement is enforceable by either party in the event of 
other’s breach, because each had relied on the conduct of the other ... While the 
words ‘good faith’ are nowhere to be found in article 29, it is clear that the outcome in 
this scenario is grounded largely on the good faith obligation.9 
 
To sum up: in spite of the absence in CISG of an explicit good faith 
provision, the principle still stands. The articles of the Convention provide 
ample opportunity for an arbitral panel to exercise flexibility in the 
interpretation of the contract.10 This is in complete harmony with the current 
trend in international commerce, consisting of a shift from the strict 
enforcement of contract to an emphasis of fairness in the exchange and good 
faith norms.  
 
 
4.2 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS  
 4.2.1 PICC IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(PICC) are the result of the work of a group of experts coming from different 
legal traditions who gathered at the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT).11 The Principles are ‘soft law’. That is, they are not 
binding upon the parties or the states, unless ‘the parties have agreed that 
their contract be governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or 
the like’.12 
                                               
9 J Klein, ‘Good Faith in International Transactions’ (1993) 15 Liverpool L.Rev. 115, 130. 
Article 29 (2) reads: A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification 
or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by 
agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a 
provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct. 
10 Good faith is certainly a factor in the application of article 8 that deals with the interpretation 
of the parties’ statements and conduct in order to ascertain their obligations, of article 16, 
article 29, article 35 (3) and of article 80, among others. 
11 This is an independent intergovernmental organization with its seat in Rome. 
12 See the Preamble of the Principles. The 2004 version of the Principles is the one used in 
this thesis. The 90th session of the Governing Council of UNIDROIT adopted the third edition 
of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (‘UNIDROIT Principles 
2010’), which contain new provisions on restitution in case of failed contracts, illegality, 
conditions, and plurality of obligors and obligees, while with respect to the text of the 2004 
edition only significant changes made relate to the Comments to article 1.4 (Mandatory rules). 
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It is submitted in this thesis that the UNIDROIT Principles reflect a new 
sagacious approach to the subject of commercial contracts:13 PICC rose as 
result of the international community’s awareness of the changing role of the 
contract in international business. From ‘discrete’ transactions, transnational 
contracts have gradually developed into a genuine source of transnational 
commercial law. The PICC stands for this dramatic change in one of the most 
important areas of international business law. 
Scholars regard PICC in two ways. 
 
a) The first position postulates that the Principles cannot be considered 
the lex mercatoria ipso facto. Their provisions must be validated as part 
of the lex mercatoria throughout their effective application and, most 
importantly, throughout the opinio iuris atque necessitatis; which 
means, the conviction in the mercantile community about their binding 
and necessary character.14 
 
b) The second position (whose most renowned exponent is Galgano) 
makes these Principles the reflection of the lex mercatoria, ‘From the 
lex mercatoria an organic compilation has been formed, under the 
name of Principles of International Contract Law’.15 
 
Considering that the lex mercatoria needs to be accepted as binding by 
commercial operators and that PICC present a high degree of abstraction – as 
they are the result of a process of creation by legal experts – the first position 
seems to be the better approach. Here, Berger holds that PICC should be 
called a ‘Pre-Statement’ rather than a ‘Re-Statement’ of transnational contract 
law. In any case, he regards these Principles as the ‘Magna Carta’ of 
                                               
13 Contrary to the scope of all existing international conventions, including CISG, PICC are not 
restricted to a particular kind of transaction but cover the general part of contract law. 
14 Cf. F Rongeat-Oudin and M Oudin, ‘The Reception of the UNIDROIT Principles by the Lex 
Mercatoria: The Example of Good Faith’ (2009) 6 IBLJ 697.  
15 F Galgano, La Globalizzazione nello Specchio del Diritto (Il Mulino, Bologna 2005) 64. See 
p. 74-5 of this book where the author recognizes the origin of the lex mercatoria in the 
community of merchants, but, he adds, ‘it is applied after receiving the cultural filter of 
UNIDROIT’. 
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international commercial contracts.16 This perspective is also assumed in 
international practice. For example, according to the abstract of the ICC partial 
award n. 10022: 
 
The arbitral tribunal decided that it would refer, when necessary, to ‘the relevant trade 
usages’ according to article 17 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, and that such 
reference included but was not limited to the UNIDROIT Principles and the 
Principles of European Contract Law (emphasis added). 17 
 
Ultimately, these Principles can be characterized as rules of consensus 
between experts on the best solutions for international commercial contracts. 
Among them, there are some norms that already reflect the standard practice 
in international trade. An illustration is, for example, an arbitral case in which 
the parties were invited to express their views of the principles to be applied 
under the lex mercatoria. In reply, they referred to norms contained in the 
UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG. The arbitral tribunal considered – with 
only one exception – that the parties have rightly identified the interpretative 
principles to be applied (the main problem was one of interpretation).18 
In practice, in those cases where the PICC effectively reflect the lex 
mercatoria, they are naturally called to supplement and complement national 
laws and CISG in arbitration. Frequently, contracts contain a choice of law 
clause designating the law of a particular state. In addition, parties explicitly 
agree to the complementary and supplementary application of the general 
principles of international law.19  Sometimes, in the latter case, reference is 
expressly made to the UNIDROIT Principles. For example, in the arbitral case 
between Ministry of Defence and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran v Cubic Defence Systems Inc. the supplementary aspect is 
                                               
16 K P Berger, ‘The Relationship between the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and the Lex Mercatoria’ (2000) 5 Unif.L.Rev. 153, 159 and 169. 
17 M J Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice (Transnational Publishers, New York 
2002) 675. The original source of this award is (2001) 12 ICC Int’l Ct.Arb.Bull. 100. 
18 ICC award n. 9875 in (2001) 12 ICC Int’l Ct.Arb.Bull. 95. 
19 Dalhuisen states, ‘The empirical evidence suggests that parties do not specifically apply the 
general principles of the lex mercatoria as proper law in their arbitration agreement or, if so, 
do it to supplement rather than displace national law. Thus, only one to two per cent of 
clauses given raise to ICC arbitration in 2002-2003 provided for transnational or other non-
national law as the governing law’. J H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational and 
Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (3rd edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 
604. 
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expressed in a clause that entitles the parties to request unilaterally 
termination of the contract or adaptation of its terms on the basis of article 
6.2.3 (4) [Effects of Hardship]. It was considered that the clause rebus sic 
stantibus is a general principle of law and, therefore, applicable to this case, 
even if it did not form part of the Iranian law. 20 
 
4.2.2 GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS PART OF THE 
PICC 
 
Now that the character of the PICC in the international sphere is clear, 
the next stage is to state the features of good faith in these Principles 
 Firstly, in practice the PICC are invoked by national judges and 
arbitrators to strengthen their perceptions of the trends in international 
commercial law; thus, in fact, good faith is acting as an overarching principle 
underpinning solutions given by international arbitrators. An example might 
help to clarify this. In the ICC award n. 10335 of October 2000 the award was 
based on Greek law, among other norms, under article 200 of the Greek Civil 
Code which states: ‘Contracts shall be interpreted according to the 
requirement of good faith taking into account business usages’. In addition, 
the arbitral tribunal mentioned other norms of European civil codes and, in 
order to demonstrate that ‘modern international law is evolving in the same 
direction’, expressly referred to articles 1.7, 1.8, 4.1 and 4.3 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles.21 
 Secondly, since the UNIDROIT Principles have exercised and will 
continue to exercise a considerable influence over the harmonization of the 
business law of regional blocks such as Africa and American States,22 the 
way to embrace good faith in these Principles is also enshrined in those 
projects of the unification of national business laws.23 This has an enormous 
                                               
20 ICC award n. 7365/FMS of 5 May 1997. Abstract available in English and French: [1999] 
Unif.L.R. 1014.  
21 Excerpts of the award published in (2001) 12 ICC Int’l Ct.Arb.Bull. 102. 
22 The Preamble of the Principles declares that, ‘They may be used to interpret or supplement 
international uniform law instruments. They may be used to interpret or supplement domestic 
law. They may serve as a model for national and international legislators’.  
23 The reason for the influence of PICC over the harmonization of business laws in different 
regions is their comparative, empirical and universal background.  
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impact in the system of commercial law as a whole, in the sense that there is 
a transposition of the concept of good faith from the lex mercatoria towards 
national systems and vice versa.24 
 
4.2.3 FEATURES OF GOOD FAITH IN THE PICC 
4.2.3.1 GOOD FAITH IS A FUNDAMENTAL IDEA UNDERLYING THE 
PRINCIPLES 
 
One of the main ideas that underlie the UNIDROIT Principles is good 
faith.25 It is postulated in this thesis that this and other underlying ideas such 
as flexibility26 are harmoniously and consistently applied by arbitral tribunals in 
international contract disputes.  
However, this thesis can be challenged in its basis by a notion 
proposed by Hyland, who sees an internal inconsistency in the UNIDROIT 
Principles. According to him, the Principles are inspired by contrasting 
conceptions: natural law (pacta sunt servanda) and risk allocation. Because of 
such incoherence, uniform interpretation according to the ideas underlying the 
Principles, as provided by article 1.6, is unfeasible; the courts might construe 
the norms in different ways.27 
It is generally known that pacta sunt servanda requires the individuals 
to be bound by their promises; in consequence, the sanction for breach of 
contract is greater when the breach is intentional. Likewise, penalty clauses 
are enforced because they have a punishment goal. Another consequence of 
such approach is the mitigation of damages. French civil law and the codes 
that follow the Code Napoléon around the world do not accept the mitigation 
of damages because that would mean to burden the innocent party. By 
contrast, risk allocation does not consider the promisor bound by law to 
perform the promise. The promisor remains free to breach. The central 
                                               
24 This idea is further developed below: see Section 4.5.2 figure 1 of this chapter. 
25 See the official comment of article 1.7 PICC. D Tallon in Le Concept de Bonne Foi en Droit 
Français du Contrat (Centro di Studi e Ricerca di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Roma 1994) 
2 states, ‘Et l'on sait que les partisans de la lex mercatoria fait de la bonne foi la base même 
de celle-ci’ (‘We know that the partisans of the lex mercatoria make good faith the foundation 
of it’). 
26 See the Introduction to the 1994 edition of the Principles. 
27 R Hyland, ‘On Setting Forth the Law of Contract: A Foreword’ (1992) 40 Am.J.Comp.Law 
541. 
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objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not 
punitive.  
Hyland, in addition, states that the UNIDROIT Principles, influenced by 
the common law, tend more toward the conception of risk allocation.28 
 To respond to Hyland: it is not possible to accept the risk allocation 
theory in essence and, even less, as a partial basis for some of the rules of 
the UNIDROIT Principles.  
Risk allocation is an idea borrowed from Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
proposed that contract law’s only aim was to guarantee the boundaries of the 
field of promising without involving moral judgements of conduct.29 Holmes 
argued: 
 
In the case of a binding promise that it shall rain tomorrow, the immediate legal effect 
of what the promisor does is, that he takes the risk of the event, within certain defined 
limits, as between himself and the promisee. He does no more when he promises to 
deliver a bale of cotton. If it be proper to state the common-law meaning of promise 
and contract in this way, it has the advantage of freeing the subject from the 
superfluous theory that contract is a qualified subjection of one will to another, a kind 
of limited slavery. It might be so regarded if the law compelled men to perform their 
contracts, or if it allows promisees to exercise such compulsion. If, when a man 
promised to labor for another, the law made him do it, his relation to his promisee 
might be called a servitude ad hoc with some truth. But that is what the law never 
does… The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law 
makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In 
every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfilment has gone 
by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.30  
 
Holmes’s position is not convincing. Law is based on the idea of justice 
which utterly embraces morals. An essential connection between law and 
morals emerges from an examination of how laws are interpreted and applied 
in concrete cases. Consider, for example, the case of protection of 
expectation interests, by which the plaintiff is compensated up to the point 
                                               
28 Ibid 547. 
29 Cfr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (first published in 1881, Macmillan, London 
1968). 
30 Ibid 235. 
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where it would be, should the contract be performed.31 The defendant is, of 
course, free to perform but the system provides in such a way that the 
promisor is highly prompted to fulfil the promise. There is a morality of 
promise-keeping at the base.32 This approach belongs to the deep field of the 
philosophy of law. The following brief explanation is offered for the sake of 
intellectual rigour. 
Legal positivism postulates the separation between law and morals, or, 
in other words, the distinction between law as it is from law as it ought to be.33 
Other authors conclude that moral notions of justice must be necessarily 
involved in the analysis of any legal structure.34 The view held in this thesis – 
it is evident – is with those who regard that there is an interconnection of law 
and morals.35 Here, Burrows remarks: 
 
The common law is best regarded as a coherent system of principles, reflecting a 
complex mix of ‘moral rights’ reasoning, modified and tempered by the desire to 
pursue certain long-term social policies. One important social policy is efficiency; but 
its place is alongside, not as a replacement for, moral rights reasoning, and this is 
how it is used in this book.36 
                                               
31 Here, in ICC award n. 8264 of 1997 in (1999) 10 ICC Int’l Ct.Arb.Bull. 62, the arbitral 
tribunal held that claimant’s failure to provide respondent with information relating to the 
equipment caused the latter the loss of an opportunity to develop and adapt its industrial 
production to the demands of the market. The tribunal referred to article 7.4.3 (2) of the 
UNIDROIT Principles which reads: ‘Compensation may be due for the loss of a chance in 
proportion to the probability of its occurrence’. 
32 See A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contracts (2nd edn Butterworths, London 
1994) 17-8. 
33 See H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harv.L.Rev. 
593. It is worth dispelling here a source of confusion as regards positivist theories: ‘Positivism 
does not strictly deny the importance of moral, ethical or even political quality of law, but the 
relegation of these issues to a realm beyond jurisprudence increasingly seemed to exclude 
matters from consideration which were not peripheral but central to the operation of law in the 
modern world’. The quotation is from J E Penner, McCoubrey & White’s Textbook on 
Jurisprudence (4th edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 101. 
34 Here, Gustav Radbruch – who lived through the horrors of the Nazi regime – considers that 
fundamental principles of humanitarian morality are part of the very concept of Recht or 
legality. See F Haldemann, ‘Gustav Radbruch v. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law’ (2005) 
18 Ratio Juris 162. 
35 See L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, London 1964); and D Beyleveld 
and R Brownsword, ‘The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal 
Positivism’ (1985) 5 Oxford J.Legal Stud. 1. 
36 A Burrows (n 32) 12. This position could be conceived as a limitation to the theory of the 
Chicago School of Law and Economics. This theory is considered an improved model of 
utilitarianism and propounds the central role of efficiency in the common law. The following is 
an attempt to explain the core of this theory: Bentham’s utilitarianism was based on the 
‘felicific calculus’, the greatest happiness to the greatest number. The felicific calculus, 
however, is difficult because it is uncertain how people will react to alternative measures. To 
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It is worth mentioning that this statement has been taken from a book 
on the ‘Breach of Contract’, the cornerstone of Holmes’s theory.  
To sum up, since the risk allocation theory has been ruled out as a 
possible back-up philosophy of any system of law, it cannot serve such 
purpose in the UNIDROIT Principles either. As a result, there is no 
inconsistency but coherence in the ideas sustaining this body of Principles – 
one of the most important of those is good faith, as it will be seen. 
Good faith is explicit in article 1.7 of the Principles, which states that, 
‘Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade’ and they ‘may not exclude or limit this duty’. 
Good faith is qualified by ‘fair dealing in international trade’. The 
reference to international trade forbids the interpreter to give a domestic 
connotation to good faith.37 That is, anyway, the common practice in 
international arbitration. Yet, as it has already been seen, the very concept of 
good faith in international trade is coinciding with and interrelated to good faith 
in the two main traditions studied – civil and common law.  
It is also opportune to reflect on the mention of fair dealing in this 
article. This is not a novelty in commercial matters. There is an antecedent in 
the experience of the US in the UCC. On the one hand, Section 1-304 
(formerly 1-203) states:  
 
Every contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement. 
 
Good faith in this case is mentioned singularly, i.e., no reference to fair 
dealing is made. On the other hand, Section 1-201 defines good faith as: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
overtake that, the economic analysis of law makes an assumption: human beings are rational 
maximizers of their satisfactions. The felicific calculus is also problematic because of the 
empirical difficulties in finding out what people do in fact want. To this the economic analysis 
of law proposes: ‘What I want is, by definition, what I am willing to pay for – either in money, 
or by the deployment of some other resource that I have such as time and effort’. See J W 
Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd edn Butterworths, London 1997); see also R Posner, 
‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 J.Legal Stud. 103. 
37 See the official comment of article 1.7 of the PICC.  
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Honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing. 
 
 That means that fair dealing is part of the concept of good faith in this 
jurisdiction. By including fair dealing in the definition, the legislator wanted to 
offer an objective criterion of good faith which is measurable according to the 
particularized settings in which it is applied.38 Similarly, the Dutch legislature 
uses the term good faith in an objective manner and, accordingly, 
characterizes the term in the sense of reasonableness and fairness.39 The 
same approach seems to be adopted in the PICC. Despite the fact that they 
are inconsistent in their coupling of good faith and fair dealing throughout the 
articles, according to Farnsworth (who was part of the drafting group for the 
Principles), ‘one may assume … that the inclusion of fair dealing imposes an 
objective standard as established by relevant trade practices’.40 
 
4.2.3.2 A CORRECTIVE TO THE AUTHORIZED NOTION: GOOD FAITH 
IS PRAGMATIC 
 
According to Bonell41 the UNIDROIT Principles are receptive to the 
realities of international practice. However, through good faith an attempt 
would be made to bring about conditions of equilibrium and correctness in 
international relations.42  
Could this instrumental-corrective character be considered as a feature 
of good faith in the Principles? 
Good faith in this context would be part of a number of other protective 
norms in the UNIDROIT Principles, inter alia: articles 1.9; 2.1.20; 3.8; 3.9; 
3.10; 4.6; 7.1.6 and 7.4.13. The absolutist view on the essentiality of 
protective norms is that of Galgano, who describes the Principles as an 
                                               
38 See R Phillips, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act’ 
(1993) 64 U.Colo.L.Rev. 1193 
39 See Chapter Two, n 74. 
40 E A Farnsworth, ‘Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, 
Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws’ (1996) 3 Tul.J.Int’l & Comp.L. 47, 60. 
41 Bonell was chairman of the working group for the preparation of the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts 2004. 
42 M J Bonell, Un “Codice” Internazionale del Diritto dei Contratti. I Principi UNIDROIT dei 
Contratti Commerciali Internazionali (Giuffrè, Milano 2006) 134. 
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‘illuminated work of techno-democracy in the research for the equilibrium 
between opposite interests, between the reasons of the company and the 
need to protect the weak party’.43 
As an explanation for the approach assumed in the PICC, Bonell states 
that the reality presents professionals with different levels of education and 
technical preparation and ‘there are those who surrender to the temptation of 
taking advantage of the weaknesses and needs of others’.44 
It is likely that, in fact, such is the role that drafters wanted to give to 
good faith in the Principles, since Bonell writes authoritatively from his role in 
the working group in the preparation of the PICC. In addition, the official 
comment of article 1.7 states that, ‘A typical example of behaviour contrary to 
the principle of good faith and fair dealing is what in some legal systems is 
known as “abuse of rights”. It is characterised by a party’s malicious 
behaviour’. 
However, that view, which points out good faith as a safeguard against 
the malicious behaviour that may pervade businesses, is not accepted in this 
thesis. This dissenting position is based on the reality of the lex mercatoria 
nowadays.  
Firstly, there is an objective and simple way to test parties’ 
trustworthiness in international trade: in the societas mercatorum a merchant 
who behaves in bad faith will lose his reputation. According to Berger:  
 
This requires a basic consensus of common values and convictions and the 
readiness of every member of that community to comply with the relevant rules and 
principles even at risk of losing and doing damage to individual interests … This is 
also true in international trade where the business persons’ consciousness of the 
validity of trade usages, customs, contract practices, and similar rules is guaranteed 
through ‘black lists’, withdrawal of membership rights, forfeiture of bonds, and similar 
dangers to the commercial reputation.45  
 
This aspect of reputation is key in the theory of good faith cooperation 
in the lex mercatoria, since the continuing interaction among traders – which 
                                               
43 Galgano, La Globalizzazione nello Specchio del Diritto (n 15) 75. 
44 Bonell, Un “Codice” Internazionale (n 42) 161. 
45 K P Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria (2nd edn Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2010) 138-9. 
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implies the likelihood that the same merchants will deal again; the ability to 
recognize each other from the past; and to recall how the other has behaved 
until now – makes it possible for cooperation to be based on reciprocity and, 
therefore, to be stable. 
One important aspect of reputation is to elicit cooperation, or to act as a 
deterrent to bad faith towards the other party. If one party has ‘historically’ 
behaved in good faith, there is a credible possibility that this party will not 
continue trading with a party who has not been in good faith in a particular 
contract. Of course, this has substantial consequences only in an ambit of 
durable or frequent interaction between traders – which is the actual situation 
of commerce in the ‘global village’46 where long-term contracts proliferate. 
Here, Axelroad states that: 
 
Ordinary business transactions are also based upon the idea that a continuing 
relationship allows cooperation to develop without the assistance of a central 
authority. Even though the courts do provide a central authority for the resolution of 
business disputes, this authority is usually not invoked … The fairness of the 
transaction is guaranteed not by the threat of a legal suit, but rather by the 
anticipation of mutually rewarding transactions in the future.47  
 
Secondly, arbitral awards analysed in this research demonstrate that 
traders are assuming spontaneously a position of cooperation. Such is, at 
least, the expected conduct.48 This is not a morality of abnegation,49 but a new 
                                               
46 M McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Routledge, London 
1962) 21, 31. 
47 See R Axelroad, The Evolution of Co-operation (Penguin, London 1990) 178-9. Axelroad 
began his project with the question: when should a person cooperate, and when should a 
person be selfish, in an ongoing interaction with another person? To solve this he used a 
particular kind of computer game called the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This project involved 
several game theorists coming from six countries. The winner of the two tournaments was a 
programme called TIT FOR TAT. TIT FOR TAT’s strategy is to start with cooperation, and 
thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move. Axelroad considered that the 
qualities that made TIT FOR TAT successful in the tournaments would work in a world where 
any strategy was possible. The cooperation theory that is presented in this book is based 
upon an investigation of individuals who pursue their own self-interest without the aid of a 
central authority to force them to cooperate with each other. Among the conditions for 
cooperation to develop there is the need for an indefinite number of interactions and also the 
need for the players to remember how the two of them have interacted so far. 
48 Justice of Appeal Priestley in an important Australian case: Renard Constructions (ME) Pty 
v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, stated that, ‘People generally including 
judges and other lawyers from all strands of the community have grown used to the Courts 
applying standards of fairness to contract which are wholly consistent with the existence in all 
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approach to contract law, whose legal framework is the parties’ commitment 
to cooperate during the duration of the contract. As an example, in ICC award 
n. 10346 of the International Court of Arbitration in Barranquilla (Colombia) 
dated December 2000,50 two Colombian companies entered into a contract for 
the sale of electricity. The agreement was never fulfilled and the claimant 
sued the defendant for breach of contract and damages. The defendant 
objected that the contract was null and void for lack of registration in a Public 
Registry.51 This was invoked by the defendant/buyer in order to justify the 
non-performance of the contract. Naturally, the discussion was centred first on 
the validity. The tribunal considered the contract as valid.52 This award cites a 
judgement by the Consejo de Estado (Council of State) Chamber for 
Administrative Disputes, which made the following comments on duty of 
responsibility: ‘It must be remembered that in state contracts the duties 
imposed on the parties have to be observed. They include the duty to act with 
sagacity which means with reasonable diligence’.53 The need to act with 
sagacity implies that a positive behaviour is required from the contractual 
parties, including the duty to cooperate with the other party’s fulfilment. The 
following part of the award places good faith as the tendency in international 
commerce nowadays: 
 
It remains only to repeat for the sake of greater clarity in relation to the duty of 
collaboration, which is central to various parts of this Award, that academic opinion, 
case law and even legislation itself are paying increasing attention to the duties of 
correction and fair dealing or, to put it in another way, to the duty to act in accordance 
with the standards of good faith at all times.54 
 
                                                                                                                                      
contracts of a duty upon the parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance. In my 
view this is in these days the expected standard, and anything less is contrary to prevailing 
community expectations’. 
49 Cf. Hyland (n 27) 545. 
50 (2001) 12 ICC Int’l Ct of Arb. Bull.106.  
51 Called Sistema de Información Comercial (Commercial Information System). 
52 It was stated that there is a difference between substantive requirement for the validity of 
contract and administrative steps to be followed for its enforceability. Furthermore, the 
registration was regarded as a joint task of both parties, mainly based in the wording of the 
same agreement (clause 16.5). The underlying norms recalled for this purpose were: article 
871 of the Commercial Code of Colombia and article 5.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles (in the 
2004 version this is article 5.3.1). 
53 (2001) 12 ICC Int’l Ct.Arb.Bull.106, 108. 
54 Ibid 111. 
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Thirdly, to accept Bonell’s explanation implies arguing that a consumer-
protective approach was adopted by the UNIDROIT Principles. Here, 
Dalhuisen states: 
 
The UNIDROIT Contract Principles, which are limited to international commercial 
contracts, present in article 1.7 (2) a typical example of the use of consumer law or 
small companies’ protection in the professional sphere. It renders good faith generally 
as a mandatory concept, without explaining its role and meaning, and makes it 
compulsorily applicable even where it would not seem to appeal to higher overriding 
values. This would be unacceptable to common law lawyers and should also be to 
those of the civil law. Article 1.201 of the European Principles (which also covers 
consumer transactions but does not make proper distinctions either), can hardly be 
perceived as an established principle of commercial contract law as it pretends to 
be.55 
 
The following is the theory proposed here about the drafters’ option for 
such a meaningful involvement with good faith: 
The answer can be found in the relationship between good faith and 
pacta sunt servanda. Contrary to what would appear to be the common belief, 
this Latin maxim was not formulated in Roman law, but by Samuel Pufendorf 
(1632-1694) who conceived the principle in the context of natural law and 
modern scientific method. Its immediate precedent is canon law, where the 
non-performance of a contractual obligation was considered a moral wrong.56 
At the time the maxim was formulated, it meant that agreements must 
be faithfully observed.57 Grotius (1583-1645) earlier also expressed this view 
in his renowned De Iure Belli ac Pacis, ‘Nothing is so in harmony with the 
good faith of mankind as that persons should keep the agreements which they 
have made with one another’.58 
 Pacta sunt servanda became such a recognized principle, especially in 
civil law systems, that its inclusion in civil codes has been regarded as 
                                               
55 J H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (2nd edn 
Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 267-8. 
56 Cf. R Hyland, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda: Meditation’ (1994) 34 Va.J.Int’l L. 405. 
57 The translation for pacta sunt servanda by Mazeaud is: ‘The given word must be kept, the 
promise must be performed whatever it costs; pacta sunt servanda’. Henri Mazeaud, Leçons 
de Droit Civil Obligations: Théorie Générale (10th edn Montchrestien, Paris 1991) para 721 
58 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres 2.11.1.4 1646 paraphrasing D. 2,14,1 pr. This 
was taken from F Kelsey (tr) (5th edn, 1925). 
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unnecessary.59 The establishment of pacta sunt servanda determined the 
importance given to good faith in the Principles. In plainer words, according to 
pacta sunt servanda agreements must be performed but, according to the 
Principles, they must be performed in good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade, i.e., the parties are required to perform according to the 
particular circumstances and practices of the trade sector and the socio-
economic environment of the contract. Therefore, good faith is a kind of 
restraint to the pacta principle today.60 
 The philosophy of pacta sunt servanda is adopted in the UNIDROIT 
Principles.61 The logic that agreements must be performed allows the flow of 
commerce.62 The less obvious part is that they must be fulfilled according to 
good faith.63 Therefore, what the UNIDROIT Principles’ drafters made in 
article 1.7 was to state their commitment to good faith as a concept that allows 
judges and arbitrators to ensure that the parties’ responsibilities will be carried 
out and their mutual legitimate expectations will be met according to the 
special conditions of the contract in the international trade.64 This 
demonstrates that pragmatic is a feature attributable to good faith in the PICC.  
 
 
                                               
59 Pacta sunt servanda is also recognized in Islamic legal system based on Shari’ah. See S E 
Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: A Comparative Analysis with Particular 
Reference to the Modern Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates 
(Graham & Trotman, London 1991) 100.  
60 For example, article 6.2.1 of the PICC Contract to be Observed provides: ‘Where the 
performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party is 
nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on hardship’. 
Those are: articles 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
61 Article 1.3 Binding Character of Contract: A contract validly entered into is binding upon the 
parties. It can only be modified or terminated in accordance with its terms or by agreement or 
as otherwise provided in these Principles. 
62 Oliver Wendell Holmes’s logic – according to which there is no binding duty to perform and 
that the law only provides the solution for cases of breach – would terribly hinder international 
trade. 
63 A Hartkamp in ‘Judicial Discretion under the New Civil Code of the Netherlands’ (1992) 40 
Am.J.Comp.L. 551, 554-5 states: ‘The principle of bona fides or good faith (expressed by the 
complementary notions “reasonableness and equity”) has three functions: …Third, it has a 
“derogating” or “restrictive” function, … in that a rule binding upon the parties does not apply 
to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to criteria 
of reasonableness and equity’. 
64 See, as support for the theory offered in this thesis, the official comment of the Principles, 
number 3.  
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4.2.3.3 SUPPLETIVE CHARACTER OF GOOD FAITH 
  
Apart from the central article 1.7, good faith is embraced in an explicit 
and also in an implicit way in other articles of the PICC.65  
Among the explicit norms: article 4.8 ‘Supplying an Omitted Term’ 
states that, ‘(1) Where the parties to a contract have not agreed with respect 
to a term which is important for determination of their rights and duties, a term 
which is appropriate in the circumstances shall be supplied. (2) In determining 
what is an appropriate term regard shall be had, among other factors, to (a) 
the intention of the parties; (b) the nature and purpose of the contract; (c) 
good faith and fair dealing; (d) reasonableness’. 
Undeniably, there is a similarity between this article and article 1135 of 
the French Civil Code that states: ‘Agreements are binding not only to what is 
expressed therein, but also to all the consequences which equity, usage or 
statute give to the obligation according to its nature’. 
Article 4.8 is related to 5.1.2. ‘Implied obligations’: implied obligations 
stem from (a) the nature and purpose of the contract; (b) practices established 
between the parties and usages; (c) good faith and fair dealing; (d) 
reasonableness. 
It has been said that article 5.1.2 is a nod towards the common law. 
However, it is expressly stated in the official comment of article 5.166 that 
implied obligations are a corollary to good faith enshrined in art. 1.7 PICC.67  
 
 
 
 
                                               
65 Inter alia, articles 2.1.4. (2) (b); 2.1.15; 2.1.16; 2.1.18; 2.1.20; 3.8; 3.10; 5.1.2; 5.1.3; 5.2.5; 
6.1.16 (2); 6.2.3; 7.1.6; 7.1.7; 7.2.2 (b) (c); 7.4.13; 9.1.3; 9.1.4 and 9.1.10. 
66 In the 1994’s version of UNIDROIT Principles article 5.1 reads: ‘The contractual obligations 
of the parties may be expressed or implied’. 
67 Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice (n 17) 184. See ICC award n. 7365/FMS of 
05.05.1997 Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran v Cubic Defense Systems Inc (see n 20) where in order to justify the application by 
analogy of a ‘Termination for Convenience Clause’ to the contract as a result of changed 
circumstances, the arbitral tribunal applied Articles 5.1 and 5.2 [Arts. 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the 
2004 edition] of the UNIDROIT Principles and the ‘widely accepted principles therein set forth 
regarding implied obligations’.  
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4.2.3.4 THE MEANING OF COOPERATION 
 
Article 5.1.3 Cooperation between Parties reads as follows: 
 
Each party shall cooperate with the other party when such co-operation 
may reasonably be expected for the performance of that party’s 
obligations. 
 
The official comment on the Principles qualified the contract as, ‘not 
merely a meeting point for conflicting interests’ but also a common project in 
which each party must cooperate. This view is related by the same comment 
to the good faith principle.    
Cooperation is inherent in the notion of good faith in transnational law. 
This is clear in the following statement contained in the preparatory work on 
the UNIDROIT Principles 2004: ‘It may be argued that since the UNIDROIT 
Principles expressly state the duty of the parties “[to] act in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing in international trade” (Art. 1.7.(1)) and to co-
operate with each other in the course of performance (Art. 5.3), no further 
provision(s) on waiver are needed’.68 The willingness of every member of the 
trade community to comply with the lex mercatoria implies that cooperation 
shall be undertaken to achieve the object of the contract. ICC award n. 9593 
expressly states this, ‘Parties must cooperate in good faith in the course of 
performance in order to achieve their contractual purposes’.69  
Federica Rongeat-Oudin and Martin Oudin have a narrow view of the 
lex mercatoria, i.e., they consider that only those principles and usages 
effectively applied by commercial operators are part of the lex mercatoria. 
However, these authors accept – in light of the positions taken in arbitral 
awards – that cooperation has been acknowledged as a duty derived from 
good faith and also that article 5.1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles appears as a 
real restatement of international practice.70  
The point made on the significant unity of criteria between national laws 
and the lex mercatoria as regards cooperation is neatly reflected in an award 
                                               
68 UNIDROIT 1998 Study L – Doc. 55 
69 (1999) 10 ICC Int’l Ct.Arb.Bull. 107. 
70 F Rongeat-Oudin & M Oudin (n 14) 713.  
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of 2008 by the Corte Arbitrale Nazionale ed Internazionale di Milano where 
the arbitral tribunal based its decision primarily on Italian law (in particular on 
articles 1375 and 1226 of the Italian Civil Code as well as on relevant case 
law and legal writings), but also referred – as ‘a confirmation of the same 
principles at international level’ – to articles 5.1.3, 1.8 and 7.4.3 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles 2004.71 
 
 
4.3 PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW  
 
 
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) are framed in the 
context of the European harmonization of law.72 Thus, the first aim of these 
Principles is to serve as the model for a future European Code of Contracts.73 
Complementary aims – until the Code is adopted – are to facilitate the 
interpretation and to fill the gaps in European harmonized and unified 
legislation in order to avoid the reference to particular national laws. Another 
no less-important objective is, as with the UNIDROIT Principles, to be a 
guideline for national legislators who consider changing the contract law of 
their countries (in areas in which the EU will not legislate).74 Naturally, the 
Principles attempt to enclose those general principles and practices that form 
the lex mercatoria and to be available to arbitrators in a clear and ready-made 
form.  
                                               
71 The case is available (in Italian) at: 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1301&step=FullText>  
accessed 10 June 2011 
72 They developed as the product of the work of a group of lawyers who in 1980 formed the 
Commission on European Contract Law (Lando-Commission) for the countries of the EEC. In 
1989 the European Parliament passed a Resolution requesting a start to be made on the 
preparatory work on drawing up a European Code of Private Law. 
73 The importance of the European Code as a stronger instrument in comparison with the 
‘creeping harmonization’ of law made by erudite people is highlighted by Ole Lando in his 
‘Principles of European Contract Law: An Alternative to or a Precursor of European 
Legislation’ (1992) 40 Am.J.Comp.L. 573. 
74 Lando (n 73) 577 states: ‘In some EEC countries a revision of the law of obligations is 
being considered in connection with the making of a new civil code. The need to provide 
“European rules” would seem to be obvious for national legislators who are making rules 
which are intended to be durable and applied in a future when the European economic and 
political union will be much closer than now’. 
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Further on the issue whether PECL are a duplication of the PICC, the 
drafters of these instruments have argued in favour of their uniqueness75 but 
also admitted their duplication.76 In arbitral practice the PICC have been 
considered from the moment of their release,77 whereas on a number of 
occasions PECL have been dismissed in favour of the PICC.78  
The main features of good faith in this set of Principles and also a 
critical approach follow. 
 
4.3.1 GOOD FAITH IS ONE OF THE MAIN PHILOSOPHIES  
 
The Principles enshrine as the main guiding philosophies: freedom of 
contract and good faith and fair dealing.  
 The core norm is reflected in article 1:201 ‘Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing’: 
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing; 
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty. 
 
The following aspects should be considered for the imposition of 
number (2) of article 1:201.  
                                               
75 O Lando, ‘Principles of European Contract Law and UNIDROIT Principles: Moving from 
Harmonisation to Unification?’ (2003) 8 Unif.L.Rev. 123. 
76 Cf. M Bonell and R Peleggi, ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
and Principles of European Contract Law: A Synoptical Table’ (2004) 9 Unif.L.Rev. 315. 
77 As of June 2007 the total number of arbitral awards and court decisions referring in one 
way or another to the UNIDROIT Principles reported in the UNILEX database 
<http://www.unilex.info> was 146. However, in actual fact at least the number of arbitral 
awards referring to the UNIDROIT Principles is likely to be much greater since most awards 
on account of their confidential nature remain unknown. Source of the numeral datum: M J 
Bonell, ‘Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?’ CISG Database, Pace Institute of 
International Commercial Law: 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/pace/do_we_need_a_global_commercial_code_michael.joachim_bone
ll/portrait.letter.pdf> accessed 2 June 2011. 
78 See ICC award n. 12111 of 6 January 2003 which stated that PECL constitute an academic 
research, at this stage not largely well-known to the international business community, thus 
‘Claimant's claim for application of the PECL is therefore rejected’. The arbitrator applied 
PICC instead. Available at: 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=956&step=FullText> accessed 10 June 
2011. 
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Firstly, the official comment declares that this article represents the 
‘philosophy’ sustaining the net of other norms.79 Since good faith acts as the 
foundation of PECL, its mandatory character is clear.  
Secondly, the purpose of the Principles is to serve as a model for a 
future European Code of Contracts, which shall be mandatory upon the 
parties. In this sense, number (2) appears completely justified.   
The comment on article 1:102 contains an interesting assuagement to 
this mandatory rule: ‘What is good faith will, however, to some extent depend 
upon what was agreed upon by the parties in their contracts’. One is easily 
reminded of Section 1-302 of the UCC where standards of good faith can be 
fixed by the parties. This is a great tool in the parties’ hands. The following 
illustration may help to appreciate its importance:  
 
A small stocking distributor in Chile contracts with a tights’ 
manufacturer in Italy, for the distribution of the Italian firm’s product in 
Chile. It is agreed that to comply with consumer protection rules the 
label with the specifications of care of the product should be in the 
Spanish language. The breach of this clause would make it impossible 
to distribute the product lawfully in Chile; therefore, the overlooking of 
this element by the Italian producer may entitle, by the parties’ 
agreement, the distributor to refuse performance, namely to reject 
delivery on the basis of lack of cooperation.80 By the parties’ stipulation 
the care instructions in a language other than Spanish amounts to a 
non-performance. Otherwise, this would not be considered a 
fundamental non-performance by the PECL.81  
                                               
79 Literally the comment reads: ‘This article sets forth a basic principle running through the 
Principles’. 
80 Article 1:301 (4) of the PECL ‘non-performance’ denotes any failure to perform an 
obligation under the contract, whether or not excused, and includes delayed performance, 
defective performance and failure to cooperate in order to give full effect to the contract. 
81 Cf. articles: 8:103 Fundamental Non-Performance; and 7:110 Property not Accepted of the 
PECL. In a German case, the Swiss defendant argued that goods were delivered by the 
German plaintiff with instructions booklets in German but not in other languages spoken in 
Switzerland. As regards this allegation, the court found that the appliances (object of the 
contract) had not been produced specifically for the Swiss market. Therefore, the delivery of 
instruction booklets in French and Italian had to be stipulated. Germany 9 May 2000 District 
Court of Darmstadt 
 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000509g1.html> accessed 23 July 2011. 
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The content of good faith may diverge widely according to the 
economic sector and to the particular circumstances of the contract; therefore, 
it is important for the parties to have an alternative to establish with clarity the 
idea of good faith embraced in their agreement. In addition, this is an excellent 
guidance for judges and arbitrators.  
 
4.3.2 GOOD FAITH IS AN INSTRUMENT IN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
INTEGRATION 
 
In its role of essential principle, good faith is offered as an instrument 
for interpretation.82 Article 1:106 states: 
 
(1) These Principles should be interpreted and developed in 
accordance with their purposes. In particular, regard should be 
had to the need to promote good faith and fair dealing, certainty in 
contractual relationships and uniformity of application. 
 
To use good faith as an element of interpretation of the PECL it is 
important to understand the meaning of good faith. The official comment 
states that ‘good faith’ means honesty and fairness in mind, whereas ‘fair 
dealing’ means the observance of fairness in fact, which is an objective test.  
There are other provisions that stress good faith’s role in the 
interpretation and integration of the contract in PECL. Among them is article 
5:102 ‘Relevant Circumstances’. In paragraph g) this article states that good 
faith and fair dealing are to be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
contract. 
In the task of integration of the contract the arbitrator is guided by 
article 6:102 Implied Terms: ‘In addition to the express terms, a contract may 
contain implied terms which stem from: (c) good faith and fair dealing’. 
The arbitrator’s task of integration of the contract governed by the lex 
mercatoria is one of incredible delicacy, because the lex mercatoria is based 
                                               
82 Here, the role of good faith is the same as in the scheme used by Roman jurists in the 
formulary process, where good faith acted ‘adiuvandi, supplendi or corrigenda gratia’. The 
citation is from Pap. D 1,1,7,1. See F Wieacker, El Principio General de la Buena Fe (Editorial 
Civitas, Madrid 1982) (Original title: Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des §242 BGB) 50. 
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on the opinio iuris atque necessitatis, that is, the persuasion in the community 
of traders about the necessity of the rule. Therefore, the arbitrator in 
integrating the contract applies good faith in order to make effective the will of 
the parties, the requirements of justice and what is generally accepted as 
binding by traders. 
Further to the power of arbitrators shaping good faith within the lex 
mercatoria, a reference must be made to the harsh posture of Critical Legal 
Studies’ authors (CLS). Here, this radical thesis challenged the very existence 
of legal rules, at least when they were thought of as capable of constraining 
and channelling individual behaviour. This was an early and undeveloped 
form of the instrumentalist view of rules, i.e., the employment of the rule as a 
tool to produce the desired effect. According to this position, it was not the rule 
that exercised power but the judge who exercised power and who used the 
rule both to help him do it and to hide the fact of his power. This criticism is 
based on the denying of the rule of law as such. This school of thought 
postulates that to the existence of the rule of law compatible with essential 
liberties of humankind there must be complete separation between morals, 
politics and the rule of law; but, in fact, there is no such separation. However, 
this criticism loses its strength in the lex mercatoria, since it is made by rules 
not imposed but created and accepted by the same traders; (another point 
made by CLS’s authors is the distorted idea of legitimacy of law only if is 
made by government, not people). Therefore, the arbitrator has no reason to 
hide anything, since the power exercised by this expert is derived from the 
same receivers of the award.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
83 See A Altman, Critical Legal Studies. A Liberal Critique (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1990) 149 ff; and J Pérez Lledó, El Movimiento Critical Legal Studies (Tecnos, 
Madrid 1996). 
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4.3.3 GOOD FAITH IS LINKED TO REASONABLENESS 
 
Good faith is linked with reasonableness all through the Principles, for 
example in articles 1:302, 5:101 (3), 2:202 (3) (c) or 8:103 (b).84 The main rule 
reads as follows: 
 
Article 1:302 Reasonableness 
Under these Principles reasonableness is to be judged by what 
persons acting in good faith and in the same situation as the parties 
would consider to be reasonable. In particular, in assessing what is 
reasonable the nature and purpose of the contract, the circumstances 
of the case, and the usages and practices of the trades or professions 
involved should be taken into account. 
 
Reasonableness provides the ‘yardstick’ for cases in which the strict 
application of a rule could amount to an unjust result.  
Reasonable means what is rational, given the intended purpose of the 
agreement. Rational means what is appropriate in the light of the available 
knowledge.85 
The official comment of the PECL offers a good illustration of what is 
rational:  
 
Constructor C, whose employees have fallen ill in great numbers, has 
asked Owner O for the time agreed for C’s completion of O’s liquor 
store to be extended by one month. O has refused to grant the 
extension. After that a licence to sell liquor which O expected to get as 
                                               
84 Other norms related with reasonableness: 
Article 6:101 Statements Giving Rise to Contractual Obligations: (1) A statement made by one 
party before or when the contract is concluded is to be treated as giving rise to a contractual 
obligation if that is how the other party reasonably understood it in the circumstances, taking 
into account: 
(a) the apparent importance of the statement to the other party; 
(b) whether the party was making the statement in the course of business; and 
(c) the relative expertise of the parties. 
Article 6:104: Determination of price: Where the contract does not fix the price or the method 
of determining it, the parties are to be treated as having agreed on a reasonable price. 
85 Cf. N Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Revisited. A Study in the Legal Theory and Practice of 
Long-Term International Commercial Transactions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London 1995) 
239. 
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a routine matter is held up due to a long lasting strike among civil 
servants which means that O will not be able to use the building until 
three months after the agreed completion time. Good faith requires that 
O notifies C that it will not need to have the building completed on time. 
  
 Fairness suggests in this case that, as O will not suffer loss because of 
third party action, it should not be able to get contractual remedy for what 
would otherwise be a contractual breach by C, because there is no loss. 
 The same perspective is taken in the rule contained in article 9:505 on 
Reduction of Loss: 
 
(1) The non-performing party is not liable for loss suffered by the aggrieved 
party to the extent that the aggrieved party could have reduced the loss by 
taking reasonable steps; 
(2) The aggrieved party is entitled to recover any expenses reasonably 
incurred in attempting to reduce the loss. 
 
 This solution is expressly accepted in some national regulations, 
namely: §1304 ABGB (1811); §254 BGB (1900); article 44 Swiss Code of 
Obligations (1911); article 1227 Italian Civil Code (1942); article 6:101 Dutch 
Civil Code (1992); article 1479 Civil Code of Quebec (1994); and also article 
7.4.8. UNIDROIT Principles. In all these cases, the rule is derived from good 
faith. The precedent at international level is represented by article 77 CISG.86 
 
4.3.4 GOOD FAITH AND COOPERATION: A NECESSARY 
SYNTHESIS 
 
Article 1:202 Duty to Co-operate states: ‘Each party owes to the other a 
duty to co-operate in order to give full effect to the contract’. 
In civil law countries cooperation is regarded as a duty derived from 
good faith. According to the official comment on article 1:202, in common law 
tradition good faith is usually an implied term that has not had much 
                                               
86 The logic, as it links to mitigation, can also be seen in common law case-law. See H G 
Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts Vol.1 (29th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) 1478 ff. 
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application. On the contrary, it has been postulated in this thesis – based on 
judicial decisions – that English courts recognize in commercial contracts the 
purpose that good faith attempts to accomplish, identifying it with cooperation 
between the parties.87 Therefore, this concept of good faith cooperation is not 
an exclusive idea of the civil law tradition. 
In the Principles cooperation is presented as an autonomous duty. 
However, the general nature of the terms used to define the duty of 
cooperation and the illustrations provided in the official comment on the 
Principles allow equating cooperation with good faith. Article 16:102 puts on 
the same stand good faith, fair dealing and cooperation. 
 
Article 16:102 Interference with Conditions 
1) If fulfilment of a condition is prevented by a party, contrary to duties of good 
faith and fair dealing or co-operation, and if fulfilment would have operated to 
that party's disadvantage, the condition is deemed to be fulfilled. 
2) If fulfilment of a condition is brought about by a party, contrary to duties of 
good faith and fair dealing or co-operation, and if fulfilment operates to that 
party's advantage, the condition is deemed not to be fulfilled. 
 
The following illustration of a resolutive condition being treated as 
having been fulfilled demonstrates that good faith is conceived as 
cooperation:  
 
When farmer H’s tractor is stolen, he hires from O, another farmer, a 
replacement tractor. As a favour to H, the rate of hire is below the 
market rate. O’s obligation to make the tractor available is subject to 
the resolutive condition that it is to come to an end if H acquires a new 
tractor to replace the stolen tractor. H turns down an attractive offer of a 
replacement tractor made by T in order to continue benefiting from the 
favourable rate of hire. The condition is deemed to be fulfilled when H 
ought to have accepted T’s offer.88 
                                               
87 See Chapter Two, Section 2.5.2. 
88 D Bush and others, Principles of European Contract Law (Part III) and Dutch Law. A 
Commentary II (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2006) 267. 
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Good faith is the main philosophy of PECL, therefore cooperation is 
regarded as essential in these Principles. Hence, article 1:301 (4) states that 
the failure to co-operate amounts to non-performance. In addition, according 
to the comment on article 1:201, good faith is required during the formation, 
performance and enforcement of the parties’ duties under the contract. 
 
 
4.4 DRAFT OF THE COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 
 
The Draft of the Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) is the result of a 
process initiated in 2001 with the Communication on European Contract 
Law.89 In 2005 several groups of academic researchers were commissioned 
by the European Commission to contribute to the DCFR.90 The research work 
finished in 2008 and led to the publication of the academic Draft of the 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),91 which includes principles, definitions 
and model rules of European private law, including contract and tort law. It 
contains provisions for both commercial and consumer contracts.92 The future 
‘political’ Common Frame of Reference (CFR) will be restricted to transactions 
in Europe, whether they have a cross-border dimension or not. 
                                               
89 COM (2001) 398, 11.7.2001. The European Commission launched a public consultation on 
the problems arising between Member States’ contract laws and on potential actions in this 
field. In light of the responses, the Commission issued an Action Plan 2003, proposing to 
improve the coherence and quality of European Contract Law by establishing a Common 
Frame of Reference (CFR) containing common principles, terminology and model rules to be 
used by the Union legislators: Commission of the European Communities, A More Coherent 
European Contract Law: An Action Plan (2003) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/com_2003_68_e
n.pdf> accessed 2 June 2011. 
90 Two groups were contracted to produce a DCFR: the ‘Study Group on a European Civil 
Code’ and a group who undertook to work specifically on the relevant acquis (the French term 
acquis communautaire refers to the rights and obligations deriving from EU treaties, laws, and 
regulations). They were granted academic independence throughout the process. Other 
groups were also commissioned with specific purposes: a group of predominantly French 
scholars to work on terminology and the philosophical underpinnings of the project (called 
‘Association Henri Capitant and Société de Législation Comparée’) and the ‘Trento/Torino 
Group’ working on the common core of European private law (see: www.common-core.org). 
Stakeholders and other experts throughout the continent were also consulted during the 
elaboration of the DCFR. 
91 C Von Bar, E Clive and H Schulte-Nölke (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law; Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (Sellier, Munich 2009). At 
p. 6 it is stressed that this is ‘an academic, not a politically authorised text’. 
92 The DCFR includes business-to-business transactions, business-to-consumer and 
consumer-to-consumer contracts (b2b, b2c and c2c, respectively). 
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Due to the intention of the drafters to incorporate the current and/or the 
best rules for every case, the DCFR contains many solutions taken from the 
lex mercatoria based on good faith. In fact, the Draft includes at least forty 
references to this principle.93 These references seem to be the Achilles’ heel 
of the Draft for its recognition and enforcement, especially to England. Here, 
Vogenauer points out the lack of precision of the Draft due to a great number 
of open-textured provisions; he adds that it has been much attacked for its 
lack of determinacy and guidance which is said to lead to a massive 
expansion of judicial power.94 
According to a document published by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union Committee 2008-2009,95 there are serious 
concerns on the English side, namely:  
- The broad scope of the DCFR, which covers, not only matters considered as 
falling within the general law of contract by practitioners of English law but 
also, contracts for the sale of goods, financial securities, intellectual property 
rights and software, and unjustified enrichment. 
- The most rigorous observations point out the differences between the 
common law and other national laws. The solutions adopted are regarded as 
differing significantly from the current law of contracts in England and Wales. 
It is considered that the DCFR raised major philosophical problems. 
Regarding specific areas of difference the big issue is good faith. In the 
Report this theme falls under the heading ‘Party autonomy and contractual 
certainty’. It is considered that the DCFR involves too much discretion, and so 
uncertainty, by the use of ‘an astonishing number of vague and ambiguous 
terms, concepts such as “reasonableness” and “good faith”’. It is said, ‘In 
contrast to English contract law, the DCFR contains an overarching principle 
of good faith and fair dealing, which applies to the process by which a contract 
                                               
93 Similar to article 7 of CISG, article I 1:102 of the DCFR provides that in the interpretation 
and development of its provisions, ‘regard should be had to the need to promote: (a) 
uniformity of application; (b) good faith and fair dealing; and (c) legal certainty’. 
94 S Vogenauer, ‘Common Frame of Reference and UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Coexistence, Competition, or Overkill of Soft Law?’ (2010) 6 
ERCL143. 
95 House of Lords, ‘European Contract Law: the Draft Common Frame of Reference’ (HL 
Paper 95) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/95/95.pdf> 
accessed 7 June 2010. 
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is brought into being as well as to the performance of contractual 
obligations’.96 
This position could seem to demolish the theory proposed in this thesis 
about the new approach of English jurists to good faith in commerce. 
However, it is submitted here that this harsh position is determined from the 
mixture of consumer law and business-to-business rules in one instrument. 
This could lead to the imposition of unnecessary protective norms on 
merchants for their vis-à-vis agreements.97  
 
4.4.1 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS: THE GREEN PAPER FROM THE 
EU COMMISSION ON POLICY OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW FOR CONSUMERS 
AND BUSINESSES 
 
Currently the Law Commission is working on policy options for 
progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses. 
With this objective, a Green Paper was launched on the 1st July 2010,98 
proposing a consultation to gather views from relevant stakeholders on the 
options in the area of unification of European contract law.99 Depending on 
the results, the Commission could propose further action by 2012.100 
The Green Paper proposes several alternatives about the instrument of 
European contract law: 
Option 1: Publication of the results of the Expert Group; 
Option 2: An official ‘toolbox’ for the legislator; 
Option 3: Commission Recommendation on European Contract Law; 
Option 4: Regulation setting up an optional instrument of European Contract 
Law; 
Option 5: Directive on European Contract Law; 
                                               
96 Ibid 13. 
97 See H Eidenmüller, ‘Party Autonomy, Distributive Justice and the Conclusion of Contracts 
in the DCFR’ (2009) Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334648> 
accessed 22 June 2010 
98 The consultation ran until 31 January 2011 
99<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0052/consultation_questionaire_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2011. 
100<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0052_en.htm> 
accessed 10 June 2011. 
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Option 6: Regulation establishing a European Contract Law; 
Option 7: Regulation establishing a European Civil Code. 
In order to carry out its mandate, the Commission has set up an Expert 
Group101 to study the feasibility of a user-friendly instrument of European 
contract law. The Group will assist the Commission in selecting those parts of 
the DCFR related to contract law and in improving the selected provisions. It 
will also take into account other relevant sources in the area and, of course, 
the results of this consultation, which closed on 31 January 2011.  
On 3 May 2011 the feasibility study on a potential European contract 
law instrument was published.102 All interested parties were entitled to send 
their feedback on the individual articles in the study until 1 July 2011. As 
stated, the next step for the European Commission will be to prepare a 
political initiative taking into account the feasibility study by the Expert Group, 
feedback on the study and the result of the aforementioned consultation on a 
European Contract Law. 
At the present stage, the following aspects can be asserted:  
- There is a lot of scepticism in the stakeholders, especially those 
representing big companies; 
- The support for this initiative varies according to the industrial sector, 
for example, there is an ample support by the insurance sector; 
- Options 6 and 7 have been ruled out as a possibility due to absolute 
lack of support, that is to say, real harmonization is excluded. The most 
possible alternatives are option two, i.e., ‘toolbox’ and option four, i.e., 
an optional instrument.103 
 
                                               
101 Commission Decision of 26 April 2010 setting up the Expert Group on a Common Frame 
of Reference in the area of European Contract Law (OJ L 105/109, 27.4.2010) 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:105:0109:0111:EN:PDF> 
accessed 10 June 2011. 
102 See the Publication of the results of the feasibility study carried out by the Expert Group on 
European contract law for stakeholders' and legal practitioners' feedback at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/consumer/docs/explanatory_note_results_feasibility_stud
y_05_2011_en.pdf> accessed 6 July 2011. 
103 Information obtained at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
Conference, ‘The Optional EU Contract Law Instrument – What to Expect?’ (7 February 
2011). 
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4.4.2 THE QUESTION IS: WHAT IS IT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR? 
 
The instrument used by the EU Commission as the basis for its 
proposal is the Draft CFR, which is an academic work, reflecting only in part 
the common practices currently applied. The topical issue is whether it will be 
effectively applied by all the addressees – though some norms are not 
according with their own tradition – or whether it will serve as a mere 
inspiration. According to the replies received, it seems that the more probable 
is the last alternative.104  
Here, a great flaw is revealed: the lack of aim of this instrument in 
commercial and consumer areas. If it is to be used as a ‘toolbox’ by 
commercial agents, there are already others instruments fulfilling the same 
role, for example PICC. In addition, what is currently clear is that big 
companies are those less supportive of this initiative. This could result in the 
fact that the instrument is limited to consumers and SMEs; and for contracts 
between these kinds of stakeholders there is the Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 
May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in 
the internal market. 
The question is: how to overtake the deficiencies detected by the 
English position, which in short proposes that, the more open terms are used 
the less harmonization is attainable? As regards good faith, the solution would 
be to state in the same instrument (or in its official comments) how the 
principle must be interpreted when it is applied. This thesis might be a useful 
resource to the Commission; the current common understanding of good faith 
cooperation could be offered to the trading community as a way to harmonize 
on this general principle.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
104 The reason adduced to opt for a toolbox is that in the search for the best practices no 
constraint is preferable. 
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4.5 OHADA 
4.5.1 GENERAL NOTIONS 
 
Among those manifestations of the lex mercatoria outside Europe an 
interesting case is the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in 
Africa (with its French acronym OHADA).105 
Article 1 of the Treaty of Port Louis (Mauritius) of 17 October 1993 that 
created the Organization establishes:106 
 
The objective of the present Treaty is the harmonisation of business 
laws in the Contracting States by the elaboration and adoption of 
simple modern common rules adapted to their economies, by setting 
up appropriate judicial procedures, and by encouraging arbitration for 
the settlement of contractual disputes. 
 
OHADA seeks for the integration of laws in different areas of the 
economical spectrum. The OHADA framework currently regulates eight areas 
of business law – commercial law, corporate law, security, debt recovery and 
enforcement, bankruptcy, arbitration, accounting and the law regulating 
contracts for the carriage of goods by road. There are plans underway to 
harmonize other areas including competition law, intellectual property law, 
banking law, labour law, evidence and contract law.107  
                                               
105 Based on the experience of OHADA, in the Conference of 15 May 2007 in Pointe à Pitre, 
Guadeloupe the OHADAC project was created. OHADAC is the acronym for the Organization 
for the Harmonization of Business Law in the Caribbean. This project is in an incipient stage 
at the moment, despite the fact that a number of conferences and seminars have taken place 
supporting the initiative. For example, a Statement by the Latin American and Caribbean 
Congress of International Commercial Arbitration in Havana was signed in June 2010 for the 
promotion of the OHADAC project. The site of the Project is: 
<http://www.ohadac.com/home.html> accessed 3 June 2011. 
106 The OHADA Treaty is made up today of 16 Africans states: Benin, Burkino Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and Togo. Initially fourteen 
African countries signed the treaty, with two countries subsequently adhering to the treaty 
(Comoros and Guinea) and a third (Democratic Republic of Congo) due to join shortly. Article 
53 of the OHADA Treaty provides that any Member State of the African Union may become a 
member. 
107 An impediment the Organisation confronts is the diversity of family legal traditions present 
in the sub-region (West and Central African States) with common and civil law jurisdictions. It 
is difficult to bring Anglophone West Africa into OHADA’s projects because of the perceived 
civilian nature of its legal thought. The other concern is the diversity of languages: English, 
French, Spanish and Portuguese. An example that can illustrate this situation is Cameroon, 
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OHADA establishes the supremacy and direct effect of the OHADA 
uniform laws; however it still provides member states with a flexible and 
modern approach which can be adapted to each country.  
Furthermore, the objective of OHADA to promote African economic 
integration and attract investment to the region is pursued through the 
establishment of a Common Court of Justice and Arbitration. This mechanism 
provides a trustworthy way to settle disputes relating to the application and 
interpretation of the uniform acts by different national courts. 
 
4.5.2 DRAFT OHADA UNIFORM ACT ON CONTRACT LAW 
 
The preliminary Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law has been 
prepared by Fontaine in line with the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts.108 
The Act deals with good faith from the point of view of the protection of 
the weaker party, since it is assumed that inequalities of bargaining power 
exist also in business relationships.109 This view is based on Fontaine’s 
preliminary work for the elaboration of the Draft: he carried out interviews, 
questionnaires and visits to the numerous African countries involved. The key 
question in the questionnaire was:  
 
The UNIDROIT Principles set great store by good faith (art. 1.7) and 
some of its consequences: the duty to collaborate (5.3), mitigation of 
harm (art. 7.4.8), penalties for negotiating in bad faith (art. 2.1.15). 
Should this approach, so typical of recent trends in international 
commercial law, be retained in the OHADA draft? 110  
 
                                                                                                                                      
which is both Anglophone and Francophone. It is probable that before the Anglophone part 
joins, the existing Uniform Acts may need some readjustment to reflect the legal tradition of 
the joining group. See S Kofi Date-Bah, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and the Harmonisation of the Principles of Commercial Contracts in 
West and Central Africa’ (2004) 9 Unif.L.Rev. 269. 
108 See M Fontaine, ‘The Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contracts and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ (2004) 9 Unif.L.Rev. 573, 584. 
109 Cf. M Fontaine, ‘OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law. Explanatory Notes to the 
Preliminary Draft’ (2008) 13 Unif.L.Rev. 633, 647. 
110 Ibid 662. 
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The countries which are the heirs of the civil law tradition are used to 
having good faith in the performance of the contract. The issue was whether 
they were prepared to enshrine good faith as a general principle in the 
different phases of the contract, because that is the way the UNIDROIT 
Principles embrace it. On this point opinions were almost uniformly positive.111 
However, as regards good faith in the case of change of circumstances 
and its consequences, the renegotiation of the contract, opinions were not 
unanimously favourable. Some (most of them still treasuring the precedent of 
the French law) consider that that could bring more uncertainty than the 
instability it intended to solve. Yet the view adopted by the Act was to 
incorporate renegotiation, including safeguards, to avoid improper use. Here, 
Article 6/22: ‘Where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for 
one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations 
subject to the following provisions…’  
The position of the majority in favour of the inclusion of renegotiation 
has prevailed, since it was considered that such a provision is beneficial for 
the unstable climate that characterizes Africa today.112  
Renegotiation takes place in the case of hardship. Hardship is a 
novelty introduced in international commercial contracts by UNIDROIT, 
complementing the gap left by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sales of Goods 1980.113 The rule of the UNIDROIT Principles 
governing the issue is article 6.2.2 Definition of Hardship: 
 
                                               
111 Furthermore, two thirds of those interviewed and Fontaine himself are in favour of 
extending the scope of this Act to all contracts without distinction, that is to say, a unified Act 
covering both civil (non-commercial) and commercial contracts. In fact, the Preliminary Draft 
makes an a priori case for a unified Act. In favour of the unification of civil and commercial 
obligations, see: L Carvajal, ‘La Unificación del Derecho de las Obligaciones Civiles y 
Comerciales’ (2006) 27 Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de 
Valparaíso 37. 
112 As regards renegotiation, Park in Arbitration of International Business Disputes (OUP, 
Oxford 2006) 543 states that, ‘ICC arbitrators are not anxious to give the proverbial “pound of 
flesh”. They find the pacta sunt servanda principle to be tempered by another rule; that of 
good faith’. Furthermore, Carbonneau in ‘A Definition of and Perspective upon the Lex 
Mercatoria Debate’ in T Carbonneau (ed), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, London 1998) 18, points out that, ‘The duty to renegotiate reflects the most 
innovative feature of rule creation through ICC arbitral adjudication’. 
113 The United Kingdom has not yet ratified CISG, therefore UNIDROIT Principles are a useful 
international body of rules (not binding) to be applied in international contractual matters. See 
an explanation of this reluctance in A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘Formation of International Sales 
Contracts: A Comparative Perspective’ (2001) 29 IBL 483. 
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There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters 
the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party’s 
performance has increased or because the value of the performance a 
party receives has diminished, and 
(a) The events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party 
after the conclusion of the contract; 
(b) The events could not reasonably have been taken into account by 
the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract; 
(c) The events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party and; 
(d) The risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged 
party. 
 
The cause of hardship is the new circumstances that make the contract 
more onerous. As a result, the debtor desires to be relieved from an extremely 
onerous obligation. In order to renegotiate the cooperation of the creditor is 
needed. Here, the concept of cooperation includes giving all reasonable 
support to the debtor when new unexpected circumstances occur. In support 
of this view, there is the commentary of article 6.2.2 (Definition of Hardship) of 
the PICC: 
 
A contract is not merely a meeting point for conflicting interests but 
must also, to a certain extent, be viewed as a common project in which 
each party must cooperate. This view is clearly related to the principle 
of good faith and fair dealing (Art. 1.7) which permeates the law of 
contract, as well as to the obligation to mitigate harm in the event of 
non-performance (Art.7.4.8). 
 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the inclusion of renegotiation in the 
Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law means that good faith is regarded 
as an element that can bring about certainty instead of uncertainty – the latter 
is the feature given to it by the orthodox doctrine in English law. 
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4.6 INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
 
It was stated in Chapter Two that the apogee of the lex mercatoria had 
already begun in the Americas with the Inter-American Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Contracts (Mexico 1994).114 It is important to 
understand this Convention in its context. 
 From the last decades of the nineteenth century the process of 
codification of international private law has been a permanent activity in the 
Inter-American context. This process has assumed different institutional 
forms.115 Currently, it takes the form of Inter-American Specialized 
Conferences on Private International Law, known by its acronym in Spanish 
CIDIP (Conferencias Especializadas Interamericanas sobre Derecho 
Internacional Privado).116 
The first CIDIP occurred in Panama in 1975. From the very beginning 
of the process of codification of international private law the experts have 
followed two criteria: 
- A general focus, in other words, a code that should embrace all the 
norms; 
- A gradual and progressive process, which implies the formulation of 
international instruments on particular subjects.  
The latter criterion, i.e., codification by sector has been carried out by 
CIDIP.117 
CIDIP are distancing themselves from the traditional approach of 
international private law for the solution of conflicts of law; instead, they are 
                                               
114 The Treaty is available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-56.html> accessed 3 
June 2011. 
115 The first treaty on this field was adopted in Montevideo, Uruguay in 1889. Another example 
is the famous Bustamante Code in 1928. 
116 The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) defines CIDIP as 
‘Intergovernmental meetings to deal with technical matters or to develop particular aspect of 
Inter-American cooperation’. 
117 At the moment six CIDIP have been held, which have produced 26 Inter-American 
Instruments (20 Conventions, 3 Protocols, 1 Model Law and 2 Uniform Documents) on the 
following general subjects: judicial cooperation between Inter-American States and legal 
certainty in cross-border transactions in civil, family, commercial and procedural relationships. 
In spite of this variety of topics, the member States tend clearly to deal in future CIDIP with 
aspects relating to mercantile law, international commerce and economic law. In fact, the 
themes chosen for the future VII CIDIP are: consumer protection and electronic-secured 
transactions registries.  
 198
procuring the regional harmonization of laws (especially from the VI CIDIP 
onwards). This is a sign of a universal trend, as it has been already seen 
here.118 
For the purpose of this thesis, the important CIDIP is the fifth because 
of its outcome: the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts, signed in Mexico the 17 March 1994. 
Article 9 (2) of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts provides that, ‘If the parties have not selected the 
applicable law, or if their selection proves ineffective, the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the State with which it has the closest ties’. 
Regarding the way to establish the State with which the contract has 
the closest ties, the Inter American Convention differs from the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980). The 
latter contains the presumption that, ‘The contract is most closely connected 
with the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is 
characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his 
habitual residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its 
central administration’ (article 4). However, article 9 of the Inter-American 
Convention opted for a completely new approach:  
 
The Court will take into account all objective and subjective elements of 
the contract to determine the law of the State with which it has the 
closest ties. It shall also take into account the general principles of 
international commercial law recognized by international organizations. 
 
This provision allows the arbitrator to take into consideration elements 
that could be even more crucial than the ‘characteristic performance’ to 
establish the applicable law in the contract concerned; among those elements, 
general principles of international commercial law – such as good faith – are 
included. This reference is completed with article 10 of the Convention: 
 
                                               
118 Following the steps of OHADA, the General Assembly of OAS has requested the General 
Secretariat to explore ways of collaboration with international organizations, such as 
UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT and BID (Inter-American Bank of Development). Further information 
is available on <http://www.oas.org/dil/private_international_law.htm> accessed 3 June 2011. 
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In addition to the provisions in the foregoing articles, the guidelines, 
customs, and principles of international commercial law as well as 
commercial usage and practices generally accepted shall apply in 
order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity in the 
particular case.119 
 
This is a call to apply the lex mercatoria to the substance of the 
dispute. Such applicability by virtue of the Mexico Convention means a 
departure from the Rome Convention which does not permit the application of 
a law that is not the state one. 
It is extremely important to note that the ratification of this Convention 
implies that arbitrators as well as national judges can apply the lex mercatoria, 
‘National judges are well advised to make an effort in order to unify the 
interpretation of these two Conventions (Mexico and Rome Conventions), 
since this is a mandatory requirement of international commerce’ (parenthesis 
added).120 
According to this thesis, good faith in the lex mercatoria is understood 
as cooperation; therefore, the fundamental point to consider is the nature of 
the encounter between this concept and those enshrined in Inter-American 
contexts. Is there homogeneity? Is there a fundamental difference between 
good faith in the lex mercatoria and concepts already embraced in national 
laws of this area? Is there willingness to evolve to this new harmonized 
concept of good faith? 
It is possible to state from the beginning that good faith as a general 
principle is not a strange element to the United States – which recognizes 
good faith as a general principle, as we have already seen – and to Latin 
American countries – which belong to the civil law tradition. Brazil and 
                                               
119 According to Siqueiros, ‘This provision was suggested by Gonzalo Parra Aranguren, 
President of the Venezuelan’s delegation’. J L Siqueiros, ‘Los Principios de UNIDROIT y la 
Convención Interamericana sobre el Derecho Aplicable a los Contratos Internacionales’ 
(1998) 27 Estudios de Derecho Internacional Público Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México 217. 
120 A Boggiano, ‘La Convention Interaméricaine sur la Loi Applicable aux Contrats 
Internationaux et les Principes d’UNIDROIT’ (1996) 1 Unif.L.Rev. 219, 227. Here Boggiano 
holds that UNIDROIT Principles can flesh out articles 9 (2) and 10 of the Inter-American 
Convention and also makes a plea that the progress represented by the Mexico Convention 
should not be hindered by the application of the rules of the forum. 
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Argentina, for instance, recently incorporated the concept into their civil law 
codes, but previously it was part of the legal culture.121 Other countries such 
as Chile, Colombia, El Salvador and Ecuador have always embraced good 
faith in their civil codes.  
Further to the meaning of cooperation assigned to good faith in 
international commercial law, it is submitted here that this is not far from what 
national spheres embrace. Brazil, for instance, incorporated ‘Objective Good 
Faith’ in the new Civil Code of 2002.122 Objective good faith is enshrined by 
article 422 of the Code as a norm of conduct meaning loyalty and honesty to 
be observed by the parties to a contract. This way of understanding was 
previously enshrined by the consumer protection code.123 However, the Code 
of 1916 (old Civil Code) only had references to subjective good faith. 
Objective good faith is one of the bases of the new contractual order of the 
Code; the other basic principles are the social function of contracts and 
equity.124 
Teresa Negreiros assigned to objective good faith in the Brazilian Civil 
Code the main function of link between private relations and constitutional 
regulations. Negreiros placed good faith within the frame of the constitutional 
general clause on people’s protection. Since the fundamental objective of the 
Republic is the construction of a society that shows solidarity, where the 
respect for the other is an essential element of every legal relation, she 
regards good faith as part of the substratum of the contract understood as a 
relationship of cooperation.125 
                                               
121 Good faith is enshrined in different ways in the Latin American codes. The principle is 
assuming a great role in Argentina where it was officially incorporated into the code by Act 
17.711 of 1968, and included in the phase of negotiation in the Unified Draft of Civil and 
Commercial Code, articles 1158 and 1159. In any case, legal scholars always affirmed the 
integrating role of good faith.  
122 The new Civil Code of Brazil was introduced by Act n. 10.406 of 10/01/02. The Code was 
effective from 12/01/2003. 
123 Brazilian author Claudia Lima Marques in Contratos no Código de Defensa do Consumidor 
(3rd edn Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo 1999) 106 states: ‘Objective good faith means a 
“reflected” behaviour, behaving and thinking of the other party, respecting its legitimate 
interests, its reasonable expectations and its rights; acting loyally, not abusing, not 
obstructing, not harming or causing excessive disadvantage, cooperating to attain the 
contractual purpose and the fulfilment of the parties’ interests’.  
124 See L De Faria Beraldo, La Função Social do Contrato – Contributo para a Construção de 
uma Nova Teoria (Editora del Rey, Belo Horizonte 2011). 
125 M C Pereira Ribeiro and R C Steiner, ‘O Paradigma da Essencialidade nos Contratos: 
Recensão da Obra de Teresa Negreiros’ (2008) 4 Revista Direito Getulio Vargas São Paulo 
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As regards the willingness of Inter-American countries to accept the lex 
mercatoria and its principles – good faith specifically –, it is possible to state 
that at the moment the scope of the Inter-American Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Contracts is restricted to a small number of 
signatory countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.126 Yet 
the lex mercatoria is being applied by other means in several countries. Many 
Latin-American Arbitral Centres, for example, have taken steps forward to 
internationality, incorporating the lex mercatoria as a possibility for the 
resolution of international disputes. In Chile, for instance, the ‘Centre of 
Arbitration and Mediation’ (Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación) explicitly provides 
that the controversy can be solved by general principles of law or the lex 
mercatoria.127 Likewise, the Rules of Arbitration of the ‘Arbitration Center of 
Mexico’ (Centro de Arbitraje de México) adopted the generic term ‘rules of 
law’ instead of ‘state law’.128 In Argentina the parties can choose the 
application of the lex mercatoria; according to article 68 of the Arbitration 
Rules of the Stock Exchange Market of Buenos Aires (Bolsa de Comercio de 
Buenos Aires) the parties are allowed to decide the substantive juridical 
norms applicable to the case.129 
                                                                                                                                      
569, 571 f. Cf. T Negreiros, Teoria do Contrato: Novos Paradigmas (2edn Renovar, Rio de 
Janeiro 2006). 
126 Some States that have failed to ratify CIDIP instruments have nevertheless used those 
instruments as models for domestic legislations. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘Regionalism 
versus Globalism: A view from the Americas’ (2003) 8 Unif.L.Rev. 63.  
127 Cf. <http://www.camsantiago.com/faq.htm> accessed 10 June 2011. 
128 Article 23 of the Rules of Arbitration of the ‘Arbitration Center of Mexico’ states: Applicable 
Rules of Law 
1. The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal 
to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall 
apply the rules of law that it determines to be appropriate. 
2. In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall take into consideration the provisions of the contract 
and the trade usages. 
<http://www.camex.com.mx/english/reglasdearbitraje-i.pdf> accessed 16 July 2011. 
Cf. ICC Rules of Arbitration article 17 (1) which provides: ‘The parties shall be free to agree 
upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the 
absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it 
determines to be appropriate’. 
129 The Spanish text of article 68 reads: El Tribunal decidirá el litigio con arreglo a las 
estipulaciones del contrato, tendrá en cuenta los usos y costumbres mercantiles y: 
a) en el arbitraje de derecho, aplicará las normas jurídicas elegidas por las partes. Si 
éstas no indicaren la ley aplicable, se aplicará la que determinen las normas de conflictos de 
leyes. Se entenderá que la indicación del derecho de un Estado se refiere al derecho 
sustantivo y no a las reglas de conflicto de leyes, a menos que las partes expresaren lo 
contrario; 
b) en el arbitraje de amigables componedores, decidirá con fundamento en equidad 
(emphasis added). 
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In conclusion, in practice national jurists from the Inter-American region 
are applying good faith in the context of the lex mercatoria.130 
 
4.7 THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
It is important to examine the creeping codification of the lex mercatoria 
and its effect on the concept of good faith. Does this phenomenon hinder the 
development of the concept?  
Undoubtedly, these numerous sets of principles and compilations of the 
lex mercatoria facilitate the work of the arbitrator. It is considered here that 
they neither limit the development of the concept of good faith nor encumber 
that currently applied in international trade, for two reasons. 
First of all, the concept of good faith normally embraced in this ambit is 
cooperation, which could mean a different behaviour according to the case. 
Therefore, the arbitrator retains autonomy to define the conduct required. In 
this regard, it must be remembered that arbitral tribunals have been called 
‘Social engineers’, as they play a pivotal role in the evolution of transnational 
commercial law.131  
Secondly, these compilations are continuously revised as they attempt 
to reflect the customs and practices effectively applied in international trade. 
This means that any change of direction in the understanding of good faith in 
the lex mercatoria should be rapidly enshrined in these instruments.132
                                                                                                                                      
The relevant part of this article is paragraph a) emphasized, which reads as follows: ‘The 
Tribunal must decide the dispute according to the stipulations of the contract; it will take into 
account commercial uses and customs and in the arbitration according to law, it will apply the 
juridical rules chosen by the parties’. 
<http://www.bcba.sba.com.ar/downloads/Regimen_Arbitral.pdf> (in Spanish) accessed 16 
July 2011. 
130 See G Cordero, ‘Cláusulas Arbitrales en Contratos Internacionales. Aspectos Prácticos’ 
(2007) 34 Revista Chilena de Derecho 91.  
131 C P Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law International, 
London 1999) 211. 
132 For example, the Preparatory work on the UNIDROIT Principles 2004 UNIDROIT 1998 
Study L – Doc. 55 declared: ‘The Secretariat will in the meantime continue monitoring the 
application of the present edition of the UNIDROIT Principles, with special attention to the 
case law’. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE STANCE OF ARBITRATORS 
 
5.1 PREMISE 
 
The lex mercatoria can be applied by arbitrators on the basis of a 
specific call in the contract and, when the parties have not specified the 
applicable law, on the basis of specific rules that provide such applicability.1 
However, the way in which good faith is applied by arbitrators has not been 
well developed, indicating the need for a strong focus on arbitral awards. 
Since this approach allows drawing further conclusions on the understanding 
of good faith in the lex mercatoria supported by empirical evidence, an 
extensive range of arbitral decisions is at the heart of this thesis.  
To obtain arbitral awards this study has benefited from: Unilex, which is 
a database of international case law and bibliography on the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and on 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts – two of the 
most important international instruments for the regulation of international 
commercial transactions; TransLex-Principles, which is an online codification 
and research platform for transnational law;2 and from other ‘classical’ 
sources of arbitral awards such as the Journal du Droit International (Clunet) 
and the Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards. For the purpose of this thesis, these 
have been accessed in the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and 
International Private Law in Hamburg. Despite this method, the limitation 
derived from the confidentiality of arbitration must be pointed out, as well as 
the difficulty of accessing unpublished decisions.3 However, the awards 
                                               
1 The most notable of international arbitral rules sanctioning the lex mercatoria are the ICC 
Rules where article 17 (1) provides: ‘The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to 
be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such 
agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be 
appropriate’.  
2 http://www.trans-lex.org/ 
3 Even in the Preparatory work on the UNIDROIT Principles 2004 UNIDROIT 1998 Study L – 
Doc. 55 it has been stated: ‘With respect to the case law it is however very difficult to obtain 
access to the awards rendered world-wide which in one way or another apply the UNIDROIT 
Principles. Informal contacts have been established with a view to receiving information from 
the most important arbitration centres concerning the relevant arbitral awards. Results 
however are still far from being satisfactory. Most of the decisions of which the Secretariat is 
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available were collected until saturation point was reached in terms of 
findings, i.e., until no new information – in terms of general trends related to 
good faith – was discovered.4  
The main focus is on international commercial arbitration between 
private parties. However, on a few occasions the awards analysed are related 
to foreign investment disputes, as they may lead – and often do lead – to the 
application, at least in part, of the lex mercatoria.5 
 
5.2 THE INTERPRETATION OF GOOD FAITH 
 
The concept of good faith in the lex mercatoria is understood by 
arbitrators as cooperation between parties.  It implies two aspects:  
- A positive aspect, i.e., good faith, corresponding to the expectations 
of the parties,6 requires them to behave in order to achieve the aim of 
the contract;7  
- A negative aspect, consisting of respect for the other party’s 
interests.8 It implies not obstructing or preventing the other party from 
                                                                                                                                      
aware have come to its knowledge thanks to the personal relations which exist with individual 
arbitrators and/or counsels’. 
4 Cf. R Kumar, Research Methodology (2nd edn Sage, London 2005) 165. 
5 Investment agreements involve state parties and their settlement comprises complex 
questions such as the applicable law including investment treaties, legal remedies and 
sometimes diplomatic protective measures. In addition, there is the possibility, in the absence 
of choice-of-law clauses, to apply rules of public international law to them, as happened in the 
TOPCO case (Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v the Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic) (1978) 17 ILM 1. See the analysis of this case in Chapter Two, n 89. See also R 
Horn, ‘Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investment: Concepts and Means’ in N Horn 
(ed), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes. Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2004) 14. The call for the application of international 
law (subsidiary to the law agreed by the parties and that of the contracting state) is made by 
article 42 (1) ICSID, article 54 (1) ICSID Additional Facility Rules and article 1131 NAFTA, 
among others. In the ICSID practice (Article 42, ICSID Convention) in the absence of the 
parties’ choice an ICSID tribunal applies the law of the host country of investment and also 
the principles or rules of international law. See R H Kreindler, ‘The Law Applicable to 
International Investment Disputes’ in N Horn (ed), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes. 
Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2004) 410. 
6 See A Lowenfeld, ‘The Two-Way Mirror: International Arbitration as Comparative Procedure’ 
(1985) 7 Mich. YBI Legal Stud. 163, 183. 
7 See H Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 OJLS 229.  
8 This is traditionally expressed by the Roman maxim Alterum non laedere, inspired by 
Ulpian’s dictum, now contained in the Corpus Iuris Civilis D.1,1,10,1. Alterum non laedere, 
i.e., ‘not to harm anyone’, is the second of the three precepts upon which the Roman emperor 
Justinian said the law was based. See also honeste vivere, ‘to live honestly’; and suum 
cuique tribuere  ‘to give each his due’. In Collins Dictionary of Law 
<http://www.credoreference.com/entry/5978662/> accessed 27 September 2008. 
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performing the contract and, on the other hand, not to compromise the 
proper performance of the contract.9 In modern arbitral practice this 
aspect of good faith is often cited. For instance in the ICC award n. 
5073 rendered in a case between a US exporter and an Argentinian 
distributor it was stated:  
 
The arbitral tribunal has already stated that California law recognizes an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which requires that neither 
party do anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the 
agreement.10 
 
The cooperative meaning given to good faith by arbitrators is 
considered as a consequence of the influence of national laws, the needs of 
trade and the current cooperative view that permeates contract law today. The 
Vienna Convention embodies this collaborative view. As stated in article 7 (2) 
CISG, the mandate is to look first at the interpretation of the provision within 
the Convention, and secondly (if a gap exists) ‘the general principles on which 
it is based’. The last resort is national law, identified by the norms of 
international private law.  
What are the ‘general principles’ referred to in CISG? 
Reiley identifies the following: 
- Uniformity; 
- Good faith; 
- Full compensation; 
- Equality between buyer and seller; 
- Respect for different backgrounds; 
- Contractual commitment; 
- Forthright communication and; 
                                               
9 In the sphere of not compromising the performance of the contract there is the legal 
institution of fraud in civil law systems. At the basis of the contract there is the financial liability 
of debtors, who respond with their assets. If debtors act, aiming to make their goods harder to 
seize, compromising in that way the performance of the obligation (fraudulent conveyance), 
the consequences of that behaviour can be redressed through the actio pauliana. The basis 
of this action – which pursues the revocation of the act and the reintegration of the assets to 
debtors – is good faith. See L Carvajal, ‘El Fraude a los Acreedores. La Revocación’ (LLM 
thesis, Università di Roma Tor Vergata 2006). 
10 (1988) 13 Yb Comm Arb’n 68. 
 206
- Forgiveness of human error11 
 
All these principles reflect the recognition of what Zimmermann calls 
‘rematerialization of contract law’ or the end of antagonism – to put it in a 
striking way.12 Numerous arbitral awards show that good faith enshrines this 
philosophy. 
In the ICC award n. 2291 of 197513 in the contract concerned a clause 
provided for an increase of the price – which was actually the claim of the 
plaintiff. The clause was interpreted in different ways by the French and the 
English parties. Due to different views, the parties could not renegotiate in 
order to adjust the contract.14 
The arbitrator upheld the claimant’s position asking for an increase of 
the price. The decision was based on the lex mercatoria, because – in the 
absence of a contract in due and good form – the arbitrator decided to apply 
‘the general principles of law and equity, which must rule international 
commercial transactions’. The award expressed three principles of the lex 
mercatoria: 
1. The obligations must remain balanced, that is, generally obtained 
through the insertion of ‘hardship’ clauses; 
2. Pacta sunt servanda;15 
3. The agreements must be interpreted according to good faith. 
The arbitrator in this case appositely declared, ‘This obligation of 
cooperation, which modern doctrine rightly finds in the good faith principle 
which must govern the performance of any convention, is necessary’.16  
This new paradigm in the theory of contract – the cooperative view – is 
essentially embraced in the notion of good faith in transnational law.17 This 
determines that the principle is brought into play, not only as instrumental but, 
                                               
11 E Reiley, International Sales Contracts. The UN Convention and Related Transnational 
Law (Carolina Academic Press, Durham-North Carolina 2008) 75. 
12 See Chapter Three, n 22. 
13 (1976) 103 JDI 989. Original in French. 
14 Regarding this different interpretation, the commentator of the award aptly pointed out: ‘The 
difficulty is that practitioners of international trade belong to both the national group and the 
international community of merchants’. Ibid 992. 
15 ‘Promises ought to be obeyed’. 
16 (1976) 1 JDI 989, 991. 
17 See Chapter One, Section 1.7.4 and Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
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as it appears inseparably linked (or implied) with the lex mercatoria. The link 
between these two domains is clear in another arbitral case: Sapphire 
International Petroleums Ltd. v National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC).18 
In 1958 the parties entered into a contract to expand the production 
and exportation of Iranian oil. The parties set up the Iranian Oil Company 
(IRCAN) to carry out the terms of the contract on behalf on the parties. 
Sapphire International, Sapphire’s subsidiary to which the claimant 
assigned the contract shortly after its conclusion, started work in the 
concession area and subsequently claimed the reimbursement of its 
expenses through IRCAN, as agreed in the contract. However, NIOC refused 
to reimburse the expenses, arguing that Sapphire International had not 
consulted NIOC before carrying out its operations. As a result, Sapphire 
International did not start drilling in the concession area as planned, and NIOC 
subsequently repudiated the contract on the basis that Sapphire International 
had not fulfilled its drilling obligations. 
In September 1960, Sapphire initiated arbitration proceedings pursuant 
to the contract, claiming breach of contract and requesting compensation for 
expenses (incurred before and after the conclusion of the contract); loss of 
profit and the refund of US$350,000 indemnity, provided by Sapphire as a 
guarantee at the time of the contract conclusion and later cashed by NIOC. 
The core of this case, for the purpose of this thesis, stems from article 
38 of the Concession Agreement, which reads: 
 
Under article 38 para.1 of the agreement the parties undertake to carry out the 
provisions of the contract in accordance with the principles of good faith and good will 
and to respect the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement. 
 
This clause influenced the outcome of the controversy in the following 
way: taking into account this clause, the arbitrator decided not to apply 
national law, particularly not to apply Iranian law, which seemed at first the 
logical system to solve the dispute. The arbitrator stated that, ‘Such a clause 
is scarcely compatible with the internal law of a particular country. It much 
                                               
18 (1967) 35 ILR 136. The award was given in 1963 by an ad hoc tribunal. 
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more often calls for the application of general principles of law, based upon 
reason and upon the common practice of civilized countries’.19 
This reasoning meant that the lex mercatoria was applied as a result of 
the agreement of the parties to perform the contract in good faith. 
Traditionally, the situation is the other way round, i.e., because the parties 
agree that the lex mercatoria must govern their contract, the arbitrator applies 
the principle of good faith.   
This impacted decisively on the final outcome: since good faith was 
contextualized in the lex mercatoria, the arbitrator granted the plaintiff’s claim 
on the basis of a lack of cooperation on the defendant’s side.20 The arbitrator 
found that the defendant deliberately refused to carry out certain of its 
obligations and that this failure was a breach of the contract. The arbitrator 
observed that there was a general rule of private law that states that the 
failure of one party to a synallagmatic contract to perform its obligations 
releases the other party from its obligations and gives rise to a right to 
pecuniary compensation in the form of damages. He also ordered 
compensation for the expenses incurred by the plaintiff only after the 
conclusion of the contract and the refund of the indemnity. 
In a third arbitral case in ICC award n. 5904 of 198921 the arbitrator 
applied the lex mercatoria on the grounds of the parties’ agreement. However, 
in doing so legal categories pertaining to national systems, such as French 
law and the law of the US, were recalled. In this case, the general conditions 
of the contract insisted on the importance of delay in the dispatch. 
Nonetheless, it was stated that, ‘it would be inconceivable that the provider 
assumes a total warranty for this reason. Such an interpretation would render 
those clauses as ‘léonine’ (unfair)’. The award finally upheld the claimant’s 
                                               
19 Ibid 173. 
20 This was also the interpretation held by the plaintiff. As evidence, in a letter sent by 
Sapphire International to the Shah of Iran and dated 9 July 1959 it is stated: ‘During our initial 
meetings with the National Iranian Oil Company, we took the precaution of repeatedly 
pointing out that we were a small company and that this was our first venture outside of North 
America. In return, NIOC assured us that, although a small company, we would receive the 
same sincere co-operation and professional treatment afforded companies of major size also 
active within Iran. Because of this undertaking, we entered into the contract and one of its 
most important conditions is that the terms and provisions thereof be carried out in 
accordance with the principles of mutual good will and good faith, the whole as set out in 
Article 38, para.1, of the contract’. Ibid 153. 
21 (1989) 115 JDI 1107. Award n. 4761 of 1987 in (1987) 114 JDI 1012 is on the same topic. 
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position – although it defaulted on its obligation to dispatch on time – 
because: ‘The principle pacta sunt servanda is subject to the concept of abus 
de droit, and to a rule that unfair and unconscionable contracts and clauses 
should not be enforced’. The parties should, therefore, cooperate in the 
stability of the relation and fulfilment of the contract.  
 
Similarly, the ICC award n. 5485 stated (sic): 
 
Whereas the rule pacta sunt servanda implies that the contract is the law of the 
parties, agreed to by them for the regulation of their legal relationship, and generates 
not only the obligation of each party to a contract to fulfil its promises, but also the 
obligation to perform them in good faith, to compensate for the damage caused to the 
other party by their non-fulfilment and to not terminate the contract unilaterally except 
as provided for in the contract.22 
 
Good faith cooperation requires the debtor and creditor to work as 
partners rather than as adversaries.23 This position is effectively embraced in 
arbitral decisions and also in restatements of principles; e.g. in arbitral award 
rendered by the Arbitration Centre of the Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce, 
1st June 2003, it was stated (sic): 
 
Each party must act in a way that does not damage the other party and that the 
parties must comply with this obligation of cooperation that modern doctrine derives 
from the principle of good faith that must govern the execution of every contract. 
Additionally, it has recently been provided by ICC International Court of Arbitration 
that according to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the 
usages of international trade require good faith in the fulfilment of contractual 
obligations (ICC, Award 9593, 1998).24  
 
In two more examples the arbitral tribunal required of both parties a 
cooperative attitude in the termination of the contract: 
 
                                               
22 (1989) 14 Yb  Comm. Arb’n 168. 
23 See the reflections on the ‘cooperative antagonist’ in Chapter Two, n 168. 
24 The case is available at: 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1101&step=Abstract> accessed 5 June 
2011. 
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- In the Wintershall v Qatar25 the concessionaire was deprived of the 
benefits of its investments because, by the time the gas discovery was made, 
the contractual period had expired and the government, on the basis of a 
contractual provision, had elected to terminate the contract.  
This is one of the rare instances in which specific performance was 
ordered. Strictly speaking, under the classical theory, the government was not 
in breach of any contractual duty, but it merely exercised a contractual option 
as a result of which the contract came to its natural end. However, opting in 
this particular way, and at this time, was both inconvenient and 
disadvantageous to the other party and the contractual project. 
The decision of the tribunal recognized the existence of a duty to 
cooperate in order to allow the concessionaire to obtain its contractual 
benefits.  
- Similarly, in the award rendered by an ad hoc tribunal on 3 November 
1977, the arbitrators, abiding by the lex mercatoria in the exercise of their 
power as amiable compositeurs, enshrined the notion of good faith 
cooperation in the final judgement.26 Though the mention of good faith in the 
form of cooperation is not explicit, it may readily be deduced from the position 
of the arbitrators, which supports the idea that during the exercise of a right 
due consideration of the rights of the other party must be held. Here follows 
the facts and the decision: 
The case is Mechema Ltd. (England) v S.A. Mines, Minérais et Métaux 
(MMM) (Belgium) 
MMM was the exclusive world distributor for the products of company 
E. By a contract of 1 November 1966, MMM granted part of this exclusive 
distributorship, namely for the UK and Ireland, to Mechema.  
By a letter of 19 September 1973, MMM terminated the contract with 
Mechema as of 31 December 1973. Thereupon, on 7 August 1974, Mechema 
informed MMM that it would resort to arbitration. 
                                               
25 (1990) 15 Yb. Comm. Arb’n 30. See with regards to this case: N Nassar, Sanctity of 
Contracts Revisited. A Study in the Legal Theory and Practice of Long-Term International 
Commercial Transactions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London 1995) 161. 
26 (1982) 7 Yb. Comm. Arb’n 77. 
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Mechema structured its claim on the basis of a number of the 
defendant’s actions in terminating the contract that would amount to conduct 
against good faith. The arbitral tribunal came to the following conclusion: 
 
Indeed, one cannot deny MMM the right to terminate the contract in accordance with 
the stipulated notice of three months in advance. But to exercise this right in these for 
Mechema particularly difficult circumstances, which became even more problematic 
by the termination of the contract, should be considered as a violation of the notion of 
equity. This entitled Mechema to damages. In fact, an action may be criticized (even 
when devoid of any intention of causing damage) when there is disparity between the 
advantage that a certain way of exercising its rights procures to the owner of these 
rights and the damage which results therefrom for the other party.27 
 
Additionally, in ICC award n. 7722 of 199928 good faith implied that 
both parties should cooperate in the stability of the relation and the fulfilment 
of the contract. Here, the claimant was a French Contractor and the 
respondent, a Client (Country X). 
The parties agreed that the law of country X be applied in this case. 
However, the arbitral tribunal did not mention any particular norm of that 
system of law to interpret the contract. Hence, the requirement of good faith 
was based on the commerciality of the transaction.  
The parties disagreed fundamentally on the interpretation of certain 
clauses, particularly clause 12.8.2, according to which in every instance of 
delay not caused by the contractor, it was entitled to an extension of time 
under this clause and could claim compensation as certified by the client to be 
‘fair’.  
The tribunal declared that the client did not have an ‘unfettered 
discretion to act capriciously or abusively’, but ‘reasonably and in good faith’. 
These terms used by the arbitrator are reminiscent of the new approach 
adopted by the Dutch Civil Code (given substantive reform in 1992) which 
does not use the term ‘good faith’ anymore, but terms such as 
‘reasonableness and fairness’, aiming to indicate the cooperative conduct 
required from the parties to a contract. In the common law, one is even more 
                                               
27 Ibid 80. 
28 (2007) 32 Yb. Comm. Arb’n 13.  
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easily reminded of Section 1-201 of the UCC which defines good faith as: 
‘Honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing’.  
To act in good faith in this case implied an extension of the time as 
necessary to obtain the aim of the contract. The tribunal stated: 
 
In determining the substantive claims, the arbitral tribunal took account of respondent 
having generally refused to grant time extensions or when it did, having made it a 
condition that the claimant would have to abandon its claims for compensation which 
in the opinion of the arbitral tribunal did not meet the standards of reasonableness 
and good faith expected between parties in a commercial contract.29 
 
As in the previous case, the next award illustrates how in many cases, 
though the law applicable is national law, arbitrators do not refer to any 
particular norm of the domestic system but base their decisions on the 
commerciality of the transaction, applying good faith in the context of 
international trade. In an ICSID case, Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH 
(Germany) v United Republic of Cameroon,30 the parties had entered into 
several contracts in the 1970s according to which Klöckner had to supply and 
erect a fertilizer plant in Cameroon. SOCAME, a Cameroonian joint venture, 
was in charge of the operation of the plant, with Klöckner’s commercial and 
technical management. 
The factory was supplied and erected, but after 18 months of 
unprofitable and technically inadequate operation under Klöckner’s 
management, the factory was shut down in 1978. Klöckner filed a request for 
arbitration in April 1981, claiming the outstanding balance of the price for 
supplying the factory. The arbitrators rendered an award on 21 October 1983, 
declaring that the Cameroonian debt to Klöckner was entirely discharged on 
the grounds of Klöckner’s failure to perform the contract. 
Klöckner requested annulment of the award on 10 February 1984, on 
the basis of article 52 (1) of the Washington Convention of 1965. In its 
decision of 3 May 1985 the ad hoc Committee annulled the arbitral award. 
                                               
29 Ibid 15. 
30 Klöckner v Cameroon annulment decision of 3 May 1985 in (1986) ICSID Review Foreign 
Investment Law Journal; also in (1986) 11 Yb. Comm. Arb’n 162. See also Chapter Two, n 
122. 
 213
 The annulment award recognized that the principle of good faith lies at 
the root of French civil law. Nonetheless, the reference to the principle was 
considered insufficient to fulfil article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention.  
The ad hoc Committee reasoned that the tribunal violated article 42 (1) of the 
Convention and exceeded its powers by not applying Cameroonian law – 
based on French law – which is the law of the contracting state. The award 
states that, ‘The arbitral tribunal has relied in reality, not on a principle of 
French law but, on a sort of declaration, as general as it is imprecise, of 
principles alleged to be universally recognised’.  
The tribunal – whose decision was annulled – held:  
 
At critical stages of the project (Klöckner) hid from its partner information of vital 
importance. On several occasions it failed to disclose facts which, if they had been 
known to the Government, could have caused it to put an end to the venture and to 
cancel the contract before the expenditure of the funds whose payment Klöckner now 
seeks to obtain by means of an award (parenthesis added). 
 
The tribunal deduced from this that Klöckner was at fault and in a very 
significant sense bore responsibility for the ‘fact that the funds were spent’ and 
that, having violated its duty of full disclosure to its partner, it ‘may not insist 
upon payment of the entire price of the turnkey contract’. 
However, when the tribunal turned to the Cameroonian counter-claim 
for damages – it requested compensation for all losses attributable to its 
participation in the project, and in the alternative, compensation for 
SOCAME's losses – just as Klöckner's claim was rejected, the tribunal 
dismissed the counter-claim, for the following reasons:  
 
There is no justification for charging the claimant with the losses incurred by the 
government in a joint venture where the two parties participated, or should have 
participated, with open eyes and full understanding of their actions. One could hardly 
accept that a State, having access to many sources of technical assistance, could be 
entitled to claim compensation for the fact that it was misled by a private company 
proposing a particular contract. If this had been the case, the government would also 
have had a concurrent responsibility, thereby excluding the counter-claim. 
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The petitioner pointed out the contradiction in the decision in the 
following terms: ‘Hence, in order to dismiss Klöckner’s claim, the tribunal 
holds that it “could have deceived” the Cameroonian Government, while in 
dismissing the Cameroonian Government’s claim, it emphasizes that the latter 
could not have been deceived’. It is submitted in this thesis that, there is, in 
fact, a contradiction and also, most importantly, the tribunal had no basis to 
state that a government cannot be deceived under any circumstance. 
In line with the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal in Klöckner (on the 
substance), cooperation during the performance implies that, in general, every 
change must be informed to the other party, especially when it entails an 
alteration in the risks, a difficulty in the fulfilment of the obligation or anything 
beyond the contractual provisions. In fact, when the economic equilibrium of 
the contract is modified, each party must be informed immediately in order to 
define the conduct to be adopted. This is an efficacy condition. The 
cooperation between the parties is clearly seen in this situation.31 Here, article 
79 (4) CISG: 
 
The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not 
received by the other party within a reasonable time after the party who 
fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is 
liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
 
In the aforementioned case Klöckner v Cameroon the award on the 
merits (21 October 1983) embraced neither the claim nor the counter-claim of 
the parties, since both failed each other in respect of their duty of cooperation, 
which implies that one party should inform the other party properly and that 
the other should search for the information according to its possibilities.32 
 
An important point, perhaps evident at this point of the study, is that 
cooperation must come from both parties – creditor and debtor. This 
                                               
31 See Y Picod, Le Devoir de Loyauté dans l’Exécution du Contrat (Libraire Générale, Paris 
1989) 123. 
32 (1986) 11 Yb. Comm. Arb. 162.  
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particularity has been highlighted by international arbitrators when applying 
national law and the lex mercatoria. For example, in ICC award n. 7314 of 
1995 the arbitral tribunal made this statement: ‘The contractual cooperation of 
the parties ended in June of the seventeenth year’ and that meant the end of 
the contract.33 
 
In another award, that of 26 May 1982 the lack of good faith on the 
buyer’s side prevented it from obtaining a positive result.34 The claimant was a 
Romanian buyer and the respondent a GDR seller. According to a contract 
concluded in 1978, several labelling machines were to be delivered in the third 
quarter of 1979. The size of the labels had not been agreed upon. The 
respondent delivered the machines with a delay of about 90 days and 
explained that this had been caused by the belated concurrence of the buyer 
specifying his requirements about the machines. The buyer claimed a penalty 
for belated delivery according to the General Conditions of Delivery of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The buyer stated that there 
was no obligation to specify the size of the labels as the contract did not 
contain any express mention thereof. 
The arbitrators, taking into account the long-standing business 
relationship between the two companies and ascertaining that it was the 
practice to put in writing agreement concerning the desired sizes of labels into 
production, decided that such practice can be understood as the recognition 
that the buyer’s concurrence was necessary in order to build the machines. 
The buyer’s delay in specifying its requirements about the machines caused 
the delay in delivery (article 13 of the CMEA General Conditions of Delivery). 
Therefore, the buyer’s claim was not upheld. 
 
Finally, the emphasis on mutual cooperation was also highlighted in a 
case before the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration.35 In March 1983 Egypt issued a tender for the supply of 
5,000/10,000 tons of frozen chicken. Later in April 1983 it issued another 
                                               
33 (1998) 23 Yb. Comm. Arb’n 50. 
34 (1984) 9 Yb. Comm. Arb’n. 103. 
35 Award of 21 December 1995 in (1997) 22 Yb. Comm. Arb’n 13. 
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tender. Both of them were awarded to a French seller. The contracts were 
concluded according to the Egyptian General Conditions, which, in the main, 
provides for an inspection of the goods prior to departure and again upon 
arrival in Egypt.  
The French seller made four shipments under the contract but the 
Egyptian party withheld part of the payment for three shipments and rejected 
the fourth, alleging that the frozen meat was not in good condition. No 
inspection was conducted in Egypt. 
The seller went to the French courts to obtain payment. After an order 
from the president of the Paris Commercial Court and two appeals to the 
Supreme Court, the buyer was required to pay US$1,311,063,27 to the 
French seller.  
The Egyptian party commenced arbitration in Cairo. The French seller 
filled a counter-claim.  
In the decision the arbitral tribunal explicitly declared that contractual 
obligations must be performed in good faith. The tribunal supported its 
position with reference to article 184 of the Egyptian Civil Code.  
The tribunal emphasized that both parties must implement their 
contractual obligations in good faith. Consequently, the arbitral tribunal 
dismissed the claim on the grounds of the failure of the Egyptian claimant to 
abide by its duty to check the goods upon arrival in the harbour.  
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
 
It is argued in this thesis – as a deduction from the several arbitral 
awards analysed – that the role of arbitrators in the development of the lex 
mercatoria and, specifically, in the determination of good faith’s meaning is 
enormous. Furthermore, the intervention of these experts allows the meeting 
of two spheres: national laws and the lex mercatoria. This causes legal effect 
to be given to new commercial usages and yet maintains a due regard for 
legal principles. This is the reason for the success of the lex mercatoria. 
It is also stated here that the creeping codification of the lex mercatoria 
does not threaten the essential role of the arbitrator in the shaping of good 
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faith in a creative manner, because the cooperation-meaning attributed to 
good faith in the lex mercatoria and then embraced by these instruments is 
precise but sufficiently ample, allowing experts to adapt good faith according 
to the needs of the particular case. For example, in one case it will mean that 
each party assumes a portion of the risk and, consequently, each shares the 
loss in some proportion depending on the circumstances of the hardship or 
force majeure;36 in another case good faith means that the buyer should 
quickly settle a new agreement with another provider if the circumstances are 
favourable to do so in order to avoid the extent of the losses. The general 
trend in all of these cases is the accent on cooperation between the parties as 
the way to interpret good faith. 
 
 
 
                                               
36 Force majeure or the impediment to perform is enshrined in article 79 paragraph 1 of CISG: 
‘A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure 
was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected 
to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to 
have avoided or overcome it or its consequences’. It is also embraced in article 7.1.7 (Force 
Majeure) of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION  
 
 This final chapter addresses the answers to all six research questions 
that were presented in the introduction.  
 
QUESTION 1: Is there a system of law called lex mercatoria? 
 
Until relatively recently scholarship distinguished only two sorts of 
variations in the way to regulate international commerce: international private 
law (conflict of laws) and international uniform law (i.e., conventions made by 
national states directly applicable to private legal affairs affected by more than 
one jurisdiction, for example CISG).  
This notion changed in the sixties, if not at general level – full 
consensus on this issue has never been reached – then in competent circles, 
at least, the possibility of a third legal order to regulate international 
transactions started to be discussed. This thesis was built upon this premise, 
i.e., the emergence of a new way of regulating international contracts. The 
research conducted revealed that the twentieth century was, in fact, an age of 
change, where the narrow and inflexible formulae of national laws and 
international uniform law were overtaken by ‘A set of general principles and 
customary rules spontaneously referred to or elaborated in the framework of 
international trade, without reference to a particular system of law’.1 
The lex mercatoria is consolidating its influence in international trade. 
In practice, the business community is embracing it in international 
transactions and it is applied in commercial arbitration. Besides, national 
tribunals have recognized awards based on the lex mercatoria and some 
national procedural codes consider its application by arbitrators.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 B Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law – The Lex Mercatoria’ in J D M 
Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 
1987) 113, 116. 
 219
QUESTION 2: Does the lex mercatoria exist as an absolute separate 
phenomenon from national laws? 
 
It is usually accepted that the lex mercatoria requires national laws to 
regulate certain aspects not considered by that system, such as the validity of 
the contract and the capacity of the parties. 
However, specifically as regards good faith this thesis offered the view 
that domestic laws are the cradle of the current interpretation of good faith in 
the lex mercatoria. Therefore, an investigation was conducted into the 
meaning given by them to this general principle. As a result, the common 
feature of these national legislations with regard to good faith can be 
summarized with the word evolution.  
France and Germany evolved the concept of good faith as enshrined in 
their Codes. France, indeed, has evolved from a restrictive notion of good 
faith to an idea where the obligation is under the influence of the theory of 
solidarism, which seeks to readjust relations that are not equal, requiring the 
parties’ full collaboration in good faith. In Germany good faith has had a major 
development on the basis of section 242 of the BGB, most notably in the area 
of adaptation of the contract – when supervening and unexpected 
circumstances occur – and on ancillary duties.  
England has evolved its position from a rejection of good faith as a 
general principle to its incorporation in the statutory law, mainly due to the 
influence of EU law. Furthermore, evidence has been found in the sense that 
courts already recognize what the principle is meant to accomplish in 
commercial contracts. On the other hand, the US has taken a great step to 
incorporate the general principle of good faith in the UCC. The definition given 
in section 1-201 of the UCC includes a subjective and objective approach: 
‘Honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing’. Scholars from this jurisdiction generally explain the meaning of 
good faith in the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (which 
enshrines good faith in §205) as an objective criterion of reasonable 
behaviour in order to achieve the aim of the contract.  
Some simple examples serve to verify how national laws have 
influenced the notion of good faith in the lex mercatoria: the change of 
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circumstances or rebus sic stantibus embraced in the lex mercatoria – which 
brings about the need to readjust the contract.2 This is a notion developed in 
Germany in the aftermath of the First World War.3 Likewise, ancillary duties 
derived from good faith – e.g. duties of confidentiality and mitigation of harm4 
– are currently embraced in the lex mercatoria, as they were originally derived 
from §242 BGB.5 
Another example is the omission of the legal concept of consideration 
in international instruments, as the same option was previously undertaken in 
the UCC. It must be remembered that today many of the contracts in which 
good faith performance is of central importance once would have been 
unenforceable for indefiniteness or lack of mutuality.6 
National laws are not only the cradle of the current interpretation of 
good faith in the lex mercatoria but, they have also been influenced by this 
concept. To put it briefly, for legal experts domestic laws and the lex 
mercatoria are heterogeneous. The absolute separation of these – national 
laws and the lex mercatoria – means that their formation must be regarded as 
having occurred in two completely different phases. However, it has been 
shown in this thesis that between them there is a perfectly well-defined 
movement of creative transformation in the area of good faith. There is a 
mutually reinforcing influence between the lex mercatoria and national laws 
carried out by arbitrators, by restatements of principles and by uniform and 
harmonized laws – which enshrine the lex mercatoria to some degree but are 
applied in national contexts7 (Fig.1).  
                                               
2 Some examples of the embracement of rebus sic stantibus in the lex mercatoria: the Force 
Majeure and Hardship Clauses issued by the ICC in 2003; article 6.2.2 (Definition of 
Hardship) of the UNIDROIT Principles; and article 6.111 (Change of Circumstances) of PECL.  
3 See Chapter Two, n 133 and accompanying text.  
4 See articles 2:302 (Breach of Confidentiality) of PECL and 7.4.8 (Mitigation of Harm) of 
UNIDROIT Principles. 
5 See Chapter Two, n 130 and 131 and accompanying text. 
6 See J Gordley, An American Perspective on the Unidroit Principles (Centro di Studi e 
Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Roma 1996) 3, explaining the role of good faith 
replacing consideration in § 2-306 (1) Uniform Commercial Code. 
7 Movements of harmonization of law in different regions containing elements of the lex 
mercatoria are increasing. For example, a group of scholars for the harmonization of Latin 
American private law was due to meet the 23rd and 24th July 2011 in Peru. This is the group’s 
fourth working meeting; a more recent one was held in Rome in 2010. Statement by Sandro 
Schipani (Personal communication 7 January 2011). Schipani is the Editor of the Law Journal 
‘Roma e America. Diritto Romano e Comune’; and Director of the Centre for Latin American 
Studies in Rome. 
 221
 
Good Faith in National Laws                                 Good Faith within the Lex   
Mercatoria 
                             
                                                      
          Inter-American Convention  
                                                     OHADA 
                                                     Restatements of Principles 
                                                  
 
 
                                     Figure 1 The conjunction and mutual influence of good faith in  
             national laws and in the lex mercatoria 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 3: What is the meaning of good faith in the lex mercatoria? 
 
The meaning given to the principle in all these spheres (national laws 
and the lex mercatoria) is cooperation between the parties to a commercial 
contract.  
This answer (which is wider than the question) means that a vast global 
event is taking place, at this very moment, in international trade. What it 
amounts to is the meeting of the national laws with the lex mercatoria 
regarding the general principle of good faith.  
The meaning of cooperation given to good faith in national laws and in 
the lex mercatoria reflects a cooperative trend in the theory of contracts today.  
The laissez faire and individualism of the nineteenth century changed 
during the twentieth century. A ‘curvature of the mind’8 occurred in the world 
consisting in an increasing role of government in what were previously private 
affairs of citizens. Also England (even earlier than in other nations) 
experienced this move.9 This trend – which has been called in the body of this 
                                               
8 This is the title of Chapter 5 in Clarence Carson’s book The Fateful Turn. From Individual 
Liberty to Collectivism 1880-1960 (The Foundation for Economic Education, New York 1963) 
71. 
9 Nonetheless, during the eighties there was an attempt to return to political and economic 
freedom and liberty of contract, not only in England but over the Western world. According to 
Atiyah (who fixes the beginning of this new movement of the pendulum with the election of 
Mrs Thatcher’s Government in May 1979), ‘We find the same faith in Adam Smith and the 
operation of market forces, the same distrust of government bureaucracies, the same belief in 
the rights of individual choice’. P S Atiyah, Freedom of Contract and the New Right (Juridiska 
Fakulteten i Stockholm 1988) 6. 
Arbitrator 
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thesis ‘compulsory cooperation’10 or cooperation from above – continues 
today at national level. Moreover, it calls for no great experience in European 
law to see that this tendency – which tends to emphasize the protection of the 
weaker party – is particularly vigorous today in EU Regulations and Directives. 
However, in international trade something particular is occurring: 
Carson’s denunciation, in the sense that social planning reduces the area of 
individual decision,11 has no place in the lex mercatoria because of the 
absence of a central authority and the fact that those governed by the lex 
mercatoria are providing the rules. Hence, they have voluntarily incorporated 
good faith in the sense of cooperation between parties to a contract, limiting 
their absolute liberty in favour of the aim of the agreement and, consequently, 
of the legitimate expectations of the other party. This is explained by the fact 
that, due to economic interests and strategic considerations, traders are 
engaging in long-term contracts, avoiding litigation12 and entering into 
partnership contracts whose aim is to maximize their own capacities with the 
capacities of the other party. The philosophy underlying these contracts in 
international trade is cooperation and this is, in consequence, the meaning 
attributed to good faith nowadays. If the matter is understood in this way, good 
faith ceases to be a discontinuous element in commercial contracts and 
becomes the fabric from which cooperation in transnational law is woven, 
since ‘a contract becomes an essential part of the trading relationship’13 and a 
genuine source of transnational commercial law today.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 See Chapter Three, n 36. 
11 Carson (n 8) 212. 
12 In many cases the parties resort to non-judicial dispute settlement procedures. This allows 
a quicker solution and, at the same time, clears the way for further cooperation of the parties 
in a project or future dealings. Cf. N Horn and J Norton (eds), Non-Judicial Dispute Settlement 
in International Financial Transactions (Kluwer Law International, London 2000); see also L 
Mistelis, ‘ADR in England and Wales: a Successful Case of Public Private Partnership’ (2003) 
6 ADR Bulletin 53. 
13 O Hart and B Holmstrom, ‘The Theory of Contracts’ in T Bewley, Advances in Economic 
Theory: Fifth World Congress (CUP, Cambridge 1987) 71.  
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QUESTION 4: Is there a unified understanding of good faith in the lex 
mercatoria? 
 
Good faith cooperation reflects a major phenomenon in the current 
contractual arena: globalization of commerce and the standardization of 
production and technological progress have made the contract a legal 
instrument of collaboration between parties. The following examples illustrate 
well this assertion: in contracts like factoring, franchising, engineering, transfer 
of technology, turnkey contracts, strategic aligned partnerships and long-term 
agreements – such as oil and gas contracts – the fulcrum is cooperation 
between the parties. The same is true in construction where ‘facilitation of 
contract performance by the other party is implicit and seriously important, as 
is the duty to disclose relevant information’.14  
This has determined that the principle of good faith in commercial 
contracts is generally understood as cooperation, because this notion is the 
only one that fits in with the experience of commerce nowadays.  
 
QUESTION 5: Is the current concept of good faith in the sense of cooperation 
a desirable outcome?  
 
The answer is positive. Cooperation has the practical aim of allowing 
arbitrators to render an award in accordance with the factual reality of 
commerce where the contract is developed. This is a practical aim, which is 
similar to the utilitarian aim that good faith presented in Roman law – where 
the principle was included in the bonae fidei iudicia, allowing the praetor to 
offer solutions non-existent in the civil law. On the other hand, in the Middle 
Ages good faith was linked to fidelity towards the word given in order to 
facilitate commercial relationships based on credit and mainly made by people 
– instead of as by corporations nowadays. During this period good faith was 
essential in contracts between traders to the point that it was said: ‘Bona fides 
                                               
14 C Molineaux in ‘Moving Towards a Construction Lex Mercatoria, A Lex Constructionis’ 
(1997) 14 J.Int’l Arb. 55, 64. 
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est primum mobile ac spiritus vivificans commercii’.15 Today good faith is also 
the life-blood of trade, since cooperation is the essence of today’s commerce.  
 
QUESTION 6: Is the concept of ‘good faith cooperation’ likely to change over 
time? 
 
Considering former concepts of good faith in history, such as the 
practical concept adopted in the Roman process (which allowed the entrance 
of juridical creations, non-existent at that time, through the intervention of the 
praetor), the moral good faith in canon law and faithfulness to the word given 
in the Middle Ages, it is almost needless to say that good faith is a dynamic 
concept. From a dynamic point of view the object in motion, good faith, is 
formed by the propulsion of the needs of commerce in a particular era and 
time.16 Therefore, in order to answer the present question the way in which 
traders are developing their businesses in our day and in the near future must 
be assessed. 
It has been stated in this thesis that the concept of cooperation in 
today’s commerce frequently surpasses the arena of economic exchange and 
enters into a field of long-term strategic considerations regarding relationships 
between traders. Buckley and Casson explain that, ‘When only the immediate 
consequences of an action are considered, it often seems best to cheat. But 
when the indirect effects are considered, forbearance may seem more 
desirable. This means, intuitively, that forbearance appeals most to those 
agents who take a long-term view of the situation’.17 
In practice, long term contracts are common in international 
commerce.18 Some examples are: supply chain management, technology 
partnering, research and development (R&D) and joint ventures. These 
                                               
15 ‘Good faith is the first motive and the spirit that gives life to commerce’ by G L M Casaregis, 
Discursus Legales de Commercio ed de Avariis (Genova 1707) 144. 
16 By analogy with what happens in physics where Newton’s second law of motion states that 
the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the force acting on the particle. 
(Momentum is the product of the mass of a particle and its velocity, p=mv). 
17 P Buckley and M Casson, The Multinational Enterprise Revisited (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2010) 45.  
18 One of the reasons for this is that multinational corporations (MNCs) and their foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in host countries require coordination of economic activities. See G Morgan, 
P Hull Kristensen and R Whitley, The Multinational Firm (OUP, Oxford 2001). 
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collaborative businesses consist of coordinated social systems that encourage 
longer-term commitments which are based on good faith understood as 
cooperation. 
Good faith cooperation is also present in single transactions, as 
contracts take place in a globalized and interconnected global village where 
reputation is important to the point of eliciting cooperation.19 
The reality shows that good faith cooperation is a notion that fits the 
way to deal in international commerce. Because of this utilitarian aim20 it is 
unlikely to change in the near future.  
From a legal perspective, the following evolution of the contract theory 
has been stated:21 from contractual individualism (nineteenth century), to a 
cooperation imposed from above (that is, good faith under the aegis of 
national laws) to the final current stage of voluntary cooperation, where the 
traders are voluntarily assuming good faith in the sense of cooperation in their 
contracts. Since the understanding of good faith as cooperation in our 
particular time in the history of humankind implies that we are part of a society 
in evolution, it is extremely difficult to predict a return to contractual 
individualism in the near future. In addition, society is evolving towards 
cooperative efforts in all ambits of life. Consider, for example, the 
enshrinement by the Brazilian Civil Code (2002) of the ‘social function of 
contract’22 and the Wikipedia’s collaborative culture.23 Following this general 
trend, it is foreseen that good faith cooperation will continue to be embraced 
by practitioners in cross-border commerce.  
 
 
                                               
19 Cooperation has been recently studied in the field of economic and psychological research 
by Dr. Christakis and his colleagues at Harvard. They used what is known as a public-goods 
game for their experiment. It was stated in this study that in the variant where participants had 
some choice over whom they interacted with the amount of cooperation stayed stable as the 
rounds progressed. Furthermore, as defectors were shunned, they change their behaviour. A 
defector’s likelihood of switching to cooperation increased with the number of players who 
had broken links with him in the previous round. Unlike straightforward tit-for-tat (see Chapter 
Four, n 47), social retaliation was having a marked effect. See ‘The Evolution of Co-operation. 
Make or Break?’ The Economist (London, 19 November 2011) 92-3. 
20 See the answer to research question 5. 
21 See Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
22 See Chapter Four, n 124. 
23 J M Reagle, Good Faith Collaboration. The Culture of Wikipedia (Cambridge MA, MIT 
Press 2010). 
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24 All sites have been accessed in July 2011 
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- http://www.camex.com.mx/ 
- http://www.camsantiago.com/ 
- http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
- http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
- http://www.credoreference.com/home.do 
- http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ 
- http://www.fidic.org/ 
- http://www.fosfa.org/ 
- http://www.gafta.com/ 
- http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php 
- http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
- http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.1998/doc.html 
- http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
- http://www.mercosur.int/ 
- http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ 
- http://www.oas.org/dil/CIDIPV_home.htm 
- http://www.ohada.com/ 
- http://www.ohadac.com/home.html 
- http://www.trans-lex.org/ 
- http://www.uncitral.org/ 
- http://www.unidroit.org/ 
- http://www.wto.org/index.htm 
- www.common-core.org 
- www.unilex.info 
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